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. , . SUMMARY OF THESIS 
This thesis examines the effect of the existence of the Iftiited 
Nations upon the Palestine Question, from i t s reference to the U.N. 
by B r i t a i n on April- 2, 1947, to the admission of I s r a e l to the U.N. 
on May 11, 1949. 
I t examines how the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
was established i n the F i r s t Special Session of the U.N., and traces 
i n d e t a i l the Committee's a c t i v i t i e s i n Palestine, the Arab States, 
and Germany. The preparation of the Committee's report and the reactions 
of the d i f f e r e n t parties involved i n the Palestine Question are then 
described. In the Second Regular Session, a f u l l description i s given 
of the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 
i t s a c t i v i t i e s , and the events i n the General Assembly x^hich led to 
p a r t i t i o n being recommended for Palestine i n the form i t was. The forces 
throughout the World behind these events are explored as f u l l y as 
possible. Russian, American, and B r i t i s h policies a f t e r the Second 
Regular Session and the work on Palestine of the Palestine Commission, 
the Trusteeship Council, and the Security Council are described. The 
reasons f o r the c a l l i n g of the Second Special Session, i t s events and 
results are examined. B r i t i s h , American, and Russian attitudes to 
I s r a e l a f t e r i t s declaration as a state are described covering the 
period to the F i r s t Truce i n the Arab I s r a e l i War of 1948, the Truce 
i t s e l f , the Ten Days Campaign, the Second Truce, and the Second Regular 
Session. The thesis concluded with the events surrounding the admission 
of I s r a e l to the United Nations. 
There are appendices on the Iftiited Nations Special Committee 
on Palestine, the boundaries of i t s p a r t i t i o n plan, and population 
s t a t i s t i c s of the plans proposed divisions. 
( i v ) 
NOTE ON REFERENCES 
United Nations documents are refered to by the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
used i n the U.N. e.g. A/C«l/l49 would be the I49th document 
submitted to the F i r s t Committee and A/705 the 705th submitted 
to"the General Assembly, In a few oases, which have been noted, 
the same document appears twice with d i f f e r e n t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , 
generally due to appearing f i r s t i n a committee then being 
re-issued for use by the General Assembly, 
Books are refered to by the surnames of author or editor only, 
except where additional d e t a i l i s necessary to avoid confusion. 
F u l l d e t a i l s of author, t i t l e , publisher, and date and place of 
publication are given i n the bibliography. 
(v) 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. APRIL ZS-MI 15. 1947 
i)The Acceptance of the B r i t i s h Proposal to Establish a United 
Nations Special Committee on Palestine. 
The Palestine Question was f i r s t grought to the attention of 
the U.N. on A p r i l 2, 1947, when Sir Alexander Cadogan transmitted 
the following message from the B r i t i s h Government, to the 
Secretary-General;-
"His Majesty's Government i n the United Kingdom 
request the Secretary-General of the Iftiited Nations 
to place the Question of Palestine on the Agenda of 
the General Assembly at i t s next regular annual 
session. They w i l l submit to the Assembly an account 
of t h e i r administration of the League of Nations 
Mandate and w i l l ask the Assembly to make recommendations 
under A r t i c l e 10 of the Charter, concerning the 
future government of Palestine." 
Sir Alexander added tha t , "In making t h i s request. His 
tiajesty's Government draw the attention of the Secretary-General 
to the d e s i r a b i l i t y of an early settlement i n Palestine, and to the 
p o s s i b i l i t y that the General Assembly might not be able to decide 
upon i t s recommendation at the next regular annual session unless 
some preliminary study of the question had been made under the 
auspices of the Iftiited Nations. Theij therefore request the 
Secretary-General to summon, as soon as possible, a special session 
of the General Assembly fo r the purpose of constituting and 
i n s t r u c t i n g a special committee to prepare f o r the consideration, 
at the regular session of the Assembly, of the question refered to 
i n the preceding paragraph."(1) 
With 11 days, 28 countries had replied to the Secretary-
General i n favour of holding a special session on the B r i t i s h 
proposal. This provided the majority, required under the U.N. 
Charter, authorising a special session. 
1.A/286 
(1) 
The Arab states then decided to enter a r i v a l proposal, "The 
termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of 
i t s independence."(1) 
The f i r s t two meetings were spent on procedural matters,(2) 
Oswaldo Aranha (Brazil) was elected President of the General 
Assembly, His suggestion that the normal rules of procedure should 
apply to the Special Session was adopted. 
The General Committee then held 4 meetings to decide which 
items i t should recommend the General Assembly to place on i t s 
agenda, (3) 
logeidentical proposals were submitted by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, on A p r i l 21, 1947 (A/287 to A/291) 
2. Meeting No.68, Monday 28 A p r i l , 1947, dealt with, 
1. The opening of the session by the Chairman of the Belgian 
delegation. 
2. The election of the Credentials Committee. 
3. The election of the President. 
4. The admission of Siam. 
5,Organisation ( i . e . the acceptance of normal rules of 
procedure), 
6.The election of the Vice-Presidents, 
Meeting No.69, l a t e r on Monday, 28 A p r i l , dealt with, 
1. The election of the Chairmen of the Miain Committees. 
2. The report of the Credentials Committee. 
3. No.28, Tuesday,. A p r i l 29, 1947, at 11 a.m. 
No.29, " " " " " 3 p.m. 
No.30, V/ednesday " 30 " " 11 a.m. 
No.31, " " " " " 3 p.m. 
~(2) 
The Committee consisted of the President of the General 
Assembly, i t s 7 Vice-Presidents, and 6 Chairmen of Committees(1). 
At i t s f i r s t meeting, the Arabs, represented by Egypt, 
apparently thought i t a waste of time to oppose the B r i t i s h item, 
since a majority of U.N. members had already approved i t i n 
p r i n c i p l e by agreeing to the Special Session. Hassan Pasha (Egypt) 
contented himself with the vague objection to "the item as i t 
stands," but did not force a vote. 
More si g n i f i c a n t was a very early statement of B r i t i s h policy, 
Asaf A l i (India) challenged B r i t i s h s i n c e r i t y i n c a l l i n g the Special 
Session. Press reports, he declared, of Lord Hall's speech i n the 
House of Lords, had indicated that B r i t a i n was not prepared to 
accept U.N. recommendations. Since i n the General Committee such 
a challenge was not i n order, and the Chairman pointed t h i s out to 
Asaf A l i , Sir Alexander Cadogan's insistence on replying shows the 
importance B r i t a i n attached to making the B r i t i s h position clear 
at an early stage. He replied:-
" I cannot imagine His Majesty's Government carrying 
out a policy of which i t does not approve...if i t were 
a decision we could not reconcile with our consciences, 
should we single handed be expected to expend our blood 
and treasure i n carrying i t out?" 
At the second meeting, the representatives of Iraq, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, and Syria, were present to sponsor t h e i r proposal. 
Mr. Jamali (Iraq) acted as spokesman. 
I . B r a z i l , Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, 
India, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, U.S.A., U.S.S.R. 
(3) 
He concentrated mainly upon attacking the l e g a l i t y of Jewish 
claims. During the F i r s t World War, Arabs had aided the A l l i e s , 
and had been promised t h e i r independence, i n return. However, t h i s 
promise was superfluous, because President Wilson of America had 
put forward the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination. The Mandate System 
had been intended to lead countries towards independence. Independence 
had been achieved i n Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Iraq, and he 
saw no reason why Palestine should be made an exception, against the 
wishes of i t s people. The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine 
tfendate had been mistakes, and t h i s was demonstrated by Britain's 
i n a b i l i t y to make the Mandate work, Zionism, he declared, was 
simply imperialism at i t s worst. 
Only towards the end of his statement diAWr. Jamali turn to 
pr a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s . He urged that Zionism was disturbing the whole 
Arab World, and jeopardising the status of Jewish minorities i n 
other Arab countries. 
He concluded that, a f t e r 20 committees and 3 white papers, 
a U.N. special committee was unnecessary. The solution simple. 
Palestine should be given i t s independence, i n accordance with' 
the U.N. Charter, 
The Arab proposal found l i t t l e favour, even with Arab 
sympathisers, l i k e Asaf A l i (India), who declared the B r i t i s h 
proposal did not rule out the solution proposed by the Arabs. 
He considered i t would be better to l e t both sides state t h e i r case 
before taking a decision. America strongly opposed the Arab item. 
U.S.A. opinion was that the Special Session had only been called to 
establish a special committee, not to take decisions, -
Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, however, were careful not 
to commit themselves to either side. Russia and Czechoslovakia 
declared that they would l i k e the substance of the Palestine 
Question discussed, i f only to help the proposed special committee. 
(4) 
The other members of the Committee, apart from Brazil 
(Chairman), followed the American lead. The Arab proposal was 
decisively defeated, receiving only one vote (Egypt) against 
8, with 5 abstentions (Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, India, 
and B r a z i l ) . The General Committee, therefore, i n i t s report 
to the General Assembly, recommended only that the Assembly 
consider the B r i t i s h proposal to establish a U.N. special 
committee on Palestine. This report was debated i n 2 meetings of 
the Assembly.(1) 
Mr. EL-Khouri (Syria) and I^r. Jamali (Iraq) made detailed 
attacks upon the inclusion of the B r i t i s h proposal. Both, However, 
were ruled out of order f o r attempting to discuss the substance of 
the Palestine Question. I f r . Malik (Lebanon) then t r i e d to lead the 
Assembly astray by suggesting that some aspects of the Palestine 
Question were more appropriate to the other four U.N. committees 
than to the F i r s t ( P o l i t i c a l and Security) Committee, which most 
members, u n t i l then, had considered the natural choice to deal 
with the Palestine Question. Mr. Malik was unsuccessful, and the 
Chairman declared the B r i t i s h proposal adopted, 
I'lr. El-Khouri, i n the next meeting, spoke i n support of . 
the Arab proposal. He declared some states were eager to vote 
f o r a special committee before hearing any evidence. However, 
when he t r i e d to go into d e t a i l , i n support of the Arab proposal, 
he was again ruled out of order. The Arabs then began to accept 
that t h e i r proposal might be rejected. Hassan Pasha (Egypt) made 
the point that a vote against the Arab item did not necessarily 
mean a vote against Palestine's independence. Mr. Jamali declared 
t h a t , although a special committee xiras unnecessary, i t could be 
instructed to investigate how Palestine might be given i t s 
independence. 
l.No.70 and No.71, Thursday, Mayl, 1947, 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. 
(5) 
Other states then spoke against discussing the Arab proposal. 
Colombia, however, suggested that, although a special committee 
was necessary, i t could be instructed to study the "termination of 
the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of i t s independence." 
Mr. Entezam (Iran) s|i!e;2ed on th i s point, and suggested a vot«.be taken 
on the Colombian proposal, which, i f accepted, could have allowed 
the Arabs to withdraw t h e i r proposal, without complete defeat. The 
President, however, h a s t i l y called f o r a vote on the Arab item, which 
was rejected, and the debate was, therefore, closed.(1) 
The Arabs did, however, muster 15 votes, including the U.S.S.R. 
bloc, the Moslem countries, and Argentina. 
Russia then proposed that the General Assembly hear representatives 
of the Jexjish Agency, before taking any decision. This was debated 
i n the General Committee, but received no support. Instead, no 
objection was raised to a j o i n t U.S.A./U.K. proposal that a l l 
requests f o r hearings by the U.N. be refered to the F i r s t Committee. 
This General Committee recommendation, however, was considerably 
debated, i n 4 meetings of the General Assembly.(2) 
After Russia had again urged that the Jewish Agency be heard 
by the Assembly, the delegates seem to have become absorbed by the 
question of whether the Agency should be heard by the Assembly or 
the F i r s t Committee. F i n a l l y , a composite resolution of Chile, 
Uruguay, Byelorussia, Yugoslavia, and Argentina, prepared during 
the lunch break, between Meetings No.74 and 75, was accepted.(3) 
1. Dr.Aranha's handling of the debate was widely c r i t i c i s e d i n the 
press, mainly on grounds of lack of command of English, but, i n 
th i s case, he seems deliberately to have frustrated Arab aims. 
2. N0.72 to 75, Saturday May 3, H a.m. to Monday, May 5, 2.30 p.m. 
3. A/305 (also c l a s s i f i e d as A/C.l/l44) 
(6) 
This instructed the F i r s t Committee to hear the Jewish Agency, and 
refered other communications to that Committee, for i t s decision. 
A vote to close the debate was taken despite Arab protests, approved, 
and the j o i n t proposal was accepted by 44 votes to 7 with 3 abstentions. 
I n view of the same delegates' l a t e r e f f o r t s i n the F i r s t 
Committee to emphasise the Arab Higher Committee's equal status to 
the Jewish Agency, i t seems that they had simply forgotten about 
the Arab Higher Committee, and intended no disparagement. 
(7) 
i i ) T h e Establishment of Unscop's Terms of Reference. 
The delegates reassembled the following day as the F i r s t 
Committee to discuss the B r i t i s h proposal. Altogether, 11 F i r s t 
Committee meetings were held during the F i r s t Special Session. 
During these meetings, another meeting each of the General Committee 
and the General Assembly were he l d , ( l ) 
During-these meetings U.S.A. policy was to avoid 
committing America i n any way, and also to prevent Russia 
from involving herself. (2) America wanted the proposed special 
committee on Palestine to consist of small, independent powers, 
with terras of reference giving them the maximum possible freedom, 
Russia, however, was anxious to take part i n a committee which 
would have real power to establish Palestine's independence, 
and therefore favoured the inclusion of the Great Powers. The 
small powers generally followed the U.S.S.R. stand, but were 
helpless i n face of the other Great Powers' refusal to serve 
on the special committee. The Arabs lacked an effective plan of 
attack within the U.N. Their f i r s t proposal on the committee's 
terms of reference appeared on ¥say 10, 1947, a f t e r proposals of 
America, Argentina, and EL Salvador. This suggests that the Arab 
states had d i f f i c u l t y i n agreeing on ta c t i c s . Also, when the Arab 
proposal was presented, i t was obvious, by then, that such a 
proposal stood no chance of being accepted. 
f a r the most effective exponent of the Arab cause was 
Asaf A f i ( I n d i a ) , who suggested numerous compromises which could 
not be easily opposed, e.g. by concentrating on the question of 
independence, he forced iimerica into the embarrassing position 
of seeming to oppose Palestine's independence. 
1, F i r s t Committee meetings 46-56, Tuesday May 6 to Tuesday 
May 13, 1947. 
General Committee meeting No,34, Wednesday May 7, at 2.30 p.m. 
General Assembly » No.76 " " ", " 4.45 P.m. 
2. Granados pp.5-6 
(8) 
The f i r s t meeting was taken up by a squabble on procedure 
between Argentine and America, Both presented proposals asking 
fo r the Arabs of Palestine to be heard as well as the Jewish Agency, 
America,):however, wanted Britain's advice on who should represent 
the Palestine Arabs given special consideration, or even to be 
accepted outright,(1) Naturally, delegates were unwilling to bind 
themselves, i n advance, to accept a B r i t i s h decision. Since there 
was no other viable representation f o r the Palestine Arabs than the 
Arab Higher Committee, American tactics appear misguided and 
over cautious. 
Over lunch, after the f i r s t meeting, American and Argentinian 
delegates agreed to amalgate t h e i r proposals, and the result was 
presented to the afternoon session.(2) F i r s t , Johnson (U.S.A.) 
asked Cadogan (U.K.) i f the Arabs of Palestine were represented by 
the Arab Higher Committee. Cadogan replied, d e f i n i t e l y , that they 
were. Johnson then proposed that a hearing be granted to the Arab 
Higher Committee as well as the Jewish Agency. B r i t a i n was s t i l l 
to have a special position i n the choice of other applicants for 
hearings. This l a s t aroused further opposition, and the proposal 
was accepted, following amendment to establish a subcommittee to 
examine applications from other organisations f o r hearings,(3) 
The whole debate threatened to become irr e l e v a n t , since the 
Arab Higher Committee had withdrawn an e a r l i e r application to 
state i t s case at the U.N., on grounds that the Jewish Agency was 
being given higher status by the General Assembly instruction to 
the F i r s t Committee to grant a hearing to the Agency, but leaving 
the Committee application to the F i r s t Committee's discretion.(4) 
1. A/C.1/146 (Argentina) and A/C.1/147 (America) 
2. A/C.1/148 
3. A/C.I/I5I 
4. A/C.1/143 (Cablegram of Mjiy 4, 1947) 
(9) 
This problem was solved by Asaf A l l ' s (India) suggestion that 
the General Assembly should be recalled to accord equal honour 
to the Arab Higher Committee as to the Jewish Agency. In the 
necessary preliminary General Committee meeting, a formula was 
agreed, that "to grant a hearing" to the Arab Higher Committee 
was the correct interpretation of the General Assembly's 
i n t e n t i o n , and t h i s was suggested to the General Assembly, 
where i t was eagerly accepted. Debate had hardly begun, when 
a proposal by fhtezam (Iran) was accepted. The formula also 
proved acceptable to the Arab Higher Committee, 
Rabbi Silver presented the Jewish case to the F i r s t 
Committee at i t s 5th meeting of the Special Session,(1) 
Following a rehersal of promises made to the Jews since 1917, and 
broken, Silver concentrated on 3 points. F i r s t , the Jewish Agency 
would give the committee complete co-operation. Since most states 
were anxious not to become involved i n the Palestine Question, 
Silver's statement was calculated to make the committee appear 
viable, something onto which the problem could be unloaded, 
and, therefore, U,N. members would be l i k e l y to support i t . 
Secondly, Silver urged that the committee v i s i t the ^^^laced 
persons' camps i n Germany. He implied that a solution to the 
Palestine problem might also solve the refugee problem. Again, 
t h i s was a t e l l i n g argument, f o r many governments were under 
pressure to help the displaced persons f o r humanitarian reasons, 
but had good p o l i t i c a l reason f o r doing nothing. Thirdly, he 
attempted to place re s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Palestine on B r i t a i n . He 
declared, "a decisive contribution can only be made by the 
Mandatory Government." This was a real appreciation of the 
l.No.50 
(10) 
s i t u a t i o n , and gave another opportunity f o r U.N. members to 
avoid r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by placing i t on B r i t a i n , and simultaneously 
putting pressure on B r i t a i n to produce a solution favourable to 
the Jewish Agency, 
Mr. Henry Cattan presented the Arab Higher Committee's 
case to the F i r s t Committee's 7th meeting of the Special 
Session,(1) He concentrated almost completely on legal issues. 
The Arabs, he declared, were not against the Jews, but simply 
against invaders, Jewish economic developments i n Palestine were 
not a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a take-over. Displaced persons were a 
World problem, not Palestine's. Jewish h i s t o r i c a l claims were 
false or ir r e l e v a n t . 
On the recommendation of the subcommittee on applications,(2) 
no f u r t h e r testimony was heard, and delegates set about framing the 
committee's terms of reference. Already, Argentine and America 
had submitted proposals, but discussion had been judged premature 
u n t i l a f t e r the hearing of the Jewish Agency and Arab Higher 
Committee.(3) The Argentine proposal was complex, although 
i t contained features which were incorporated i n the Committee's 
f i n a l recommendations, e.g. that the special committee should have 
"the widest powers to ascertain and record f a c t s , " that i t should 
receive "written and or a l testimony,,,from the >feiidatory Power," 
and that i t should report "not l a t e r than 1 September, 1947," The 
r e a l l y controversial features were that the f i v e permanent members 
of the Security Council "should not be excluded," and that the 
remainder of the committee should be chosen on a complex geographical 
basis. 
1, No.52 
2, A/C.1/164 
3, A/C.1/149 (Argentine) and A/C,l/l50 (U.S.A.) 
(11) 
The American proposal vjas much simpler. I t was couched i n 
very general terms, apart from pr a c t i c a l details of organisation. 
I t s most important feature was to name 7 countries as members 
of the committee, a l l of which l a t e r served.(1) Before meeting 
No.50, El Salvador had circulated a vague proposal that the 
committee should produce proposals on Palestine leading to "the 
destiny i t deserves,"(2) This did not survive debate apart from 
a minor paragraph refering to the interest of Islam, Judaism, 
and C h r i s t i a n i t y i n Palestine, which persisted into the committee's 
terms of reference. At meeting iJo.57» a further subcommittee 
was set up to t r y to reconcile these proposals.(3) 
The subcommittee reported to the next meeting, but made 
no recommendations on membership, a question which was postponed. 
The only controversial proposal i n t h e i r report was that the 
committee should bear i n mind that independence was the "ultimate 
purpose" of t h e i r work,(^) Mr Gromyko (U.S.S.R.) promptly began 
to emphasise the importance he attached to Palestiae's independence. 
Russia prepared a resolution f o r the next meeting, which implied 
support f o r the Arabs. (5 ) E|y emphasising that the committee 
should investigate "on the spot" he implied that the committee 
should not v i s i t the displaced persons' camps, a v i t a l element 
i n the Jewish case. The proposal further declared that the 
committee should prepare proposals f o r establishing, '"without 
delay, the independent state of Palestine." Asaf A l i (India) 
r e a l i s i n g that i f the committee were instructed to prepare plans 
fo r the independence of Palestine, i t implied rejection of p a r t i t i o n , 
t r i e d to preserve the Russian principle by incorporating the Russian 
proposal with the subcommittee's, i n a further proposal.(6) 
1 . Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, 
and Uruguay, 
2 . A/C.I/I56 
3 . Argentine, Australia, China, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Russia, 
B r i t a i n , America, Canada, and Czechoslovakia. 
J^.A/C.l/165 
5 . A/C,1/166 
6. A/C.I/I67 
(12) 
The Philippines then produced a prac t i c a l d r a f t of 
terms of reference, leaving blank the names of the members.(1) 
I t was only at t h i s point, that Iraq produced the f i r s t Arab 
proposal, (2) This emphasised that independence for Palestine 
was the commission's "primary purpose," and that i t should 
consider the effect of i t s proposals on the Mddle East as a 
v;hole. This proposal came too l a t e to be taken seriously, 
and obviously better tactics vfould have been to t r y to amend 
the d r a f t , produced by the subcommittee, i n Arab favour. 
S t i l l attempting to produce an agreed t e x t , the subcommittee 
was enlarged to include-'Iraq and Philippines, and met 3 times, 
during the weekend, May 1 0 - 1 1 . I t reported to the F i r s t Committee 
on Monday Ifey 12, but had only been able to produce a text with 
many alternative paragraphs. These were debated and voted 
consecutively, with the exception of membership, which was 
postponed again.(3) 
Chile proposed that, i n the preamble, the words "future 
government of Palestine" should be changed to "question of Palestine'.-
Cadogan (U.K.) accepted t h i s readily, and t h i s indicates, that, at 
t h i s stage, B r i t a i n was looking f o r a xjider solution from the U.N. 
than simple advice on how Palestine should be governed by B r i t a i n . 
The Arab states c e r t a i n l y appreciated the change of emphasis. 
They objected to "question," insisted that there was no "question," 
and declared that the U.N. had only to follow i t s Charter, 
However, Chile's proposal was adopted by a large majority. (4 ) 
1 . A/C.1/168 
2 . A/C.1/169 
3 . A/C.1/171 
k.A/C.1/175 
(13) 
Russia then indicated that she was changing her t a c t i c s , 
i n a manner which might s u i t the Jewish Agency, Poland introduced 
a proposal that the committee should v i s i t the displaced persons' 
camps i n Germany and the internment camps i n Cyprus, where Br i t a i n 
was holding i l l e g a l immigrants to Palestine.(l) This was rejected, 
and the committee received simply the "widest powers." 
There was no objection to the committee determining i t s 
own procedure0 
Panama and Guatemala were not s a t i s f i e d that the committee 
had not been i m p l i c i t l y denied the r i g h t to v i s i t Cyprus and 
Germany, therefore they proposed the committee should investigate 
"wherever i t may deem convenient," which was accepted with "convenient" 
amended to "useful" at Australia's suggestiono(2) 
Paragraph 5 then led to c o n f l i c t , Iraq had prepared an 
alte r n a t i v e , emphasising that Palestine should become independent, 
America obviously did not l i k e t h i s , but equally obviously did 
not want to vote against independence f o r any country, therefore 
introduced an ambiguous motion, allowing Palestine independence, but 
not e x p l i c i t l y unpartitioned, (3 ) France solved the problem by 
suggesting leaving out the embarrassing paragraph, and th i s was 
rea d i l y done. 
Very l i t t l e i n terest was taken i n the religious clause, 
and the simplest version was chosen. 
In paragraph 6, Russia again had an opportunity to emphasise 
that she wanted Palestine independent. The Russian proposal f o r 
1. A/fi.1/174 
2. A/C,1/172 
3. A/C.1/173 
the establishment "without delay, the independent State of 
Palestine," also incorporated i n the Indian amalgamation of 
subcommittee text and Russian t e x t , was pressed by Russia, 
but rejected,(1) Gromyko (U.S.S.R.) then insisted that Poland 
persist with an almost i d e n t i c a l proposal,(2) which was rejected 
likewise. The majority of delegates prefered to l e t the committee 
"submit such proposals as i t may consider appropriate," 
The deadline f o r the committee to submit i t s report 
was fi x e d at September 1, 19^7» and the Secretary-General 
authorised to make the necessary arrangements. The F i r s t 
Committee then turned to the question of membership. 
Since most of the permanent members of the Security Council 
had refused to serve, Argentina withdrew her proposal on 
membership, Norway then t r i e d to interest the delegates i n a 
compromise scheme, but f a i l e d , Russia, however, persisted i n 
proposing great powers. Two Russian proposals and one Polish were 
rejected before the Committee decided to accept an Australian 
proposal to have a committee of 11, not including the 5 
permanent members.(3) Since America had already proposed 7 members 
and Chile 2, {^') Bolivia suggested voting on the 9» and they were 
accepted. Australia and India were voted i n , i n preference 
to Philippines and Siam, to complete the 11. 
Fin a l l y , a vote was taken on the Committee's recommendations 
as a whole. Of the Arab states, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon abstained. 
Malik (Lebanon) explained his country did not want to be associated 
i n any way with the report. The other Arab states voted against i t . 
The report was therefore approved by 39 votes to 3» with 10 
abstentions. 
1, A/C.1/166 and A/C.l/167 
2, A/C,1/17^ 
3, A/C.l/li*9 (Argentine), A/C.1/177 and alternative (Russia), 
A/C.1/166 (Poland), and A/C,1/178 (Australia), 
4, A/C.l/ (America) and A/C.l/180 (Chile), 
(15) 
The delegates reconvened the next day as the General 
Assembly to give the report of the F i r s t Committee f u l l authority 
as a General Assembly resolution. No change of attitude was 
expected, Iraq and Syria restated t h e i r previous positions, 
emphasising that Palestine should be made an independent state. 
However, Gromyko (U.S.S.R.), a f t e r his early attempts to get 
Palestine's independence wr i t t e n into the Commission's terms 
of reference had f a i l e d , began a fresh approach. He described 
his i d e a l solution as a sort of bi-national state, "independent, 
dual, homogenous, Arab-Jewish," but, i f relations between Arabs 
and Jews were so bad as to make t h i s impossible, then p a r t i t i o n 
might be the best solution. This statement indicates that the 
Russians had decided, at t h i s time, that t h e i r main aim, the removal 
of the B r i t i s h presence i n Palestine, might be better served 
by supporting p a r t i t i o n than by supporting the Arab demands f o r 
immediate independence as a unitary state. 
The gaining of Russian support was a great step forward for 
the Jewish Agency, but does not seem to have been the result of 
t h e i r diplomacy. Instead, i t seem to have come as a complete 
surprise. ( 1 ) 
In the f i n a l vote, most of the abstainers decided, presumeably 
on t h e i r governments' instructions, to vote f o r the resolution, 
Lebanon and Syria decided to vote against. The f i n a l vote therefore, 
was 45 i n favour, 7 against, and 1 abstention (Siam). The 7 
votes against were the Arab states plus Afghanistan and Turkey.(2) 
1 . Horowitz Chapter Zk 
2. For the terms of reference, including a l i s t of members, see 
App.I 
(16) 
iii)Reactions to the Establishment of Uhscop, 
The reaction of the Jewish Agency to the establishnnnt of 
Oiscop, as the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
quickly became known, was to make a f i r m decision to f i g h t for 
p a r t i t i o n . U n t i l t h i s time i t had been possible f o r the Agency 
to avoid committing i t s e l f completely, although i t had produced 
a p a r t i t i o n plan for discussion i n London, at the end of 19^. 
However, at the U,N. i t was necessary to make d e f i n i t e proposals 
which would be brought to the attention of the whole World. At 
a meeting of the JewiHh Agency Executive, Aubrey Eban and David 
Horowitz were nominated liason o f f i c e r s to Uhscop, and Moshe 
Shertok, the head of the Agency P o l i t i c a l Department, gave 
them clear instructions "to work fo r the establishment of a Jewish 
state i n a suitable area of Palestine."(1) By Unscop's f i r s t 
meeting. May 26, 19^7» the Agency had offered f u l l co-operation 
and had formally applied to establish liason. (2 ) 
The Agency was optimistic, but realised a hard struggle lay 
ahead. Ben Gurion, i n the Vaad Leumi on May 22, spoke at length of 
the "moral and p o l i t i c a l value of the Soviet Union's approach to 
the dual problem of the Jewish people and Palestine." However, 
he warned against undue reliance on the words of statesmen.(3) 
In the Agency Executive meeting, Shertok was likewise cautious. 
"The decision,"he said, "to exclude the big powers d i r e c t l y was 
taken i n Committee a f t e r a long debate i n the General Assembly, 
But t h e i r influence w i l l , no doubt, be evident behind the scenes,"(^) 
The decision to work f o r p a r t i t i o n had one great advantage; 
i t was the policy favoured by Chaim Weizmann, therefore the Agency 
Could r e l y on his influence and prestige. Of course, Weizmann had 
1. Horowitz p.159 
2. Times May 27, 19^7, and Unscop Report, Vol . 1 , p.^, para.30 
3 . Times May 23, 19^7 
4. Horowitz p.159 
(17) 
been i n the p o l i t i c a l wilderness ever since the V/orld Zionist 
Congress at Basel, but t h i s did not prevent the Agency using 
his services or Weizmann rendering v i t a l aid to the Zionist 
cause. Indeed, at times, Weizmann being o f f i c i a l l y a private 
i n d i v i d u a l was an advantage. The Agency could present the most 
extreme demands, which were r e a l l y bargaining counters, against 
which Weizmann could present, as a moderate compromise, the maximum 
they r e a l l y hoped f o r . The r i g h t tactics to follow seem to have 
caused some confusion at f i r s t i n the Zionist Organisation.(1) 
In f a c t , Ben Gurion made public that the Agency would accept 
p a r t i t i o n , i n a speech to the Vaad Leumi , (2) Silver promptly 
telegraphed a "strongly worded rebuke," and Ben Gurion was 
severely c r i t i c i s e d i n the Palestine Jewish press. Finally, 
\ihen the Agency Executive met on May 26, he was severely 
"reprimanded." Altogether, the Jews took considerable trouble 
to give the impression that p a r t i t i o n would not necessarily be 
welcome,(3) 
Agency decisions, of course, did not bind Irgun or Stern 
Gang. Begin of the I.Z.L. p a r t i c u l y believed i n a Jewish state 
A 
incorporating the whole of the o r i g i n a l mandated Palestine, 
including Transjordan, On May 15, 1947» when i t was obvious Unscop 
would be established, the New York Herald 'Tribune carried a f u l l 
page advertisement f o r funds for t e r r o r i s t s . Begin ignored resolutions 
of the U.N. of May 15 and the Vaad Leumi of 22, condemning 
terrorism. However, his a t t i t u d e to Unscop i s contradictory. 
While denying charges that his a c t i v i t i e s a f t e r May 15 were designed 
to a t t r a c t Unscop's attention, he appeared to be very proud of the 
meeting he arranged with the Iftiscop Chairman, 8 days after IMscop's 
a r r i v a l . ( 4 ) 
1 . Weisgal and Carmichael p.297, Eban states that "responsibility 
o s c i l l a t e d between Ben Gurion i n Jerusalem and Silver i n 
New York." 
2 . Times May 23, 19^7, reporting May 22 . 
3 . Times May 27, 19^7 
4 . Begin pp.293-4 
(18) 
Unlike the Jewish Agency, the establishment of Unscop was 
the signal for a major dispute among the Arabs. The Arab Higher 
Committee announced, on June 19, that i t would boycott Ifriscop. 
No Palestinian Arab was to discuss any p o l i t i c a l matter with any 
member of Itoscop, None was to take up a position with Unscop 
except as a result of being employed on Government s e ^ i c e . When 
Uhscop arrived, the Committee organised a 15 hour protest s t r i k e , 
and the Mufti issued a statement, i n the most extreme terms, 
c a l l i n g on Arabs to unite against invaders. Later, r a l l i e s vjere 
organised at Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, protesting against 
Zionist immigration. The Arab League, however, after a 
preliminary statemant declaring Uhscop established contrary to 
the U.N. Charter, 11 days l a t e r declared they would co-operate 
with Unscop^. 
The motives of the Arab League appear quite understandable. 
They had fought, both against Unscop being established, and against 
Uhscop's terms of reference. However, once Uhscop had been 
established, i f the Arab case were not put to i t , then the Unscop 
Report would inevitably be very strongly biassed towards the Jews, 
for Unscop would have a choice of producing a report which sa t i s f i e d 
Jews only, or nobody. The Arab Higher Committee does not seem 
to have appreciated t h i s , or considered i t i r r e l e v a n t . The best 
explanation of the Committee's action may be that the I & f t i saw a 
settlement coming as a result of Arab pressure on B r i t a i n . 
Zionist success seemed associated with Zionist terrorism. However, 
by early 19^7, the l ^ u f t i must have been f a i r l y confident that the 
Arabs could put on the same sort of pressure, f o r he had managed 
u 
to co-ordinate the a c t i v i t i e s of his o\m group (Al Puta(wwah) with 
Al Najjadah and the Moslem Brotherhood. By Unscop's departure, 
Arab terrorism had become a real problem.(1) 
l.Hurewitz p.29^ 
(193 
The Palestine Government did not welcome the establishment 
of Unscop, but was not i n a position to refuse them entry. Neither 
did they want to be involved i n defending the B r i t i s h record. 
They, therefore, received Unscop p o l i t e l y , t r i e d to r e s t r i c t 
themselves to giving factual information, and at the same time 
t r i e d to demonstrate that they alone held pox*er i n Palestine, 
They objected to Unscop's request f o r them to appoint a liason 
o f f i c e r , w i t h i n the meaning of Unscop's rules of procedure, 
because thgy objected to being placed on the same lev e l as the 
Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee, which was a possible 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Unscop's rules. Also, they were not prepared 
to bind themselves to "supply such information or render such 
assistance as the Committee may require," which was the duty of 
the liason o f f i c e r s , specified i n Iftiscop's rules. However, j u s t 
before Unscop l e f t Palestine, the Palestine Government declared that 
t h e i r liason o f f i c e r , MacGillivray, was a liason o f f i c e r within 
the meaning of Unscop's rules of procedure, and, at a farewell 
party the High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham stated his views 
regarding a solution. 
During most of Uhscop's stay i n Palestine, however, there was 
i l l - f e e l i n g between Unscop and the Palestine Government, The 
pro-Jewish delegates, Granados (Guatemala) and Fabregat (Uruguay) 
became most unpopular, but the pro-Arab Abdur Rahmans pointed 
remarks and persistent questioning annoyed Sir Henry Gurney. 
Fi n a l l y , relations became very strained during the death sentence 
question. 
(20) 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE UNSCOP INVESTIGATION, MY 15-SEPTEI-lBER 1. 19^7. 
i ) Unscop at Lake Success, 
At the request of the General.Assembly, the Secretary-
General nominated f o r Unscop a secretariat of nearly 60. In 
charge was Dr. Hoo, an experienced diplomat, formerly Chinese 
minister to Switzerland, a l i n g u i s t p r o f i c i e n t i n French, English, 
Russian, and German, as w e l l as Chinese, He held the post of 
Assistant Secretary-General i n charge of Trusteeship, on which 
he was considered an authority. How far he influenced Uncop's 
work i s d i f f i c u l t to estimate. He was always discrete, and 
seldom ventured an opinion, but he was continually seen with 
Sandstrom (Unscop Chairman), whom he accompanied on his meetings 
with Begin, Haganah, and Abdullah, 
Hoo was supported by his pri n c i p a l secretary. Dr. Alphonso 
Garcia Robles, a Mexican lawyer. Director, General P o l i t i c a l 
Division, Department of Security Council A f f a i r s , who seems to 
have kept s t r i c t l y to routine business, and his aide. Dr. Ralph 
Bunche. Bunche probably had more influence on the shape of the 
Unscop report than any other member of the Secretariat, and 
possibly more than some members o^ Unscop. He i d e n t i f i e d the 
Jewish struggle with his own e f f o r t s to overcome r a c i a l prejudice 
against himself as a negro, took a considerable part i n the 
preparation of the Report, and earned the highest praise from 
Jewish writers.(1) He x*as also chairman of the subcommittee 
dealing with Unscop's tour of Palestine, and his sympathetic 
at t i t u d e must have helped the Jews impress Unscop. 
I.Horowitz pp. 159 and 176 
(21) 
By Unscop's f i r s t meeting, the Secretariat had prepared a 
"Working Documentation on Palestine," containing general information 
and the most important documents dealing with previous attempts 
at a solution. 
Uhscop met, f o r the f i r s t time, on Monday May 26, 19^7, 
at Lake Success. The Secretary-General presided, but only 5 
delegates. Hood (Australia), Rand (Canada), Granados (Guatemala), 
Entezam ( I r a n ) , and Sandstrom (Sweden), were able to attend. 
Fabregat (Uruguay) had been called to Montevideo, and the rest had 
not arrived. The Secretary-General's speech of welcome was heard 
i n public session, then the Committee went int o private session 
to discuss i t s future work. Since only 5 members were present, 
election of o f f i c e r s and adoption of rules of procedure was 
postponed, but a Preparatory Working Group was formed to work 
out proposals on various organisational details for the consideration 
of the f u l l Committee. This group met 3 times i n the Einpire State 
Building, and produced provisional rules of procedure, which were 
adopted at the second meeting, on June?:2, 1947. Also at t h i s 
meeting, ru l e 31, concerning liason o f f i c e r s , was communicated to 
the Jewish Agency, Arab Higher Committee, and the Palestine 
Government, Unscop's f i r s t press release was authorised, 
i n v i t i n g organisations which wished to give evidence to the 
Committee i n New York to submit statements i n w r i t i n g , on the 
basis of i^hich hearings might be granted,(1) Finally, a plan of 
work was adopted, Unscop would f i r s t , a f t e r a r r i v i n g i n Palestine, 
request the Palestine Government to provide factual information, 
then the Je\>dsh and Arab liason of f i c e r s would be asked to comment 
upon i t . Next would follow a b r i e f survey of the country, and 
l a s t would come hearings of witnesses. 
l , I n the end, no hearing was granted i n New York, 
(22) 
The f i r s t disagreement arose over the election of Unscop's 
Chairman. Sandstrom (Sweden) had been i n Stockholm when 
nominated to Unscop, and had planned to f l y direct to Palestine, 
but "several friends" of Granados (Guatemala) had suggested that 
Granados should be Chairman, and "a move began i n that direction. 
Professor Fabregat of Uruguay had l e f t word for Roberto Fontaina, 
one of the Uruguayan delegates, to propose my name. Dr. B r i l e j 
supported suppoaited t h i s move," therefore, B r i t a i n and America 
caused "a high U.N. o f f i c i a l to wire him (Sandstrom) to a l t e r his 
plans and hasten at once to New York so that he would be present 
at the voting and insure his election, 'Shortly before the second 
meeting. Dr. Hoo i n v i t e d a l l the delegates, save Granados, B r i l e j , 
and Fontaina, to lunch, over which they agreed to support Sandstrom, 
Granados, therefore, was outvoted,(1) Granados did not even 
become Vice-Chairman, t h i s , probably to s a t i s f y the Latin American 
bloc, went to Dr. Ulloa (Peru). The Vice-Chairman, however, had 
l i t t l e power, and Dr. Ulloa i n the end did not even go to Palestine 
but delegated a l l his duties to his alternate. Dr. Garcia Salazar. 
Disagreement continued. Certain delegates had informed 
the press that Unscop was to v i s i t the displaced persons' camps 
i n Germany and Austria. Since Uhscop l a t e r did v i s i t the camps, 
i t i s probable that'most delegates were then i n favour of a v i s i t , 
but the question was shelved, because a decision to v i s i t the camps 
would have been interpreted by the Arabs as a recognition of the 
v a l i d i t y of the Jewish case. This would certainly have destroyed 
a l l hope of Arab co-operation i n Palestine, which was already very 
much i n doubt. 
1.Granados pp.13-15 Although Granados was inclined to 
over-dramatise events, t h i s account i s consistent with 
a c t i v i t i e s of Unscop l a t e r . 
Another question which caused disagreement was whether 
to contact any of the t e r r o r i s t s . Hood (Australia) had contacted 
underground movements as a delegate to the recent Balkan Commission, 
but he refused to reveal his methods. In the end, each delegate 
was l e f t to make arrangements as he thought f i t , although 
Sandstrom made i t clear he agreed with contact, i n principle. 
The delegates also decided to make private arrangements for travel 
to Palestine. Most wanted to break t h e i r journey i n London, but 
Ehtzam (Iran) protested at what might appear an o f f i c i a l v i s i t 
suggesting bias i n B r i t i s h favour. 
(24) 
ii)Unscop's Early Work i n Palestine, June 14-June 17. 1947 
At f i r s t the Palestine Government considered housing Unscop 
i n the Y.M.C.A. building opposite the King David Hotel, and 
within the security area closely guarded by B r i t i s h troops. 
However, the Government f i n a l l y decided that U.N. representatives 
should not need m i l i t a r y protection, and housed them i n Kadimah 
House, a new building i n the Jewish area of Rehavia, which had 
been intended as police accommodation. Three Arab policement were 
provided as guards. The choice of location and police was a t a c i t 
admission by the Government that i t considered Uhscop could 
expect more trouble from Arabs than Jews. However, the 
Government decided that Unscop's meetings should be held inside 
the security area i n the Y.M.C.A. 
An advance party of the Secretariat arrived on June 5, 1947, 
and Sandstrom, who had decided to f l y direct to Palestine, arrived 
with 2 others on June 14, He was met by the Chief Secretary of the 
Government, Sir Henry Gurney, and he informed the press that Lhscop 
would tour Palestine, v i s i t i n g both Jewish and Arab areas "to get 
the f e e l of the land and the background of the si t u a t i o n . " He 
l a t e r v i s i t e d the High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, with 
Dr. Hoo and Dr. Robles. The remainder of Unscop arrived on June 15, 
and t h e i r f i r s t o f f i c i a l meeting i n Palestine(l) was on June l 6 . 
At t h i s meeting was read a telegram from the Secretary-General 
informing the Committee that the Arab Higher Committee was 
refusing to co-operate with Unscop. The delegate/ do not at f i r s t 
seem to have taken t h i s very seriously, after a l l , the Committee 
had made a great show of refusing to give evidence to the Special 
l.No.5 
(25) 
Session, but had relented a f t e r a suitable formula had been 
devised to s a t i s f y t h e i r d i g n i t y . Sandstrom was authorised 
to appeal over Jerusalem Radio f o r f u l l co-operation from 
" a l l elements of the population." He also asked fo r Uhscop 
to be sent written statements and requests f o r hearings 
from interested parties. The Arab Higher Committee, however, 
never weakened, and on July 8, Unscop sent the Committee 
secretary a further appeal for co-operation. This was 
immediately rejected. ( 1 ) 
&t Unscop's f i r s t meeting i n Palestine, the most 
controversial matter was whether the meeting withtthe Palestine 
Government, decided upon i n t h e i r plan of work, should take place 
i n camera. The Government had announced that they would meet 
Unscop i n camera, to the press, on May 29, 19^7. However, th i s 
had never been mentioned i n New York, and most delegates were 
s t i l l unaware of t h i s statement u n t i l the f i r s t Palestine 
meeting. Granados, however, produced a copy of the Palestine 
Post, which indicated that Sandstrom had made an unauthorised 
press release on June l 6 , that Unscop would meet the Government 
i n camera. Sandstrom was embarrassed. Most delegates would 
have prefered a public hearing. However, since private hearings 
had been promised to a l l who requested them, and there was no 
way of compelling the Government to a public session, Unscop 
gave i n . Uhscop did announce, however, that i t prefered public 
hearings, and did not approve the Governmenifs desire for a private 
hearing. At the press conference, Sandstrom had d i f f i c u l t y 
explaining that the Palestine Government was not di c t a t i n g 
Uhscop's procedure. 
l.For the text of the exchange of l e t t e r s between Unscop and 
the Committee see Unscop Report, V o l , I I , p.6. Annex 7 and 8 . 
(26) 
In i t s o r i g i n a l plan of work, Unscop had decided to ask 
the Palestine Government f o r "factual information on i t s 
constitution and functions, together with other relevant data." 
However, when Ihscop reached Palestine, the Palestine Government 
presented them with copies of the "Survey of Palestine," which 
had been prepared f o r the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 
1945-6, plus a supplement bringing the information up to 1947, 
prepared specially f o r Unscop. Altogether, i t was 1524 pages, 
i n 4 volumes. Not s a t i s f i e d with t h i s , the Government, for i t s 
meeting produced a 14 page memorandum on the administration of 
Palestine under the Mandate, Uhscop's meeting with the Government, 
therefore, was to "seek further information," 
The meeting took place on Monday June I 6 . The Palestine 
Government was represented by Sir Henry Gurney and Ifr . D.C. 
MacGillivray, t h e i r liason o f f i c e r . Sir Henry began with an 
outline of Palestine's constitution and administration. He was 
then questioned on d e t a i l , and MacGillivray provided most of the 
s t a t i s t i c a l answers. To dire c t the discussion, Sandstrom had 
prepared a l i s t of questions, directed f i r s t at details of Palestine's 
administration, legal system, education, industry, and trade, 
and seconA.at the extent to which Jews and Arabs had developed 
as separate communities. Most Uhscop delegates were happy to 
follow Sandstrom's lead. In f a c t , t h e i r questions showed they 
had not digested the information i n the Survey of Palestine, and 
most queries were answered by reference to the appropriate volume, 
chapter, and page. However, Sir Abdur Rahman (India) and Jorge 
Garcia Granados (Guatemala) asked verijpointed questions. 
Rahman questioned Gurney closely on the numbers of the 
native population which had obtained positions of authority, 
explaining he was j u s t t r y i n g to f i n d out how far Bri t a i n had 
(27) 
carried out the League of Nations Mandate. Gurney refused to be 
drawn int o damaging admissions, as Rahman's questions were 
obviously intended. Granados went further than simple cross-
examination, but t r i e d to c a l l into question the r i g h t of the 
Palestine Government to make laws regulating Jevrish immigration, 
but his questioning was cut short by Sandstrora, The meeting was 
closed when i t became obvious that further discussion was pointless 
u n t i l the delegates had digested a l l the material already 
available to them. 
The following afternoon, Unscop heard Moshe Shertok, 
Head of the P o l i t i c a l Department of the Jewish Agency, and 
the Agency liason o f f i c e r , David Horowitz, give evidence. 
Although the meeting was scheduled only to obtain information 
from the Agency, Sandstrom i n v i t e d Agency comments on the Palestine 
GovernxnentJs publications, available to Uhscop. Shertok then gave 
his appreciation of the s i t u a t i o n , and then he and Horowitz answered 
questions. The content of Shertok's speech indicates that, at t h i s 
stage, the Agency was being careful to appear reasonable, and 
concentrated on f a c t s . However, i m p l i c i t i n i t was a Jewish 
claim to a l l Palestine which would have a Jevdsh majority i f 
Jews were allowed to enter Palestine freely./ He also touched 
on Jews^ h i s t o r i c a l claims to land, even beyond Palestine, 
including TransJordan, emphasised Jewish achievements i n Palestine, 
and stressed that Jewish economic developments, and Jewish 
immigration, brought benefits to the whole community, including 
Arabs. F i n a l l y , he sought to prove that Palestine could absorb 
a l l Jews who wished to come. 
At t h i s point again, most delegates remained uncommitted, 
but Rahman took great pains to force Shertok to admit that laws 
(28) 
r e s t r i c t i n g immigration were not necessarily wrong, and were 
quite properly applied i n many parts of the World, fiitezam 
(Iran) also showed lack of sympathy with the Jewish case. 
Granados, however, put the Jews i n a much more favourable l i g h t , 
by asking f o r a comparison between the percentage of Jews i n 
the population and the percentage of Palestine's revenues 
contributed by the Jews, 
(29) 
i i i ) l h s c o p ' s Tour of Palestine. 
Following t h e i r plan of work, Unscop next made a tour of 
Palestine. Their i t i n e r a r y was based on suggestions of the 
Jewish Agency, the Palestine Government, a t h i r d version based 
by ELom (Netherlands) on the previous two, and the recommendations 
of a subcommittee of alternate delegates, with Bunche as Chairman. 
Jewish policy was to take advantage of the Arab boycott to present 
Jewish industry, agriculture, and c i v i l i s a t i o n at i t s best, and 
the Arabs' at i t s worst. Unscop alternate delegates obviously 
had f a r too inadequate a knowledge of Palestine not to tbe 
guided by Agency recommendations, and MacGillivray does not 
seem to have opposed t h e i r suggestions.(1) Horowitz managed to 
have the superiority of Jewish industry impressed on the 
Committee by his suggestion, which was accepted, that Jewishhand 
Arab factories should not be v i s i t e d i n equal numbers but i n 
proportion to t h e i r t o t a l numbers. 
In the end more Arab factories were v i s i t e d than was 
s t r i c t l y allowed by t h i s r u l e . However, no modern Arab factories 
were v i s i t e d . Arab factories included the Karaman, Dick, and S a l t i 
cigarette factory at Haifa, on June 19, the Golden Spindle t e x t i l e 
factory at Beit Dajan, on June 2^, the Palestine Iron and Brass 
foundry at Jaffa, on June 24, the Riad building Estate at Jaffa, 
on June 24, the Shaker soap factory at Nablus, on June 28. The 
Jews displayed the Sheraen soap factory at Haifa, on June 19, 
the Alta t e x t i l e factory at Haifa, on June 19, the E l i t e chocolate 
factory at Tel Aviv, on June 25, Goldberg's laboratory for 
precision optical instruments, at Tel Aviv, on June 25, and Weizmann's 
private laboratory i n the Daniel Sieff I n s t i t u t e , on July 3. Jews 
also impressed by the Permanent I n d u s t r i a l Exhibition of Palestine 
Products, v i s i t e d by Unscop i n Tel Aviv, on June 25. 
06) 
Probably the Jewish Agency did not ask f o r Horowitz's 
suggestion to be adhered to r i g i d l y , because i t was v i t a l l y 
important f o r the Jews to impress Unscop with t h e i r agriculture. 
This was because the Jews could only make a reasonable claim to 
unrestricted immigration i f they could prove that they could 
increase a g r i c u l t u r a l production to feed them. However, Jewish 
agriculture was r e s t r i c t e d by l i m i t a t i o n s on Jewish land purchitse 
imposed i n 1939» and the vast majority of a g r i c u l t u r a l production 
was by Arabs. Jews had a more than proportional representation 
i n agriculture, and used i t to demonstrate t h e i r show-pieces, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y where they had reclaimed the desert at Beth Haarava 
labbutz by the Dead Sea, and Revivim,sH.ir Am, and Hsfetz Haim, i n 
the Megev. Other Jewish a g r i c u l t u r a l settlements included Zichron 
Yaakov, I-Iishmar Haemek, Nahalal, Dan, Kfar Giladi, on June 30, 
and Yavne on July 3« Despite Arab t r a d i t i o n a l s k i l l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n c i t r u s , cereals, and olives, Arab agriculture was only 
represented by a v i s i t to the Kadoorie Agricultural School, 
which was r e a l l y a Government i n s t i t u t i o n , and a v i s i t to a 
f r u i t farm run by a Radi e f f . Nabulsi, In Jerusalem, Unscop 
v i s i t e d the Hebrew University, Palestine's Jewish past x*as 
emphasised by a v i s i t to the ruins of Jericho and ELisha's well, 
and, while being shown Jewish agriculture, Unscop was shown 10 
variations on the Jews^special social group, the kibbutz. 
However, Jews were careful to explain that Jews and Arabs 
could work together. Haifa was chosen as IMscop's f i r s t v i s i t , 
because i t was a mixed community. There, the Mayor gave his 
address of welcome i n Hebrew, which was translated into Ehglish 
by the Arab town clerk, and then by a Jew into Arabic, The 
next day Unscop v i s i t e d the Palestine Potash Company, which 
employed equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. Also, a Jew at 
Revivim claimed to Granados that the Atabs were r e a l l y friends 
with the s e t t l e r s , but had been vjarned to stay away by the B r i t i s h , 
(31) 
Everywhere, Uhscop was overwhelmed with Jewish ho s p i t a l i t y , 
which contrasted strongly with the hostile reception from the 
Arabs, However, the Higher Committee's boycott was not completely 
e f f e c t i v e . At a few places the Arab tfayors were w i l l i n g to t a l k 
to Unscop, but at most Arab toims receptions were arranged by 
the l o c a l B r i t i s h representative. Unscop, however, was always 
most unwelcome i n Arab factories, officSs etc. Sometimes 
there was a point blank refusal, at others excuses were made. 
During the whole tour, the Jewish liason officers l o s t 
no opportunity to press t h e i r case. There can be no doubt that 
the impression gained during t h i s tour of an advanced Jewish 
c i v i l i s a t i o n , only capable of helping i t s backward neighbour, 
the Arab c i v i l i s a t i o n , had a great influence upon the Unscop 
Report. 
(32) 
iiv,)The Question of the Death Sentences, 
The most controversial matter, i n Unscop's earliest days 
in Palestine, was what to do, i f anything, about the death 
sentences passed on three Irgun t e r r o r i s t s captured after 
attacking Acre Gaol, on ^fay 14, 194?. The sentences were passed 
on June 16, 194?, the very day on which Uhscop held i t s f i r s t 
hearing i n Palestine, and Jexfish propagandists claimed the Palestine 
Government had chosen the day deliberately, to demonstrate i t s 
strength to Unscop at the expense of the prisoners. 
The sentences worried Sandstrom (Sweden) and Granados 
(Guatemala). Granados met Sandstrom on an evening walk, and suggested 
that they should approach the Palestine Government informally, 
and urge that the executions would lead to disorder l i k e l y to 
prejudice Qhscop's work. They agreed to take advantage of a reception 
to be held the next evening, June 18, by Sir Alan Cunningham. 
Granados was to press his views on General MacMillan, the B r i t i s h 
commander i n chie£ i n Palestine, who was therefore responsible for 
the m i l i t a r y courts which t r i e d t e r r o r i s t s , Sandstrom was to 
approach Cunningham himself. However, MacMillan only replied that 
i t was his duty to administer the laws of Palestine, and that only 
the High Commissioner could grant clemency, Sandstrom either had 
no opportunity to speak to Cunningham, or had changed his plans 
because he had j u s t received a p e t i t i o n from the relatives of the 
condemned.(1) 
The same evening Sandstrom i n v i t e d a l l delegates to his 
room fo r an informal discussion of the death sentence question, 
which implies he was no quite sure whether Uhscop was competent 
to deal with the matter, and an informal meeting where delegates 
could speak more f r e e l y , might be more f r u i t f u l than a proper 
meeting. The problem was that Uhscop's terms of reference only 
l.For t e x t see Unscop Report, Vol.2, annex 10, pp.11-12 
(33) 
covered investigations, and the only basis f o r action on the 
death sentences was the resolution of the General Assembly 
c a l l i n g f o r a l l parties to "r e f r a i n from.,othe threat or use of force, or 
any other action which might create an atmosphere p r e j u d i c i a l 
to an early settlement of the question of Palestine," However, 
should t h i s appeal be ignored, there was no procedure 
recommended for Uhscop to follow to t r y to enforce the appeal, 
Sandstrom (Sweden) had miscaleulated, i f he thought the matter 
could be settled informally. As soon as he announced the 
purpose of the meeting, heated arguments began, plus persistent 
demands from Hood (Australia) that the meeting be made into 
a regular Unscop session. Informal discussion proving f r u i t l e s s . 
Hood's demand was granted, but i t required 3 more meetings to 
arrive at a decision. 
Most delegates considered the question beyond Uhscop's 
terms of reference, but, i n view of the U.W. resolution against 
actions which might hinder Unscop's work, they considered 
Uhscop's opinion should be communicated to the Palestine 
Government. A resolution was prepared with d i f f i c u l t y . 
Granados (Guatemala), Fabregat (Uruguay), B r i l e j (Yugoslavia's 
alternate delegate), and Simic(Yugoslavia) who arrived during 
the discussions, argued that Unscop had f u l l competence to 
c r i t i c i s e the Palestine Government, and wanted to do thi s i n 
a strongly worded resolution. Rand .<Sanada) and Blom (Netherlands) 
were unwilling even to express concern, but were w i l l i n g that 
the Palestine Government be n o t i f i e d that the majority of 
Unscop were concerned. Rahman (India) declared Uhscop was not 
competent to do anything at a l l . Hood found i t d i f f i c u l t to 
come to a decision. He agreed Unscop might be exceding i t s terms 
of reference, but s t i l l wanted Unscop to express concern. 
(3^ )^ 
F i n a l l y , Sandstrom was authorised to inform the relatives 
of the condemned that the question was outside Unscop's terms 
of reference, but the "proper authorities" were being informed 
of the r e l a t i v e s ' p e t i t i o n , and to send a copy of the p e t i t i o n 
to the Palestine Government, with a covering l e t t e r , i n which 
i t was stated that, "the majority of the members of the Committee 
have expressed concern as to the possible unfavourable 
repercussions that the execution of of the three death sentences 
might have upon the f u l f i l m e n t of the task with which the 
General Assembly has entrusted the Committee."(1) 
The reaction of the Palestine Government was immediate 
and h o s t i l e . Without waiting f o r the l e t t e r to go through 
U.N. channels. Sir Henry Gurney sent a reply, based on press 
reports. He declared that the sentences had not been confirmed, 
therefore the matter was s t i l l sub judice, and therefore Unscop's 
comments were inappriopriate. He, further, denied the suggestion, 
also implied i n the l e t t e r , that the sentences had been passed 
deliberately on "the day on which the Committee held i t s f i r s t 
meeting i n Jerusalem."(2) On receiving t h i s l e t t e r , the majority 
of delegates decided that i t was pointless to persue the matter, 
although they did not necessarilty accept Gurney's views. 
1. For the text of t h i s l e t t e r see Uhscop Report, Vol . 1 , p.6, para.51 
2. For the text of Gurney's l e t t e r see Unscop Report Vol . 2 , 
annex 155 pp,13-l^» Gurney sent a reply, a f t e r receiving 
Uhscop's l e t t e r o f f i c i a l l y , i n x^hich he quoted the Emergency 
Regulations to show the case was s t i l l sub judice, informed 
Unscop that clemency was a royal prerogative, delegated to the 
High Commissioner, with which His Majesty's Government never 
int e r f e r e d , and declared that the normal administration of 
j u s t i c e could not be interpreted as a threat to peace. 
For t e x t , see same volume, annex l 6 , p . l 4 . 
(35) 
v)Unscop and the Uhderground Movements, 
The Jewish underground, i . e . organisations which were 
i l l e g a l under the lawssof Palestine, and which carried out acts 
of violence against B r i t i s h soldiers or property, consisted of 
the Haganah, which was r e a l l y a branch of the Jewish Agency, 
and the Irgun and Stem Gang which t r i e d to press more extreme 
demands than the Agency. Evidence i s available only f o r 
some contacts betx-jeen the underground and Uiscop. Since 
a l l contacts were arranged p r i v a t e l y , there may have been others 
unrecorded. 
On June 26, 19^7» Sandstrom, accompanied by Hoo and Bunche, ^ - j 
met Menachem Begin, the Irgun leader, and, about two weeks l a t e r 
met Granados (Guatemala) and Fabregat (Uruguay), Both v i s i t s 
were arranged by American press men. At both meetings. Begin 
declared that a l l Palestine should be given to the Jews as th e i r 
national home, and that the Jews were r e a l l y due to Transjordan 
as x j e l l . He also asked f o r Ifriscop to make representations on 
behalf of the t e r r o r i s t s under death sentence, not only against 
the sentence but against the prison conditions. None of the 
delegates vrere much impressed. Even Granados, who was coming 
to sympathise very strongly with the Jews, considered his 
demands too extreme and impractical, and urged him to r e f r a i n from 
reprisals against the executions, i f they were carried o u t . ( l ) 
However, Begin kept i n touch with Fabregat, Granados, and Bunche, 
i n Geneva, i n August, 19^7» during the preparation of Uhscop's 
report, via his agent Samuel Katz , (2 ) 
The meeting with the Haganah took place towards the end of 
Uhscop's stay i n Palestine. Again, for security reasons, Sandstrom 
1. For accounts of the meetings, see Begin pp.29^-30?, Granados 
pp. 1^1-7-6;, Horowitz p. 178. 
2 . Katz p.170 and p.175 
(36) 
only was i n v i t e d , with Hoo and Bunche as assistants. The Haganah 
leaders presented the same demands as the Jewish Agency had 
been presenting at public hearings. In response to questions 
prepared by Sandstrom, they declared they would accept a 
partitioned Palestine, but only i f i t was a viable state. I f 
such a state was not offered, the Haganah would "do i t s utmost 
to continue Jewish immigration," and would not "permit peace i n 
Palestine" as long as there was a regime there which sought the 
"l i q u i d a t i o n of Zionis^t aims." The Haganah stated i t was confident 
i t could deal with any Arab resistance to a solution which 
admitted Jewish claims, even i f Arab resistance included the 
Arab states, provided that no large power supported the Arabs. 
I t was not worried about danger to Jewish communities i n Arab 
countries i n such a c o n f l i c t , since "one of the f i r s t acts of 
a Jewish state would be to transfer them to Palestine." 
Meanwhile, i l l e g a l immigration was the only way of attaining 
Zionist objectives. There was only peace i n Palestine, at that 
moment, because of Unscop's presence, and the Haganah could 
only I'cppe viith t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y " i f "immigration and settlement" 
were "f r e e l y permitted i n Palestine,"(l) The meeting with the 
Haganah, unlike his meeting with Begin, was discussed by Sandstrom 
with the whole Committee, and made a great impression.(2) I t 
was a strong argument f o r p a r t i t i o n that Haganah could prevent 
peace i n a unitary state and continue i l l e g a l immigration 
against the wishes of an Arab majority, while, with Haganah help, 
Britain, could easily enforce any p a r t i t i o n scheme. 
1. Granados pp.183-88 
2. Horowitz Chapter 2? 
(37) 
vi)The Evidence of the Jewish Agency. 
The Jewish Agency, having dedided to work f o r "a Jewish 
state i n a suitable area of Palestine," made i t obvious i n their 
evidence what t h i s state was to be.. I t was to be the 
recommendations of the Peel Commission, of 1937» plus the Negev. 
Peel had suggested a Jewish state i n the coastal plain and 
a l l Galilee. The rest of Palestine, he considered, should be 
re-united vjith Transjordan, except f o r a few strategic areas 
which would remain under the Mandate, This would have deprived 
the Jews of Jerusalem, However, the Agency seems to have decided 
that Jerusalem, buried deep i n predominantly Arab t e r r i t o r y , 
could not be extracted from Unscop, Jerusalem remained a 
sedondary objective, and the Agency concentrated on the value 
of the Negev to the Jews. 
Agency tactics were to continue to press as hard as 
possible f o r t h e i r o f f i c i a l program of a Jewish State i n a l l 
Palestine, and to represent any reduction of the i r aim as a 
great concession. Any other solution than t h e i r o f f i c i a l 
program, or p a r t i t i o n was rejected vehemently. The Agency did 
not want Unscop to be impressed with Dr. Magnes' idea of a 
bi-national state, which had so much impressed the Anglo-
American Commission of Inquiry. 
Ben Gurion opened the Jewish case, laying the foundations 
upon which l a t e r witnessed based a huge mass of technical d e t a i l . 
He declared the Jews to be a people i n th e i r ovm. r i g h t , who had 
h i s t o r i c a l and religious connections with Palestine. This people 
needed a home because of t h e i r insecurity, due to lack of statehood, 
and being permanent minorities i n a l l countries. Palestine was 
quite suitable, because the land was largely waste, but capable of 
development. I t had been promised to the Jews internationally, 
and, he claimed, quoting the Feisal-VJeizmann agreement of 1919i 
even the Arabs had agreed to t h i s . Home, he claimed, -meani^-
(38) 
had meant a Jewish state i n the whole of Palestine, and he 
quoted several statesmen and the Peel Commission Report to 
support t h i s . 
I'Jhile discussing the Peel Commission, Ben Gurion quoted at 
length i t s views that p a r t i t i o n would benefit both Jews and Arabs, 
and stated that, while at the subsequent Zionist Congress a 
considerable minority had been against p a r t i t i o n i n principle, 
many had been w i l l i n g to discuss a state based on t h i s plan. 
Ben Gurion then returned to the .promises which had been 
made concerning a national home f o r the Jewish people. These 
had been embodied i n the j^ !iandate for Palestine, but Brit a i n did not 
keep them. Instead, B r i t a i n had deliberately obstructed the Jews. 
The worst example was the V/hite Paper of 1939, which re s t r i c t e d 
Jewish immigration and land purchase. Ben Gurion p a r t i c u l a r l y 
emphasised his opposition to the White Paper. 
He then spoke at length on the Jewish contribution to 
the Palestine economy, which he claimed had benefitted the Arabs. 
Fi n a l l y , he turned to possible solutions. He ruled out a 
bi-national state i n any form, s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioning that 
proposed by Hashoraer Katzair, a Jewish organisation, although he 
admitted that they were proposing a "full-blooded Jewish solution." 
This i r a p l i c i l l y ruled out any other version, including Dr. I^^gnes'. 
He then declared t h a t , "Only by establishing Palestine as a itewish 
state can the true objectives be accomplished: immigration and 
statehood fo r the Jews, economic development and social progress 
for the Arabs. 
He emphasised that co-operation with the Arabs was quite 
possible, and that the current d i f f i c u l t i e s were the entire 
(39) 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the ex-Mufti, i n charge of the Arab Higher 
Committee, and concluded tha t , "Co-operation between Jews and Arabs 
w i l l prove the truest blessing f o r both peoples," 
Various x^itnesses enlarged on Ben Gurion's statements. Rabbi 
Fishman explained further the Jew's h i s t o r i c a l and s p i r i t u a l 
connections with Palestine. He emphasised that the Jews did not 
want a theocratic state, because they were "members, not only 
of one r e l i g i o n , but of one nation." They did not want to 
"adapt to an alien l i f e , " and had "only one homeland i n the V/orld-
the land of I s r a e l . " David Horovjitz supported Ben Gurion's 
claim that Palestine was largely waste land, by quoting various 
s t a t i s t i c s . He emphasised that the Jews could develop^ t h i s land, 
and t h i s would benefit the Arabs. Of course, f o r t h i s , Jewish 
immigration i^as necessary on a large scale, and demonstrated 
t h i s with graphs, i l l u s t r a t i n g that Palestine's Gross National 
Product was related to immigration of Jews. Although Jews were 
found i n a l i m i t e d range of occupations, outside Palestine, he 
claimed that they could adapt them.selves to any kind of employment 
necessary i n building up a state. His s t a t i s t i c s showed Jews i n 
Palestine to be distributed i n occupations, i n a pattern similar 
to the average man throughout the World. Horowitz, without 
going i n t o very great d e t a i l , sought to prove the Jewish presence 
had contributed to Arab economic progress, and the reduction i n 
the Arab morta l i t y rate. Mr. F. Bernstein concentrated on Ben 
Gurion's claim that B r i t a i n had deliberately set out to prevent 
the Jevjish national home. He charged B r i t a i n with causing trouble 
between Jews and Arabs and r e s t r i c t i n g Jewish economic development, 
to provide an excuse to l i m i t immigration. The B r i t i s h Government, 
he claimed, had turned the Arabs against the Jews, by concealing 
from the Arabs the fact that much Arab economic progress x^ as due 
to the Jewish presence. He claimed the potential of Palestine 
(^0) 
industries was "nearly unlimitted," and would have been developed 
to a f a r greater extent, but for B r i t i s h obstruction. He 
dismissed the Arab League's boycott of Palestine manufactures 
as innfefective and against Arab interests. 
Mr. E Kaplan gave a f i n a l summing up of the Jewish case. 
His main points were that, "Jewish immigration has created -aew-
new economic absbrbtive capacities," and had "given great impetus 
to economic progress...to the benefit of a l l . " The Jews had 
already established "a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t Jewish economic e n t i t y , " 
and Palestine had great potential f o r development, given large 
scale immigration, which could be financed^international 
co-operation. 
This concluded the main presentation of the Jewish case, 
and the witnesses made themselves available for questioning 
i n the order i n which they had appeared. Various other organisations 
also gave evidence, some associated with the Jewish Agency, and 
some with ideas of t h e i r own, but no representatives of the Palestine 
Arabs appeared. This occupied 7 days, then Moshe Shertok made 
a f i n a l appearance f o r the Agency to answer any questions arising 
from the evidence of other organisations, and to give a f i n a l 
summing up of the Jewish case. 
ViTeizmann appeared before Unscop as a private individual. 
The Agency appreciated the advantage of t h i s , f o r he could put 
the case f o r p a r t i t i o n openly, the objective f o r which the Agency 
was vzorking, but which f o r t a c t i c a l reason^, was much less than t h e i r 
o f f i c i a l demand.(l) Weizraan was, i n f a c t , working closely with the 
l.Weisgal and Carmichael p.297 
(^1) 
Agency,(l) Weizmann appeared before Ifriscop, j u s t a f t e r Ben Gurion 
had been questioned,/for the f i r s t time by Unscop. The timing 
appears to haje been deliberate. Ben Gurion was at his most 
intransigent, which contrasted considerably with the statements 
he had made ear l i e r i n the Vaad Leumi, for which he had been 
c r i t i c i s e d by Silver, Weizmann appeared at his most reasonable. 
When Ben Gurion appeared again, after Weizman, he appeared more 
moderate, though s t i l l more extreme than Weizmann, giving the impression 
he might, i n the end, accept Weizmann's proposals, Unscop, i n 
questioning Ben Gurion, f o r the f i r s t time, was mai&ly interested i n 
a possiblbe c o n f l i c t between Jews and Arabs. This, Ben Gurion 
emphatically denied existed, iVhen he was questioned on what might happen 
i f there was an attempt to impose a Jewish state on the whole of 
Palestine, he was evasive, even to such a d i r e c t question as when 
Rahman (India) demanded, "Would i t not mean war between the Jews and 
Arabs? Let us put i t s t r a i g h t . Would i t not mean an absolutely 
bloody war between you and the Arabs?" ^e was equally evasive when 
asked i f the Jews wanted the U.N. to impose a solution, or what 
sort of a timetable the Jews had i n mind for the establishment of a 
Jewish state, 
Weizmann appeared as a complete contrast. He praised the 
ideals he saw behind the Balfour Declaration, and excused the 
" u t i l i t a r i a n " motives which had inspired many of i t s supporters. 
He emphasised Jewish homelessness, and insisted that only Palestine 
was acceptable to the Jews as a home. He declared, making i t clear 
his knowledge was from personal experience, that the statesmen 
behind the Balfour Declaration r e a l l y meant a Jewish state to emerge 
eventually. For t h i s , immigration was necessary. The Arabs opposed 
t h i s , but only from a natural resistance to change, Bri t a i n had 
introduced the White Paper of 1939 as "appeasement" to Arab 
reactionaries. I t had been a contradiction of the Mandate, and had 
m 
provoked acts of Jewish terrorism, "which are un-Jewish, contrary 
to Jewish ethics, contrary to Jewish t r a d i t i o n . " ^anwhile, 
exclusion from Palestine had resulted i n thousands of Jews dying 
i n the gas chamber. The VJhite Paper was not even a clever p o l i t i c a l 
expedient, f o r Arab opposition to the Jews was only due to "one 
small group of men headed by the M u f t i . " The national home did 
not then e x i s t , and Jewish energy should be used i n building i t , 
not, f o r example, i n dissipating t h e i r energies i n rebuilding 
Europe. The Mandate had been workable, but had ceased to be 
workable due to the administrators' "lack of confidence." A 
solution was needed, which could only be p a r t i t i o n , Transjordan 
had been separated from Palestine, and the Jews had to accept that. 
They also had to realise that they could not have the whole of 
Palestine, Weizraann suggested the Jews should have the area 
recommended by the Peel Commission, plus the Negev, This would 
be accepted by.the Arabs, except the Mufti, who did not matter, 
and could be implemented by moral force alone. In conclusion, he 
admitted that his agreement with Feisal, i n 1919, had been overtaken 
by events. He thought a bi-national state impractical because i t 
was not a f i n a l solution, but he thought some sort of economic 
union of the two states i n partitioned Palestine was possible. 
When questioned further on the p o s s i b i l i t y that Arabs might t r y 
to v i o l a t e a p a r t i t i o n scheme, he replied some Jews might also, but 
he hoped everybody would accept i t eventually. 
After Weizmann, various other witnesses reappeared. Ben 
gurion appeared more reasonable, and said that the Agency would 
consider a state i n "less than the whole of Palestine." Kaplan, 
Horowitz, Bernstein, and Rabbi Fishman cleared up a few points of 
d e t a i l . Then followed evidence by Jewish organisations, including 
the Vaad Leumi, irfhich declared, from the f i r s t , that i t supported 
(^3) 
the Agency p o s i t i o n , the Chief Rabbinate.and Agudath I s r a e l , who 
supported the arguments of Rabbi Fishman, the Jewish Women's 
Organisation of Palestine and the General Federation of Jewish 
Labour who explained t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s to Palestine s o c i e t y 
and t h e i r support f o r the Agency program, Moshe Shertok returned 
i n two f i n a l meetings to answer questions and sum up f o r the 
Agency, He managed t o introduce many nevj items of evidence, and 
informed Unscop t h a t , a t the Second Regular Session, the Agency was 
going t o ask the U.W. t o a b o l i s h the White Paper and allow l a r g e 
scale jJewish immigration. 
Long before the end of the session, Unscop was s u f f e r i n g 
from a s u r f e i t of evidence, p o s s i b l y even t o the extent of 
r e a c t i n g , t o a small degree, against the ever present Z i o n i s t 
arguments. However, t h i s x^ as more than counter-balanced by an 
i n v i t a t i o n t o v i s i t Vfeizmann i n his home. The i n v i t a t i o n was 
proppted by the Agency, and two groups v i s i t e d Weizmann, on June 23 
and 29, Bunche was p a r t i c u l a r l y impressed, but Jhtezam ( I r a n ) , 
who opposed partition...I!could not disguise his f e e l i n g s , " and Rahman 
( I n d i a ) the strongest opponent of p a r t i t i o n , refused the i n v i t a t i o n . ( 1 ) 
l.Vera Weizmann p.21? Horowitz Chapter 27 Weisgal p.2^5 
v i i ) T h e Eyidence of the Hebrew Communists. Ihud. and the League 
f o r Jex'fish Arab Rapprochement and Co-operation. 
Apart from the Jewish Agency's demand f o r Palestine t o be 
made a Jewish s t a t e , w i t h a broad h i n t t h a t p a r t i t i o n might be 
acceptable, and Weixmann's open advocacy of p a r t i t i o n , the only 
other s o l u t i o n presented w i t h any c l a r i t y was f o r a b i - n a t i o n a l 
s t a t e . The Communists clairay t o be presenting ideas f o r a s o l u t i o n 
but t h e i r evidence i s so vague and c o n t r a d i c t o r y , i t i s impossible 
to say they had agreed on anything beyond an e a r l y withdrawal by 
B r i t a i n , 
The Communists gave evidence i n three separate meetings. 
I n the f i r s t , they accused B r i t a i n of holding on t o Palestine f o r 
s t r a t e g i c reasons, p a r t i c u l a r l y Middle East o i l , but they also 
i m p l i e d as a base against Russia. To f a c i l i t a t e holding Palestine, 
B r i t a i n had repressed the people, and d e l i b e r a t e l y aroused 
antagonismebetween Arabs and Jews, on the p r i n c i p l e of "d i v i d e 
et impera," The s o l u t i o n was simple. End the Mandate, and Jews 
and Arabs would f i n d they had no q u a r r e l . As f o r the displaced 
persons, they should be helped t o go where the l i k e d , even t o 
P a l e s t i n e , However, Palestine a f t e r a B r i t i s h withdrawal was 
not p r e c i s e l y described. The Communists considered a s t a t e would 
a r i s e , "independent, democratic, b i - u n i t a r i a n s t a t e , which means* 
a s i n g l e s t a t e i n h a b i t e d and governed by the two peoples, Jews and 
Arabs, having equal r i g h t s , " A f t e r considerable questioning, the 
Communists said t h a t the s t a t e would have an assembly elected by 
p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and they declared, i n t h i s s t a t e , there 
was no p o s s i b i l i t y of a c o n f l i c t between a m i n o r i t y of one race 
and a m a j o r i t y of another. 
I n a second incoherent meeting, the Communists claimed not 
t o have heard of Dr. Magnes' proposals, given i n p u b l i c the previous 
day, and published i n h i s book, "Towards a Union i n P a l e s t i n e , " 
published February 19^7» t h e r e f o r e they could not say whether 
they supported them. Under close questioning, they suggested 
an a d d i t i o n a l assembly, i n t h e i r proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n , containing 
Jews and Arabs i n equal numbers. However, they seemed not t o 
have given a possible c o n s t i t u t i o n any r e a l thought, and Rahman 
( I n d i a ) made obvious his disgust a t t h e i r inadequacy. They d i d 
however, i n s i s t , once again, B r i t a i n had t o leave Palestine q u i c k l y . 
Communists concluded w i t h a new group of witnesses under the 
t i t l e of the Palestine Communist Union. These suggested " t e r r i t o r i a l 
f e d e r a l i s m , " and then a f t e r B r i t a i n withdrew, a c o n s t i t u e n t assembly 
of Jews and Ai'^ abs i n equal numbers under U.N. supervision. 
Dr. Magnes presented his proposals i n a manner^ which impressed 
Uhscop, even i f i t d i d not convince.(1) He declared t h a t ce-operation 
between Arabs and Jews was not only d e s i r a b l e but possible, and he 
wanted an "honourable and reasonable compromise'lbetween "Arab n a t u r a l 
r i g h t s " and "Jewish h i s t o r i c a l rights.;.' .The ^glo-Aweticanjeomfliitfeee 
had been r i g h t t o suggest t h a t Palestine should be n e i t h e r Jewish 
nor Arab, bu t , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t had not suggested a constitutioHo 
Magnes, t h e r e f o r e , proposed his own. M a j o r i t y r u l e , he considered, 
was i m p r a c t i c a l , because of the d i s p a r i t y i n numbers between the 
two races. Therefore, he proposed t h a t the Palestine Government 
should set up a commission of Jews and Arabs i n equal numbers, 
t o d r a f t a c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n case of deadlock, decisions should be 
taken by a t r i b u n a l appointed by the U.N., which would be necessary 
f o r some time. 100,000 Jews should be admitted from the displaced 
persons' camps i n GErraany and A u s t r i a immediately, and f u r t h e r 
immigration should be allowed, l i m i t t e d only be the economic 
absorbtive capacity of P a l e s t i n e , u n t i l Jews were present i n equal 
numbe'rs t o the Arabs, then i t should cease. Magnes considered t h a t 
100,000 Jews should not f r i g h t e n t h i - A r a b s , and a f t e r t h i s , i t was 
Granados pp.143-4 Magnes represented Ihud. 
(^6) 
u n l i k e l y t h a t enough immigrants would even a r r i v e t o give the Jews 
p a r i t y x*ith the Arabs, as provided i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The League f o r Jewish Arab Rapprochement and Co-operation, 
c o n s i s t i n g of Ihud, Hashomer Ha t z a i r , and several lesser 
organisations and i n d i v i d u a l s , proposed a s i m i l a r scheme t o Magnes, 
except t h a t they believed Jewish immigration should be u n l i m i t t e d . 
v i i i ) T h e Evidence of the Church of England, the Church of Scotland. 
the Ashkenasic Jewish Community, and the Father Gustos of the 
Holy Land, 
Respresentatives of the churches provided i n f o r m a t i o n , but only 
t o help Unscop, not as support f o r a s o l u t i o n proposed by them. The 
Churches of England and Scotland declared t h a t Jews and Arabs could 
l i v e i n peace p e r f e c t l y e a s i l y , and the c o n f l i c t arose because of the 
leaders on b-th sides. The Ashkenasic Community complained t h a t 
n e i t h e r the Palestine Government nor the Vaad Leumi t r e a t e d i t 
f a i r l y , and wanted i t s p o s i t i o n safeguarded i n any settlement. 
The Father Gustos wanted Unscop t o bear i n mind the s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
the Holy Places of Palestine t o people a l l over the World, He agreed 
t o provide Uhscop w i t h a l i s t o f places f o r which, he considered, 
s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n was neeessary. 
(^8) 
ix)The Evidence of the Government of Palestine, 
Uhscop* l a s t formal hearing i n Jerusalem was w i t h the 
Palestine Government, which was represented by S i r Henry Gurney, . 
Mr. D. C. M a c G i l l i v r a y , Mr. B. De Bunsen, and Mr. M. Hogan. 
Uhscop's i n t e n t i o n vas t o ask questions on matters a r i s i n g from the 
other evidence, already presented, but S i r Henry Gurney requested 
t h a t t hey should consider f i r s t the main po i n t s contained i n a 
supplementary memorandum t o the "Survey of P a l e s t i n e , " This was 
a s t r o n g l y worded r e f u t a t i o n of Jewish c r i t i c i s m , and occupied most 
of the meeting. 
Gurney denied Ben Gurion's charge t h a t B r i t a i n had f r u s t r a t e d 
the development of the n a t i o n a l home. Instead, only B r i t a i n had made 
i t p o s s i b l e . This f a c t had been concealed by extremists t o support 
t h e i r demands, Howeverv- there was no need t o grant "the most extreme 
Jewish demands i n the face of b i t t e r opposition from the i n h a b i t a n t s 
of the country," He f u r t h e r emphasised t h a t the Jews ignored the 
o b l i g a t i o n s of the ffendate towards the Arabs, I t was wrong t o claim 
Jews die d i n concentration camps because they could not get i n t o 
P a l e s t i n e , They had died there because the War had closed the f r o n t i e r s 
of Europe, and, i n f a c t the t o t a l of immigration allowed under the 
I'Mte Paper had not even been f i l l e d i u n t i l the V/ar was over, On 
the J ^ r r e n t problem of i l l e g a l immigration, he declared " i l l e g a l " 
immigration was i l l e g a l , and t h a t was a l l there was t o say. B r i t a i n had 
not turned Palestine i n t o a p o l i c e s t a t e by the emergency r e g u l a t i o n s . 
In f a c t , the r e g u l a t i o n s had been introduced before the War t o p r o t e c t 
Jews, and had been welcomed by them. Jewish t e r r o r i s m made i t 
necessary f o r them to remain i n f o r c e , and f o r the presence of large 
numbers o f troops. The Palestine Government had not fomented t r o u b l e 
between Jews and Arabs, and censorship was not d i r e c t e d against Jews 
alone, but had prevented many inflammatory statements by Arabs, 
(^9) 
x)Hearing, the Arab States 
By Unscop's terms of reference, i t could consult governments, 
and, towards the end of Unscop's stay i n Palestine, the question 
arose of whether t o consult the ^ ij^ab s t a t e s . Rahman(lndia) and 
Entezam ( I r a n ) were i n favour, but several others wondered whether 
to do so would be t o e s t a b l i s h these states as i n t e r e s t e d - p a r t i e s , 
and, i f so, whether t h i s was d e s i r a b l e . Entezam saw representatives 
of the Arab states p r i v a t e l y i n Jerusalem, and obtained agreement t h a t , 
i f t h e y were approached o f f i c i a l l y , they would meet w i t h Unscop, i n 
one of the Arab s t a t e s . He proposed t h i s t o Unscop, and i t was accepted. 
Uhscop and the Arab s t a t e s , t h e r e f o r e , agreed t o meet a t Sofar, i n 
Lebanon. The only exception was Transjordan. Abdullah, obviously 
wanting a separate meeting w i t h Unscop, made the p e c u l i a r excuse t h a t , 
as Transjordan was not a member of the U.N. he could not meet 
w i t h them a t Sofar, b u t , i n s t e a d , i n v i t e d them t o Amman. 
Abdullah's i n v i t a t i o n caused some controversy i n Uhscop. 
At f i r s t , Unscop decided t o postpone discussion u n t i l a f t e r the Sofar 
meeting, but Sandstrom made arrangements w i t h Abdullah f o r a v i s i t 
of himself and a few other delegates p r i v a t e l y . This l e d t o accusations 
of underhand p r a c t i c e against Sandstrom, and, i n the end, Fabgregat 
refused t o go becauseof a q u a r r e l of accommodation a v a i l a b l e on 
the aeroplane t o Amman, Rahman, because he thought the v i s i t wrong 
i n p r i n c i p l e . Hood, because he was not i n t e r e s t e d , and Granados, 
because he thought no good could come of i t . Abdullah, i n p u b l i c , 
supported the stand c o n s i s t e n t l y taken by a l l the Arab st a t e s , but 
when asked whether he would j o i n w i t h the Arab states i n opposing 
a Jewish s t a t e established by the U.N., w i t h f o r c e , he .replied, p r i v a t e l y , 
"That i s a very serious statement t o make, f o r i t c l e a r l y means d e c l a r i n g 
war on the United Nations..Transjordan v?ould not take such an extreme 
a t t i t u d e . " ( l ) 
1.Granados p.210 This q u o t a t i o n i d second hand i . e . Granados d i d 
not go t o Amman. 
(50) 
Unscop heard evidence from representatives of the Arab League, 
at meetings on July 22 and 23, 19'+7, i n the Grand Ho t e l , Sofar. The 
f i r s t meeting was p u b l i c , t o allow the Arab League t o present a 
prepared statement i n the presence of the press. The second was 
p r i v a t e , t o allow Unscop t o put questions a r i s i n g from the statemeiht. 
The Arabs views a t t h i s conferencey'were almost i d e n t i c a l w i t h those 
put fonward a t the London Conference, September 19^6. There was a 
minor concession, t h a t any immigrant x*ho had obtained c i t i z e n s h i p 
from the Mandatory Government, would be allowed t o r e t a i n i t i n the 
u n i t a r y s t a t e which the Arabs proposed. Previously, they had 
demanded a 10 year residence q u a l i f i c a t i o n o The manner i n which 
the Arab case was presented must have had an unfortunate e f f e c t on 
Unscop. There was no attempt t o present evidence, b u i l d i n g up an 
argument le a d i n g t o an i n e v i t a b l e conclusion. Nor was Unscop t r e a t e d 
w i t h the respect t o which i t must have become accustomed i n Jerusalem, 
F i n a l l y , the Arab states made i t c l e a r , vjhatever Unscop recommended 
would count f o r nothing w i t h them unless i t was a complete 
acceptance of t h e i r demands. 
The f i r s t meeting began w i t h a speech of welcome by the 
Vice-President of the Council of Lebanon, i n which, before Unscop 
had heard a.word o f Arab evidence, he declared t h a t the Arab states 
x^ould "destroy the home of e v i l i n the Middle East." Hamid Frangie 
then prefaced h i s reading of the League statement by saying t h a t 
"any i n v e s t i g a t i o n of so obvious a question has become unnecessary," 
and the Arqb Governments were not even going t o bother t o go through 
a l l t h e arguments i n t h e i r favour. He concentrated on Palestine's 
r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and the need t o maintain peace i n the 
Middle East. He quoted promises made by the A l l i e s i n the F i r s t World War, 
d e c l a r i n g t h a t the Balfour Declaration c o n t r a d i c t e d them. 
Also, the Declaration was co n t r a r y t o A r t i c l e 22 of t h ^ League of 
Nations Charter. The King-Crane Commission, too, had, i n 1919> 
(51) 
reported t h a t , "a n a t i o n a l home f o r the Jevjish people i s not 
equivalent t o making Palestine i n t o a Jewish s t a t e , " He then 
declared t h a t Jewish ambitions went f a r beyond the current f r o n t i e r s 
of P a l e s t i n e , and t h a t Jevjs planned t o r e a l i s e these ambitions 
by t e r r o r i s m . Meanwhile, the s t a t e which the Z i o n i s t s planned 
i n P a l e s t i n e vjas completely i m p r a c t i c a l , and could not pos s i b l y 
absorb the immigration which the Z i o n i s t s wanted. 
During the second meeting the Arabs t r i e d t o s t i c k t o agreed 
answers t o Uhscop's questions, p r e v i o u s l y presented i n w r i t i n g . 
However, under examination, they began t o argue t h e i r case more 
f r e e l y and e f f e c t i v e l y . Unscop's main question was what would be 
the a t t i t u d e of the Arab League i f the U.N. t r i e d t o e s t a b l i s h a 
Jewish s t a t e i n P a l e s t i n e . This embarrassed the representatives. 
At f i r s t , they declared a Jewish s t a t e could not po s s i b l y be 
est a b l i s h e d . Then, when pressed, they agreed t h a t such a decision 
would be c o n t r a r y t o the U.N.Charter, and would, t h e r e f o r e , "make 
us f r e e t o make our own decisions t h e r e . " 
(52) 
xi)Unscop's V i s i t t o the Displaced Persons' Camps. 
A f t e r the Sofar meeting, Unscop t r a v e l l e d t o Geneva t o 
prepare i t s r e p o r t f o r the Second Regular Session of the U.N. 
However, the f i r s t business i n Geneva was the questioned, postponed 
at Lake Success, o f v i s i t i n g the displaced persons' camps. The 
question had been r a i s e d again, b r i e f l y , during Unscop's stay i n 
P a l e s t i n e , but no delegate pressed f o r a dec i s i o n u n t i l a f t e r 
the meeting w i t h the Arab s t a t e s , probably inocase the states 
were offended and refused t o meet Unscop, Granados and Fabregat 
were eager f o r a v i s i t , i n order t o get evidence of Jews' desire 
t o go t o Pa l e s t i n e . Rahman ( I n d i a ) and Entezam ( I r a n ) were j u s t 
as eager f o r the v i s i t not t o take place, presumably because 
they d i d not want t h i s desire emphasised. Hood was i n favour 
of a v i s i t . I n his case, however, i t d i d not mean he supported 
the Jewish case. U n t i l then, he had not been p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s j m p a t h e t i c , and explained h i s d e s i r e f o r a v i s i t was simply t o 
f i n d out i f opinion had changed among the refugees since the 
iinglo-American Committee of I n q u i r y . Hood ( A u s t r a l i a ) seems to have 
f e l t i t possible t h a t fewer Jews would want t o go t o Palestine i n 194? 
than i n 1946, Simic (Yugoslavia) was against a v i s i t as a waste of 
time, because the Jews' desire t o go t o Palestine was common 
knowledge,(1) 
When the question was voted, Granados (Guatemala), Fabregat 
(Uruguay), Hood ( A u s t r a l i a ) , Rand (Canada), Blom (Netherlands), 
and Sandstrom (Sweden) were i n favour. Rahman, Ehtezam, Simic, 
and Salazar (Peru) were against. B r i l e j (Czechoslovakia) 
abstained. The next question was the composition of the v i s i t i n g 
d e l e g a t i o n . Most delegates were i n favour of sending t h e i r 
a l t e r n a t e s , and g e t t i n g do>m t o work i n Geneva on the preparation 
of the Uhscop Report, Granados and Fabregat, however,, were 
1.Information i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s drawn from the r e p o r t of 
Subcommittee 3, which v i s i t e d the camps (Uhscop Report annex 18) 
and Granados Chapter 20 and 21, 
(53) 
were eager t o go themselves and persuaded Ihscop t o allow 
delegates t o choose whether t o send t h e i r a l t e r n a t e s or t o go 
i n person. Granados claims t h a t the other delegates were 
embarrassed when o n l y Granados and Fabregat of the delegates wanted 
t o go, and Hood changed his mind and v i s i t e d the camps t o make sure 
n e i t h e r Granados nor Fabgregat became Chairman of the subcommittee. 
Hood, t h e r e f o r e , was ele c t e d . 
The subcommittee met on J u l y 31 and August 1, 19^7, t o d r a f t 
an i t i n e r a r y and terms of reference. These were approved by Unscop, 
and s t a t e d t h a t , "The Sub-Committee s h a l l v i s i t selected representative 
assembly centres f o r Jewish refugees and displaced persons i n 
Germany and A u s t r i a , w i t h a view t o a s c e r t a i n i n g and r e p o r t i n g t o 
the Committee on the a t t i t u d e of the inmates of the assembly 
centres regarding resettlement, r e p a t r i a t i o n , and immigration 
i n t o P a l e s t i n e , " ( l ) The subcommittee then v i s i t e d 5 camps i n 
Germany, between August 8 t o I'J-. A l l but one, the Hohne Camp, 
near Bergen-Belsen i n the B r i t i s h Zone, were American c o n t r o l l e d . 
The t o t a l o f inmates was over 23,000, and about 855^  were Polisho 
Not a l l were Jews, The subcommittee then s p l i t . 8 members v i s i t e d 
2 centres i n Vienna, c o n t a i n i n g about 6,250 Romanian Jews, while 
Mohn (Swedish a l t e r n a t e ) and Sp i t s (Netherlans a l t e r n a t e ) v i s i t e d 
3 more camps i n Germany and 1 i n A u s t r i a . A l l 6 camps were American-
c o n t r o l l e d . 
Evidence was c o l l e c t e d by means of a standard questionnaire, 
which asked how the person had become a refugee, whether he would 
l i k e t o r e t u r n home, would he l i k e t o emigrate, and where, and why. 
They were also asked i f they had applied f o r immigration i n t o 
P a lestine before the War, and what was t h e i r a t t i t u d e t o Palestine. 
Many o f f i c i a l s also were inter v i e w e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y Rabbi Bernstein, 
the o f f i c i a l adviser on Jewish a f f a i r s t o the M l i t a r y GovernorQ 
1.Uhscop Report Vol.1, pp.7-8, para,68 
(5^ 0 
A 
UoS, Zone, Germany, Lieutenant Colonel McFeeley, Chief of the 
Displaced Persons D i v i s i o n s , .U.S. Zone, A u s t r i a , General Clay, 
the American M i l i t a r y Governor, and General S i r Brian Robertson 
of the B r i t i s h Army i n Germany, 
The subcommittee reported t o Uhscop t h a t , " p r a c t i c a l l y 
a l l t he persons...wish, more or le s s determinedly, t o go t o 
P a l e s t i n e . " They d i d not x^ant t o r e t u r n home through f e a r of 
ant i - s e m i t i s m , and because of t h e i r " i n c a p a b i l i t y t o s t a r t l i f e 
again i n places haunted by memories of endured h o r r o r s . " Nor were 
they w i l l i n g t o consider other countries than P a l e s t i n e , there 
being "a reasonable estimate...who would i n f a c t accept o f f e r s . . . 
i f they were f i r m o f f e r s and not merely hopeful expectations, would 
be some 20 t o 25^," The subcommittee declared t h a t "such a 
s i t u a t i o n must be regarded as a t l e a s t a component i n the problem 
of P a l e s t i n e . " I t suspected t h a t p a r t of the d e s i r e t o go t o Palestine 
might be the r e s u l t of i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , and pointed out t h a t 
several Jewish organisations were i n a p o s i t i o n t o impress 
Zionism on the refugees. However, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Romanian 
case, the d e s i r e , was the r e s u l t of Jewish education i n general 
plus "present p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s " and 
memories o f Nazi persecution, and, i n any case, the o r i g i n of the 
desire had no e f f e c t on whether i t was a f a c t o r i n the Palestine 
problem. Most Jewish refugees regarded Palestine as t h e i r own country, 
and, i f they were l e f t alone Arab-Jew r e l a t i o n s would be s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
Even i f they x;ere n o t , they f e l t the Yishuv could take care of 
i t s e l f . 
The delegates were deeply moved by the d i s t r e s s they had seen, 
and included i n t h e i r r e p o r t a s p e c i a l plea t h a t a c t i o n should be taken 
t o help displaced persons apart from the Palestine Problem. This plea 
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was repeated i n Unscop's r e p o r t , as one of i t s unanimous 
recommendations, although i t was outside Unscop's terms of 
reference. The r e p o r t also i n f l u e n c e d both Ifeiscop's m a j o r i t y and 
m i n o r i t y plans. The m a j o r i t y declared "Jewish immigration i s the 
c e n t r a l issue i n Pal e s t i n e today," and the m i n o r i t y agreed t h a t 
immigration was " c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o the s o l u t i o n of the Palestine 
q u e s t i o n , " ( 1 ) 
1,Uhscop Report Vol.1, p,4'7 ( m a j o r i t y ) and p.64 ( m i n o r i t y ) 
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x i i ) T h e Preparation of the Unscop Reporto 
!^ y the time the subcommittee had f i n i s h e d i t s t o u r of the 
refugee camps, each delegate had developed h i s own view of the 
problem, and his own deductions on how the problem might be 
solved. 
Hood ( A u s t r a l i a ) had been very r e t i c e n t throughout the whole 
of the Uhscop i n v e s t i g a t i o n , which now makes an estimate of his 
o p i n i o n d i f f i c u l t . However, c e r t a i n f a c t s suggest he was eager 
t o avoid embarrassing B r i t a i n , e.g. he d i d suggest a compromise 
which enabled Uhscop t o avoid a clash w i t h Uhscop over v^hether the 
f i r s t hearing should be i n p u b l i c or camera; he d i d refuse t o allow 
Iftiscop, despite Sandstrom's wishes,^discuss the l e t t e r from the 
r e l a t i v e s of the condemned Irgun t e r r o r i s t s i n f o r m a l l y ; he then 
abstained from the r e s u l t i n g r e s o l u t i o n ; he was i n favour of a v i s i t 
t o the refugee camps .but only because they might have changed t h e i r 
o pinions; he was u n w i l l i n g t o l e t Granados or Fabregat, who had 
become extreme c r i t i c s of B r i t a i n , occupy p o s i t i o n s of a u t h o r i t y , 
even a t cost t o h i s convenience. On a s o l u t i o n , Hodd stated t h a t 
he d i d not t h i n k a choice easy. P a r t i t i o n was not p r a c t i c a l , 
and, p o s s i b l y , a U.N. t r u s t e e s h i p might have been best. However, 
he considered Uhscop's r e a l task was t o present the f a c t s t o Unscop, ' 
w i t h as many possible s o l u t i o n s as Uhscop could, and Unscop should 
then l e t the U.N. decided 
Rand (Canadal), l i k e Hood, wanted t o avoid embarrassing B r i t a i n , 
He had made no fuss over the Palestine Government's desire t o be heard 
i n camera, or over the question of the condemned, i n which he said 
Uhscop could not i n t e f f e r e w i t h the laws of Palestine. However, 
he had developed a bias towards the Jews, due t o Arabs' h o s t i l e 
behaviour and the p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s work of the l i a s o n o f f i c e r s 
and Weizmann, He believed a s o l u t i o n p ossible, because he was 
impressed by Jews' a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a b i l i t y , and because he thought 
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the Arabs would not produce any r e a l opposition. Because of his 
a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the Jews, i t i s reasonable t o suppose t h a t h i s 
proposals vrere i n s p i r e d by them. He wanted p a r t i t i o n , but d i d not 
b e l i e v e t h e 2 states could be economically independent, and wanted 
some s o r t of t r e a t y guaranteeingeconomic co-operation w r i t t e n i n t o 
t h e i r c o n s t i t u i o n s . However, his main aim was t o produce a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n , and T i?ithin Unscop, he vi&s w i l l i n g t o 
compromise. 
L i s i c k y (Czechoslovakia) appears t o have been influenced by 
the Czech de s i r e not t o offend Russia, which r e s u l t e d i n him 
f a v o u r i n g p a r t i t i o n . However, he also wanted good r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
the Czech neighbour, Yugoslavia, t h e r e f o r e , a t Geneva he began 
t o suggest a j o i n t Czech-Yugoslav f e d e r a l s t a t e p l a n . However, 
the '^ewish Agency managed t o contact Masaryk, who, i n a recent 
conversation w i t h S t a l i n , had learned t h a t S t a l i n favoured the 
Agency l i n e . L i s i c k y was informed of t h i s , and he c o n s i s t e n t l y 
supported p a r t i t i o n , t h e r e a f t e r , 
Granados (Guatemala) had, a t f i r s t , favoured a c a n t o n i s a t i o n a l 
p l a n , but Horowitz (Agency l i a s o n o f f i c e r ) persuaded him against 
t h i s . From then on, he worked f o r p a r t i t i o n , accepting the Jewish 
Agency's case t o such an extent that^^even the Agency^thought he 
o f t e n l o s t touch w i t h r e a l i t y . Granados believed the establishment 
of a Jewish s t a t e would solve the x^hole Jewish problem. They were 
e n t i t l e d t o a s t a t e , not only because of anti-semitism, but because 
they were "a h i g h l y c i v i l i s e d and capable community i n Palestine." 
B r i t a i n vias present p u r e l y f o r s e l f i s h reasons, and her presence 
l e d t o v i o l e n c e . However, although he would not admit the Arabs had 
any r i g h t t o P a l e s t i n e , he d i d t h i n k t h a t some p r o v i s i o n had t o 
be made f o r them. 
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Rahraann(India) gave his views a t considerable l e n g t h i n 
hi s re s e r v a t i o n s t o the Unscop Report. He considered t h a t the Balfour 
De c l a r a t i o n should not have been made, and t h a t the I-iandate was 
i n c o n f l i c t w i t h the Covenant of the league of Nations. However, 
i n h i s op i n i o n , t h i s d i d not i n v a l i d a t e the Mandate. I n f a c t , i f the 
Mandate were found t o c o n f l i c t w i t h the Covenant a t any time, then 
the Mandate should be f o l l o w e d . This reasoning, he seems t o have 
f e l t necessary i n order t o avoid coming t o the conclusion t h a t a l l 
the Jews who had entered Palestine since the Mandate had no r i g h t there 
and ought t o be expelled. He was a t pains t o deny he wished any Jew 
then r e s i d e n t i n P a l e s t i n e / e x p e l l e d . However, he completely r e j e c t e d 
the Agency's case, based on h i s t o r y , r e l i g i o n , t h e i r economic 
c o n t r i b u t i o n , t h e i r homelessness, t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l promises, 
and t h e i r s u f f e r i n g . He considered immigrants were being used by 
the Agency t o e s t a b l i s h a s t a t e . This, he considered not j u s t i f i e d 
under the Mandate. His s o l u t i o n was t h a t a l l immigration should 
cease, a l l Jews then i n Palestine should become c i t i z e n s of Palestine, 
and P a l e s t i n e should be a u n i t a r y s t a t e . B i - n a t i o n a l or cantonal 
systems were i m p r a c t i c a l . P a r t i t i o n y ' h e c o n s i d e r e d y ^ p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i m p r a c t i c a l , as i t was impossible t o produce two v i a b l e s t a t e s , 
and any Jewish s t a t e would be surrounded by h o s t i l e Arab s t a t e s . 
This r u l e d out completely any plan f o r an autonomous Jewish s t a t e , 
or p a r t i t i o n w i t h economic union, 
Entezam ( I r a n ) had decided t h a t the object of the Mandate was 
t o e s t a b l i s h a n a t i o n a l home f o r the Jews, and t h a t t h i s task had 
been completed, suggested a b i - n a t i o n a l s t a t e , on the l i n e s of 
Dr. Magnes', but he was ready t o compromise, he s a i d , claiming 
he had had no i n s t r u c t i o n s from his government, 
Blom's (Netherlands) opinion i s very d i f f i c u l t t o estimate, 
because he hardly ever stat e d h i s views d i r e c t l y However, he 
i m p l i e d t h a t he would l i k e Unscop t o suggest a s o l u t i o n which 
would a l l o w B r i t a i n t o remain i n Palestine, He d i d not t h i n k 
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absolute independence was possible, therefore there had to be some 
supervising authority, but he did not think a tj.N, Trusteeship 
suitable. Also, on the question of immigration, he considered 
Ifriscop was not competent to give a decision, and a higher authority 
xws needed. This should have been given by the League of Nations, 
which no longer existed. HLom seemed to imply, therefore, that 
a decision on immigration should be taken by the U.N. as the League's 
successor, but he was strangely reluctant to say so e x p l i c i t l y . 
However, he did give his views on the t r a n s i t i o n a l period necessary 
between the end of the Mandate and any solution coming int o force,, 
i n a memorandum, 
"l.A t r a n s i t i o n a l period i s unavoidable, 
2, The solution must be imposed, ^ 
3. Hence the use of force appears indispens^le, 
4.Such a force probably cannot be an international 
force. " ( 1 ) 
Therefore, i t i s probable HLom's solution would have been for 
B r i t a i n to remain i n Palestine, impose a solution, and administer 
Palestine u n t i l that solution was accepted by Jews and Arabs. Ely 
asking f o r a postponement of a decision on the immigration question, 
i t i s at least possible that he considered the current B r i t i s h 
regulations of 1,500 per month about r i g h t . 
Salazar (Peru) had decided that the object of the Mandate was 
to establish a national home f o r the Jews, and that t h i s had been 
achieved. Independence fo r Palestine was therefore due. However, 
since Jews and Arabs would not co-operate, Palestine would have to 
be pa r t i t i o n e d , with, perhaps, the most tenuous l i n k s between the 
two states. The enmity between Jews and Arabs made i t necessary 
to establish a Jewish state only i n those areas where Jews were i n 
a majority, to avoid a large discontented minority i n the Jewish state, 
Salazar's solution, therefore would have produced a Jewish state too 
small to be acceptable to the Jewish Agency, 
l.Gfanados p.2^1 
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Sandstrom (Sweden) had arrived at d e f i n i t e conclusions, by 
the time Unscop reached Geneva, The Mandate should be ended, 
independence should come aft e r a t r a n s i t i o n a l period, and Palestine 
should be partitioned. P a r t i t i o n was essential, because Jews and 
Arabs vjould not co-operate. He rejected a bi-national state because 
of the d i f f i c u l t y of framing a constitution, and because p a r t i t i o n 
would be f i n a l . He did not anticipate trouble from the Arabs, 
whose threats and protests he regarded as "no more than a form 
of Oriental haggling."(1) 
Fabregat (Uruguay) had become deeply emotionally involved 
i n the Palestine Question. (2) He was regarded as a frien^^by both 
the Jemsh Agency and the Irgun. His ideas on a solution were 
strongly held and not quite consistent. He believed a Jewish state 
and an Arab state should be established, and they should be completely 
independent, i n no way a federation, but believed they should 
cfl-operate economically, while certain areas of Palestine, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the Negev, should be administered by both states, as 
mandated t e r r i t o r y with the help of a U.N. nominee. There was 
to be a special administration f o r Jerusalem, which should not be 
independent, otherwise a sort of theocracy might arise. Finally, 
special arrangements should be made f o r the transport to Palestine 
of Jewish women and children unable to face another European Winter. 
Simic (Yugoslavia) had been working with the Hebrew Communists, 
and, on August 7» 19^ 7» presented a memorandum containing a plan 
based upon the proposals of the Communist Central Committee. There 
was to be a constitution with two houses, one based on proportional 
representation, and one with Jews and Arabs i n equal numbers, the 
approval of both being rquired f o r l e g i s l a t i o n . Simic claimed this solution 
was practicalbbecauseit was only the B r i t i s h presence which caused 
1. Horowitz p.183 
2. The presence of a "well-organised and active Jewish community" 
i n Montevideo (Kirk p.240) seems not have influenced Fabregat 
personally, although i t might have resulted i n him being chosen 
i n the f i r s t place. 
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trouble between Jevjs and Arabs, Simic's atti t u d e suggested that 
he was acting under s t r i c t orders from his government. This i s 
consistent with the growing estrangement between Yugoslavia and 
Russia, and could have been inspired by Yugoslavia being determined 
to demonstrate i t could take an independent l i n e from Russia. 
The Secretariat's opinions are important because i t was 
agreed, during discHssions on procedure, that the Secretariat 
should be allowed to submit memoranda on each point i n the 
program of work i n the same way as the delegates. Since there 
was very l i t t l e time to complete the report, and much time was 
wasted by disagreements, the Secretariat came to play a large 
part i n i t s preparation,, and i t s views must have influenced 
points of d e t a i l at leasto Bunche, who had become deeply 
committed to the Zionist cause, took the greatest i n i t i a t i v e . 
He xiianted a f i n a l solution, but saw, as the greatest d i f f i c u l t i e s 
implementation and obtaining a 2/3 majority i n the General Assembly. 
At the beginning of August he had not made up his mind whether two 
states were economically viable, and he considered Transjordan's 
reactions important, Dr, Hoo and Dr. Robles did not make the i r 
opinions obvious, but both worked on the p a r t i t i o n plan. 
Two meetings and some informal discussions decided the 
procedure to be followed i n preparing the Report, the ideas 
adopted being mainly worked out by Sandstrom. Unscop's work 
was divided ixito^matters of f a c t , religious interests, and 
proposed solutions. 
^fetters of fact caused no controversy. Unscop had received 
many thousands of pages of documents from the Palestine Government, 
the Jewish Agency, and hundreds more from the B r i t i s h Government, 
other Jewish and non-Jewish organisations i n Palestine and elswhere. 
Also, they had the testimony of 18 meetings, and the Working 
Documentation on Palestine, prepared by the Secretariat, 
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Unscop approved three chapters, based on a summary prepared by the 
Secretariat. The f i r s t , e n t i t l e d "The Origin and Activites of 
Unscop," contained a summary of the work of the F i r s t Special 
Session of the U.N., i t s decisions, Unscop's work at Lake Success, 
Palestine, Sofar, Germany, and Geneva. The second, e n t i t l e d "The 
Elements of the Con f l i c t , " contained an outline of the geographic, 
demographic, and economic factors r e l a t i n g to the Problem of Palestine, 
a b r i e f history of Palestine under the Mandate, and a discussion of 
the Jewish and Arab claims. The t h i r d , e n t i t l e d "The Main Proposals 
Propounded for the Solution of the Palestine Qaestion," contained 
summaries of the proposals of the Peel Commission Report, 1937, 
the Woodhead Commission Report, 1938, the Anglo-American Committee 
of Inquiry Report, 1 9 ^ , the Morrison Plan, 1 9 ^ , and the Bevin 
Plan, 19^7i plus proposals of Jewish organisations, including those 
opposed t o the Agency, and Arab states' proposals,(1) 
Unscop was required to "give most careful consideration to the 
religious interests i n Palestine of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity," 
therefore a committee of alternate delegates was set up under Spits 
(Netherlands alternate). Their report outline^the development of 
the extremely complex sit u a t i o n existing i n Palestine. Some Holy 
Places were f u l l y owned by one sect, but most were owned, j o i n t l y , 
by two or more, with very complicated systems of use and maintainance. 
The committee, therefore recommended that the status quo be allowed 
to stand i n the new states' constitution. The only exception was the 
City of Jerusalem. At f i r s t i t was refered to the alternates, but 
when the delegates began to examine p a r t i t i o n seriously, the question 
arose ^ t o which state, i f any, should Jerusalem belong, and 
Jerusalem became inextricably bound up with the debate i n the main 
committee, and, although the alternates produced recommendations, 
t h e i r votes were dictated by the main delegates,(2) 
1 . These chapters formed Chapter I , I I , and IV of the Unscop Report, 
2. Religious recommendations are found i n Chapter I I I of the 
Uhscop Report. 
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No real progress was made upon recommendations fo r a 
solution, because delegates were afraid to commit themselves to 
a proposal which might not be supported by the other delegates, 
and because Fabregat (Urugay), Granados (Guatemala), and Hood 
(Australia) were absent i n Germany. When they returned, therefore, 
Rahman suggested the delea'gates might be l o l l i n g to speak freely 
i f discussions were informal, with no record taken. This was agreed, 
and Sandstrom put k questions i n turn to each delegate, lilhen asked 
whether the Mandate should be ended a l l agreed i t should. IVhen 
asked whether Palestine should be wholly Arab or wholly Jewish, 
a l l agreed i t should be neither. Vi/hen asked whether Palestine 
should be bi-national, 3, Rahman (Ind i a ) , Entezam (I r a n ) , and 
Simic (Yugoslavia) agreed that i t should. When asked whether 
Palestine should be partitioned a l l the others, except Hood 
(Australia) agreed i t should. Hood insisted i t was Unscop's 
duty to present a l l possible solutions f o r the U.N. to make a 
choice and refused to commit himself to any. A l l Unscop 
members f e l t that a j o i n t report was preferable to a majority 
and minority report, p a r t i c u l a r l y as i n matters of fact there was 
no dispute, but separate provision had to be made i n the report 
f o r supporters of the bi-national state and f o r those who supported 
p a r t i t i o n . Therefore i t was decided to present recommendations 
which were generally agreed, a plan f o r p a r t i t i o n , and a bi-national 
state p l a n , ( l ) The "p a r t i t i o n i s t ^ " then separated from the "federalists" 
i n working groups, at Sandstrom's (Sx'jeden) suggestion. 
The chapter on recommendations which were generally agreed 
was made up of points i n common i n the two plans. I t was unanimously 
agreed that the Mandate should be ended and Palestine given i t s 
independence as soon as possible; that existing religious rights 
should be guaranteed; that the General Assembly take immediate steps 
to relieve the p l i g h t of refugees i n Germany; that a tr a n s i t i o n a l 
1.Chapter V, VI, and V I I of the Unscop Report. 
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period was necessary, but i t should be short, and 
the U.N. should take re s p o n s i b i l i t y fj^ Palestine during that 
time; Palestine should be democratic, with protection f o r minorities 
and obey the U.N. Charter i n i t s foreign a f f a i r s ; there should be 
economic unity; the capitulations, which gave special rights to 
some foreign countries to protect t h e i r nationals i n Palestine, 
which had been suspended during the Mandate, should be abolished; 
the General Assembly should appeal to the people of Palestine not 
to commit acts of violence. The l a s t recommendation, that a 
solution of the Palestine Problem should n t t be considered a solution 
of the Jewish problem i n general, vjas opposed by Fabregat (Uruguay) 
and Granados (Guatemala). Granados considered Palestine was quite 
capable of accepting a l l Jews, i t was quite p r a c t i c a l to transport 
them there, and Arab opposition was not important. 
to .''worked out. Rahman(India) wanted a unitary state, Simic (Yugoslavia) 
1 
the Communist based plan, previously mentioned(1), and Entezam (Iran) 
a cantonal system, involving considerable fragmentation of Palestine, 
The compromise, therefore, was to accept as a middle course, Simic's 
plan. Palestine was to be ruled by two houses, one elected by 
proportional representation, the other with an equal number of 
Jews and Arabs. Both houses' approval was necessary f o r l e g i s l a t i o n . 
In case of deadlock',.,there would be a r b i t r a t i o n by the Head of State 
and a Federal Court. Palestine was to be divided i n t o Jewish 
and Arab areas, each with l o c a l self-government. The Jews were 
to have a coastal s t r i p from Tel Aviv to Acre linked to t h e i r 
settlements?around lake Tiberias. West and central Galilee would 
be an Arab enclave, the Jews would have the eastern Negev as an 
enclave. Jerusalem was to be divided into Jewish and Arab areas. 
Immigration was to be controlled by a council of 3 Arabs, 3 Jews, 
and 3 U.N. nominees. 
In the V/orking Group on the Federal State, a compromise had 
1.pp.61-2 
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Very soon aft e r the Working Group on P a r t i t i o n began i t s 
discussions, i t concluded that i t was impossible to draw boundaries 
which produced two economically viable states without putting 
unacceptably large minorities i n each state, therefore the delegates 
compromised by declaring that each state should be independent 
p o l i t i c a l l y , but economically united. I t was hoped that by 
forcing the two states to work together economically, an eventual 
p o l i t i c a l reunion might happen. The group, therefore, divided, 
Salazar (Peru), Lisicky (Czechoslovakia), Fabregat (Uruguay) and 
Hood (Australia) began to consider possible boundaries, and 
Saindstrom (Sweden), Blom (Netherlands), Granados (Guatemala), 
and Rand (Canada), assisted by Hoo, Robles, and Bunche, began to 
work out a constitution. 
The i n t e r n a l constitutional matters of each state were 
settled x^ithout d i f f i c u l t y , A constituent assembly was to be 
elected by each state by universal adult suffrage, and each state 
could then s e t t l e i t s ovm constitution. However, economic matters 
led to problemss. A customs union, common currency, common operation 
of transport and communications, and j o i n t economic development of 
irrigation'-and reclamation schemes x#&s specified. This was to be 
enforced by a treaty, signed simultaneously by both states as they 
gained t h e i r independence. Exactly how the granting of independence 
was to be supervised caused some controversy. The obvious choice 
was B r i t a i n , with perhaps help from America, but B r i t a i n had given 
Uhscop no assurance that she would implement a plan, and i t was clear 
from the F i r s t Special Session, B r i t a i n xfould not implement a plan 
of which she did not approve, Atyeo (Australian alternate) suggested 
that he be authorised to contact the Foreign Office, to f i n d out 
B r i t i s h opinion, but the other delegates were against t h i s . Finally, 
Unscop p a r t i t i o n plan recommended that B r i t a i n be asked to help. 
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which suggests that the delegates thought there was a very good 
chance B r i t a i n would refuse, but they were afr a i d , i f B r i t a i n did 
refuse, they would be at a loss to suggest how the plan might be 
implemented. 
The boundaries group, however, by August 28, 19^ -^7, decided 
they could not agree, and each of the group was to vjrite his cfi-m 
recomraenflations. The delegates had refused to compromise th e i r 
previously expressed views, and, i n two weeks, no progress had been 
made. Instead, each delegate had enlarged on his own ideas, 
Fabregat (Urugay) had abandoned his idea of a j o i n t Jewish-Arab-U.N. 
mandate f o r the Negev and special arrangem.ents for Jerusalem. 
Instead, he wanted the Negev partitioned with the res t , viest of 
Beersheba to the Jews, east to the Arabs, Jerusalem was to be 
divided, the Old City going to the Arabs, and the new c i t y to the 
Jews. Jewish Jerusalem was to be linked with the main Jewish area 
by an indentation from the coast. Fabregat j u s t i f i e d including 
western Galilee i n the Jewish state, despite i t s ovenrjhelmingly 
Arab majority, by the success of the Jewish settlements at Nahariva 
and Hanita. However, he wanted Jaffa to be an enclave i n Jewish 
t e r r i t o r y . Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) pressed f o r a wider area than 
Fabregat, f o r the Jewish state, including the whole ^^egev, but he 
thought the future of western Galilee should be decided by the U.N. 
Salazar (Peru) t r i e d to work out a state with a reasonably small 
;irab m.indirity for the Jews, and which would be economically viable 
even i f economic union broke down. He thought i n terms of the 
Peel Commission's recommendations, and wanted Jerusalem to be an 
inter n a t i o n a l c i t y . Hood (Australia) does not appear to have come 
to a decision. The group on the constitution, however, had decided 
that Jerusalem ought to be internalonal, but, apart from Sandstrom, 
who seemed to want a similar solution to Salazar, but with western 
Galilee i n the Arab state, none had worked out any other ideas. 
(67) 
The failure of the boundaries group, was considered a disaster 
by the Jewish Agency, They feared that, either there would be no 
p a r t i t i o n , or the Jewish state would be extremely small, therefore 
the liason o f f i c e r s contacted t h e i r two strongest Supporters, Granados 
(Guatemala) and Fabregat (Uruguay) to see i f anything could be done. 
The txiTO Delegates suggested the liason officers approach Rand (Canada), 
who promised his support f o r a viable Jewish state. The problems 
were Jerusalem, the Negev, and western Galilee, Most delegates, 
Granados, Fabregat, and Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) .exce|)ted, vjanted 
a compact Jewish state, similar to that recommended by the Peel 
Commission, The Agency, however, were t o t a l l y against t h i s , because 
the state would be too small, and Jerusalem and the Negev would be 
excluded. JUSO, some delegates were doubtful about even allowing 
western Galilee to the Jews, and, with, i t , the Jewish state would 
hardly have been viable. The Agency, therefore, inspired the f i n a l 
boundaries. The central area, on the coast, with i t s Jev/ish majority, 
had never been questioned as part of a Jewish state, nor had eastern 
Galilee, with i t s Jewish minority of considerable size and economic 
strength. The Agency, therefore, made i t clear, i t would give up i t s 
claims to Jerusalem, provided i t was internationalised, and i t s claims 
to western Galilee, i n return f o r the Negev. The delegates eagerly 
grasped t h e chance of producing recommendations to which, the Jews 
at least agreed, and followed the Agency suggestions, excluding 
only the 100,000 Arabs i n the Gaza area from the Jewish state.. 
The result was boundaries of astonishing complexity, each 
state being divided i n three, and each part isolated from i t s o t h e r ( l ) 
parts. The plan was dravm up i n haste, and, i n i t s f i n a l form, 
may have owed i t s shape mainly -d«e to Mohn (Swedish alternate) 
and Reedman, an economic expert of the Secretariat, 
The plan was, therefore, completed j u s t within the time l i m i t 
of September.1, 19^7. 
l.For a map of the p a r t i t i o n plan, see app.2, 
(68) 
CHAPTER THREE, 
REACTIONS TO THE UNSCOP REPORT AND THE SECOND REGULAR SESSION. 
i)Reactions to the Unscop Report, 
The Jewish Agency was delighted with the majority report. 
"In the opinion of us a l l , " wrote Horowitz, " i t was a b r i l l i a n t 
success which surpassed a l l our expectations."(1) The Agency 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n of the majority plan, was, naturally, based on t h e i r 
view of the situation as i t was i n September, 1947* They assumed 
that the Arab leadeifs were so suspicious of each other that violent 
opposition to a plan of p a r t i t i o n was unlikely, ( 2 ) and that, i f 
B r i t a i n withdrew, B r i t a i n could not avoid handing over authority 
to states established by the U.N. i n an orderly fashion.(3) This 
meant that there appeared to be a very good chance of obtaining the 
p a r t i t i o n plan, which had been very largely inspired by the Agency, 
through i t s liason o f f i c e r s , working unopposed by the Arab Higher Committee, 
i n a l l i t s d e t a i l s . The main fear appears to have been that 
B r i t a i n would f i n d some excuse to remain i n Palestine, perhaps i f 
the U.N. did not approve p a r t i t i o n by a 2/3 majority.(4) This made 
acceptance of the tfnscop plan by the U.N. v i t a l , because, Weisgal 
wrote, "we knew that t h i s was the f i n a l n a i l i n the c o f f i n of the 
B r i t i s h Mandate."(5) 
The advantages of the p a r t i t i o n plan, which had so delighted the 
Jewish Agency, were that i t set up the largest possible jfewish state 
i n which '^ ews were a majority. Assuming that the U.N. could not 
possibly approve a r a c i a l i s t state, or the expulsion of Arabs from 
t h e i r homes, i t was pointless to ask f o r more. This, of course, 
ruled out the usual r e v i s i o n i s t cry f o r a Jewish state i n a l l 
Palestine, or even Transjordan as w e l l . At the U.N., such a proposal 
I.Horowitz p.222 
2.Sykes p.388 
3. Begin p.332-3 says that many people thought the U.N. could 
enforce a solution. 
4. U n t i l September 26, B r i t a i n made no unqualified statement that 
she was leaving Palestine, and then few took her seriously at f i r s t , 
5. Weisgal p.245 
(69) 
could, too easily, by removal of the discrimination against Arabs, 
be converted in t o exactly the unitary state that the Arabs wanted. 
The Jewish state, i n the p a r t i t i o n plan, however, would dominate 
the whole of Palestine economically and st r a t e g i c a l l y . The way x^ould 
be open f o r the extension of Jewish control, perhaps via the j o i n t 
economic i n s t i t u t i o n s , when immigration had raised Jewish numbers 
s u f f i c i e n t l y , over a l l Palestine. In short, the p a r t i t i o n plan 
gave the minority of Jews effective control over the majority. As 
f o r Jerusalem, as an international c i t y i i t , at least, was not i n 
Arab hands, and therefore some way towards becoming Jewish, Of 
course, the Agency could f i n d details to c r i t i c i s e , l i k e the Jewish 
state having to pay a subsidy to the Arab state to make i t viable. 
The Irgun rejected the report, remaining consistent i n th e i r 
demand f o r a l l Palestine, However, there i s no reason to suppose 
that Begin was much less optimistic than the Agency, Katz does not 
mention the Irgun reaction, and Begin only c r i t i c i s e s the Agency 
fo r hoping f o r a peaceful implementation, by quoting his "Voice of 
Fighting Zion," f o r October 1 , 19^7, af t e r the B r i t i s h statement 
of inte n t i o n to withdraw, V7hich the Irgun, with i t s extreme assumption 
of B r i t i s h malevolence, interpreted at i t s worst. 
The Jewish Agency, however, s t i l l had to convince the Zionist 
General Council, which met i n Zurich from August 25-September 2, 
19^70 I t i s an indication of the unsoundness of the p a r t i t i o n plan, 
as a permanent solution, that the General Council f i r s t rejected i t , 
and a t r i b u t e to the plan's p o s s i b i l i t i e s and the perceptiveness of 
the General Council, that i t was f i n a l l y accepted by an overwhelming 
majority. Revisionist and other proposals to maintain the i n t e g r i t y 
of Palestine were decisively defeated.(1) 
1 ,Details i n Cohen p.360. Sykes, p.386 called i t "the boldest 
essay i n moderation that the Zionist r u l i n g body ever made. 
(70) 
Even at t h i s stage, the Agency attempted to negotiate with 
the Arab League, hoping to gain some concessions. A meeting was 
arranged by Jon Kimche with Az4m Pasha, the League Secretary, 
i n the Savoy Hotel, London. The Agency had prepared a scheme 
defining the relations betvjeen the p a r t i t i o n states, guaranteeing 
the Arabs against further Jewish expansion, and offe r i n g economic 
co-operation throughout the IUddle East. Az~am Pasha, however, 
considered negotiations no longer relevant. This conversation 
f i n a l l y convinced the Agenoy that a peaceful solution was impossible.(1) 
The Arab reaction to the Uhscop Report was consistent with a l l 
t h e i r previous statements. They declared complete opposition to 
any settlement which might remove any part of Palestine from Arab 
sovereignty. They, therefore, rejected the report i n t o t a l , 
p a r t i t i o n plan and federal state plan. On September 19, 19^7, the 
Arab League P o l i t i c a l Committee met at Sofar and announced that 
any attempt to implement the Uhscop report would be resisted by force 
of arms. At a subsequent meeting, i n Beirut, on October 9» i t was 
resolved that the secret decisions, takne' at Bludany i n 1946, should 
be executed, i f Palestine's i n t e g r i t y were threatened, that " m i l i t a r y 
precautions"be taken on the f r o n t i e r s , that Palestinians receive 
material and moral assistance, and that a defence fund should be sot 
up.(2) In Palestine, the Arabs were confident that they would 
succeed at Lake Success, despite Unscop, or, i f not, they ijould 
f i g h t and win. Compromise was rejected u t t e r l y . The Arabs, therefore, 
put on a brave show, and kept i t up u n t i l well into 1948. However, 
i t i s possible some of the Arab leaders were neither do confident or 
enthusiastic as they seemed, but were unable to make coneessions 
because of pressure from t h e i r peoples. A^m Pasha certainly 
believed t h i s was the situation. ( 3 ) 
1 . Horowitz pp.233-4 
2. K h a i i l pp.164-5 
3. Horowitz -p.234 
(71) 
^y September, 19^7, pressure had increased on the B r i t i s h 
Government to wash t h e i r hands of Palestine. The B r i t i s h public 
had been p a r t i c u l a r l y h o r r i f i e d by the murder, by the Irgun, of 
two sergeants i n r e p r i s a l f o r the hanging of three t e r r o r i s t s . 
In August there was a f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s , and Palestine was costing 
£30-40 m i l l i o n p.a. In India, a deliberate B r i t i s h withdrawal, 
even i f i t had been folloxired by over 2,000,000 Ihdian deaths, had 
taken the problem of India o f f B r i t i s h hands. Also, on August 28, 
the Security Council rejected the Egyptian attempt to have the 
Angle-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 declared i n v a l i d . This l e f t B r i t a i n 
with a legal r i g h t to a base i n Egypt, as an alternative to Palestine, (1) 
Obviously, the B r i t i s h reaction ultimately depended on whether 
Unscop produced a plan which B r i t a i n f e l t able to implement,. Since 
p a r t i t i o n had been discussed since 1937i probably Bevin and his 
advisers expected a p a r t i t i o n plan, which would be rejected by 
both sides, but at least would produce viable states, with the 
Jewish state small enough fo r the Arabs to accept eventually, 
.At the U.N. request, B r i t a i n would implement t h i s solution, and 
get out. V/hat B r i t a i n had not expected was a p a r t i t i o n plan 
which did not produce two viable states, vjhich, therefore, would 
require years of supervision, with f r o n t i e r s of enormous length, 
requiring huge forces of troops to guard, and putting such a hufee 
minority i n the Jewish state that no Arab could consider i t as other 
than an enormous i n j u s t i c e , thus undermining ti& B r i t i s h position 
i n the vjhole Arab World i f B r i t a i n So-operated with the U.N. i n 
implementing the solution. I t i s impossible to know exactly 
what ^evin was hoping f o r . Sir Alan Cunningham's farewell speech 
to Ihscop suggested that a solution, could not give "absolute ju s t i c e 
to everybody," would not be agreed to "wholly" by everybody, therefore 
a solution had to be imposed, and i t had better be imposed soon.(2) 
s 
1 . M;Aroe pp. 165-7 
2, Granados pp.291-2 
(72) 
Logically, Bevin might have expected areas of Jewish majority to 
form a Jewish state. This might have resulted i n the plan being 
similar to the Grady-Morrison plan of 1946. In f a c t , t h i s would 
have been very much the effect i f Unscop had given the Negev to 
the Arab state. I t i s possible that Bevin, by threatening to leave 
Palestine, during the Second Regular Session, was actually trying 
to get America to agree to t h i s , Bevin t o l d Alami, i n November, 
that America would not accept the Mandate and would i n s i s t B r i t a i n kept 
i t . Then Bevin would only agree to stay i f given a free hand,(l) 
The State Department were ce r t a i n l y quite w i l l i n g to hand over the 
Negev to the Arabs, but Bevin's policy, i f such i t was, collapsed 
completely when Truman intervened against the State Department to 
prevent t h i s happening. 
The Americans, having shelved the problem with the 
establishment of Unscop, had to take i t up again, but were i n 
a state of i n t e r n a l confusion. 'Truman wanted a Zionist solution, 
the State Department wanted good relations with the Arabs, and the 
m i l i t a r y advised that America could not spare any troops for the 
Mddle East. These factors made American policy inconsistent and 
in-^e^ective, at least i n producing a viable solution. Truman, 
nat u r a l l y , committted America to p a r t i t i o n i n the opening debate 
of the Second Regular Session, However, i t was impossible to 
reconcile c o n f l i c t i n g advice to produce a considered statement of 
opinion before October 11. I t appears that Truman insisted the 
p a r t i t i o n plan be supported without any major change. However, 
he accepted the Chiefs of Staff advice not to involve American 
troops. Since American policy was against increase of Russian 
influence, t h i s meant that America had to oppose the use of Russian 
troops. This, i n American calculations, only l e f t B r i t a i n to 
implement the plan, f o r no small country would get involved i n such 
a d i f f i c u l t problem. I t would have suited America well for B r i t a i n 
l.Furlonge pp.148-9 
(73) 
to implement the Uhscop p a r t i t i o n plan, bringing down Arab X7rath 
on B r i t i s h heads. This encouraged much wishful thinking i n the 
State Department, even as l a t e as A p r i l , 1948, that B r i t a i n might be 
persuaded to do t h i s . 
(74) 
i i ) E s t a b l i s h i n g the Ad Hoc Committee. 
Three items on Palestine appeared i n the Provisional Agenda, 
prepared by the Secretariat, f o r the Secon^Regular Session of the 
U.N.(l) No,21 was the. o r i g i n a l U.K. request, x^hich had resulted 
i n the establishment of Unscop. No.22 was the Unscop Report, 
No,23 was an Arab states' proposal to terminate the Mandate and 
establish Palestine's independence as "one state." The Secretary-
General suggested that items 21-3 be dealt x-7ith by an ad hoc 
committee,(2) otherwise the F i r s t Committee would have been 
overloaded and unable to complete i t s work u n t i l long after the 
other committees.(3) 
In the General Committee, Mr. Sl-Khoury (Syria) opposed 
the reference of Palestine items to an all hoc committee, on 
grounds that i t should not be made a special case. America and 
B r i t a i n , however, supported an ad hoc committee as a practical 
way of solving U;W. organisational problems, which followed 
l o g i c a l l y from the F i r s t Special Session, The Committee, therefore, 
decided to recommend to the General Assembly to establish an "Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question," to deal with items 21-3 
of the Provisional Agenda,(4) 
VJhen the report of the General Committee was considered by 
the General Assembly, I4r. Jamali (Iraq) repeated Vir. EL-Khoury's 
plea that Palestine should not be singled out for special 
treatment, Mr. ^felik (Lebanon) went further, declaring that 
"peculiar standards were being applied" to Palestine, Also, i n 
an ad hoc committee, alternate delegates would probably be assigned, 
and therefore the problem would not get the attention i t deserved, 
and make the delegates easily susceptible to pressure. However, 
despite Arab protests the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian 
1 . A/329 July 18, 1947 
2 . A/BUR/82 September 12, 1947 
3. A/BUR/83 " " " 
4. General Committee meeting No.35> VJednesday, September 17, 1947. 
Committee x^ as B r a z i l , China, Cuba, France, Mexico, U.S.S.R., U.K., 
U.S.A., Luxembourg, New Zealand, Chile, India, Poland, and Syria. 
(75) 
Question was established by 26 votes to 11, with 6 abstentions.(1) 
This Committee met 3^ times between September 25 and November 25. 
I t s work f e l l i n t o three parts, general debate and hearing witnesses, 
di v i s i o n i n t o subcommittees to prepare possible solutions, and 
consideration of subcommittees* reports. During a l l t h i s time 
delegates were under considerable pressure, and on two occasions 
the Committee met three times i n the day, i n order to complete 
i t s work without an unreasonably long delay.(2) 
1.Meeting No.90, September 23, 19^ 7 (N.B.slight change of t i t l e 
during debate). 
2.On Saturday November 22 (m?.etings 27-9) and Monday November 24 
(meetings 30-2) 
(76) 
i i i ) G e n e r a l Debate and Hearing Witnesses i n the Ad HQc Committee. 
At the Committee's f i r s t meeting(l) Dr. Evatt (Australia) 
was elected Chairman, Siam Vice-Chairman, and Iceland Rapporteur, 
The Committee approved the Chairman's suggestion that the Arab 
Higher Committee and Jewish Agency be i n v i t e d to give evidence(2) 
and that business should not otherwise begin, u n t i l the Committee 
had heard a statement from the U.K., which was to be given the 
next day. Meanwhile, the Chairman asked the delegates to consider 
a time l i m i t on proposals f o r solutions to the Palestine Problem, 
Creech-Jones (U,K.) delivered the expected statement at the 
next meeting, (3) He began with general comments on the Unscop 
Report. B r i t a i n agreed that the tJandate should be terminated, that 
Palestine should be independent, and that displaced persons were 
and international resp o n s i b i l i t y . ( f t ) However, the most significant 
statement was that B r i t a i n would not enforce a solution, unless 
approved by both Arabs and Jews. Of course, the U.K. would not 
obstruct a U.N. settlement, but would not enforce i t unless the 
?UDOve conditions were met. I f they were not, then Creech-Jones 
was instructed to say that B r i t a i n would withdraw. He warned, therefore, 
that any solution that did not meet with the approval of both Arabs 
and Jews should be accompanied by a properly worked out plan 
of implementation. The effect should have been, and probably was 
intended to be a clear warning to Arabs and Jews that i t was i n t h e i r 
best interests to compromise, and to the U.N. that they should not 
propose plans on the assumption that some-one else was going to 
bear the cost of enforcement. 
The Arab Higher Committee gave evidence at the t h i r d meeting 
and the Jewish Agency at the fourth. (5) The Agency answered 
questions and gave further information at meeting No.l?* and the 
Higher Committee at No.l8.(6.)1EA1S6 a't.No.lS, Vfeizmann appeared 
I.September 25, 11.a.m. 
2. A/AC . I V 2 ( i n v i t a t i o n s ) A/AC.1V^, A/AC.1V5 (replies) 
3. Friday September 26, 11 a.m. 
^.Unscop recommendations I , I I . and VI. (see A/364) 
5.September 29, October 2. 5. Ocotber 1? And 18 
(77) 
at the request of the Agency, although he was not acting f o r them 
i n an o f f i c i a l capacity.(l) 
The Higher Committee completely rejected both the majority 
and minority proposals of Unscop. j^fter a detailed exposition 
of the Arab case and condemnation of the Jewish case, the Higher 
Committee proposed that there should be an Arab state i n the whole 
of Palestine. I t should guarantee the generally accepted human 
r i g h t s , protect minority interests and freedom of worship. A 
constituent assembly should be elected, by a l l genuine Palestine 
c i t i z e n s , to draw up a constituion base on the above, A government 
then elected on the basis of t h i s constitution should take over 
from the Mandatory Government. These proposals were incorporated, 
with only d e t a i l changes, i n a Syrian d r a f t resolution, on October 
19^7.(2) This indicates that the Higher Committee was working 
closely xjith the Arab states, but the delay of 11 days between the 
Higher Committee's appearance and the Syrian proposal suggests 
c o n f l i c t , ini/eticiency, or both. 
The Agency stated that i t accepted, i n p r i n c i p l e , the Unscop 
majority plan. I t also re-stated the Jewish case and attacked the 
basis of the Arab case. Much more important, when l a t e r events 
are considered, was i t s declaration that, i f force was necessary to 
implement a a solution, but B r i t i s h forces were not available and 
no other force was forthcoming, then the Agency would maintain order 
i n i t s own areas. VJhen U.N, members began to realise that B r i t a i n 
actually meant what she said when she talked of leaving Palestine, 
the chance that the plan of p a r t i t i o n might be enforced without 
outside intervention, must have weighed, at least to some small 
extent, vjith governments wanting to support the Jews for p o l i t i c a l 
reasons, but not wanting to vote f o r an unworkable scheme or to 
get involved themselves. 
1. v/eizmann pp;55^-5 
2, A/AC.14/22 
(78) 
In the general debate which followed, 32 states expressed 
opinions, with varying degrees of c l a r i t y , on the Palestine Problem. 
The p a r t i t i o n plan was most favoured with 14 states i n favour.(l) 
The Arab states' proposal f o r a unitary state i n Palestine was next 
with 10.(2) The Unscop minority plan died a natural death, with 
the support of only 2 of i t s o r i g i n a l 3 supporters.(3) About 
half the U.N. did not commit themselves. On secondary issues, there 
was an even greater reluctance f o r members to commit themselves, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y over implementation and the connection between 
displaced persons and Palestine. Delegates appear either to have 
forgotten Creech-Jones' statement of B r i t i s h policy, or chosen to 
ignore i t . (4) The supporters of the Arab states' plan assumed that 
no measures of implementation were needed, and to have forgotten that, 
i n t h e i r scheme, the co-operation of B r i t a i n was necessary i n 
establishing a provisiohal government, although to a lesser degree 
than i n the p a r t i t i o n plan. 5 of the supportess of p a r t i t i o n 
ignored implementation or accorded i t no consequence i n t h e i r 
speeches,(5) Russia agreed the question was important, but made no 
de f i n i t e proposals. The American view, that an international force 
might be used, was supported by Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand, 
Only Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Guatemala considered the questions 
of implementation v i t a l l y important,(6) 
On the question of displaced persons, B r i t a i n made a proposal 
that the U,N, should ask a l l countries to take a share of refugees, 
and therefore solve the problem. (7) Since i t vias Jewish policy that 
1. Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, H a i t i , New Zealand, Panama, 
Peru, Poland, Sweden, South Africa, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Uruguay, 
Venezuela. 
2. Afghanistan, Argentine, Egjrpt, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen. 
3 .Iran and Yugoslavia (India was now supporting the Arab proposals) 
il-.Creech-Jones f e l t obliged to restate B r i t i s h policy at the close 
of debate (meeting No.15 Thursday October l6, 3 p.m.^  
5,Panama, Poland, Uruguay,^Peru, H a i t i , Yugoslavia. 
6.Sweden wanted the permanent members of the Security Council to take — 
Guatemala (A/AC.1V13) wanted any but them. 
7. A/AC. 1^14 (79) 
a l l Jewish refugees should go to Palestine, B r i t a i n appeared to be 
working against the Agency. The separation of the refugee issue and 
the Palestine Question was supported by those delegates who had 
spoken i n favour of the Arab states* proposal. However, of the 
uncommitted, only 2 declared f o r a separate solution for the refugees.(l) 
Yugoslavia made a proposal which p a r t l y linked the issues,(2) 
Of the supporters of p a r t i t i o n , only 2 made definite-proposals, 
both l i n k i n g displaced persons with Palestine, Only 4 states 
took the r e a l i s t i c view that unless the U,N.^produced a plan agreed to 
by both Jews and Arabs, any solution proposed by the U,N, was l i k e l y 
to be ignored, and therefore i t was v i t a l l y necessary to get the 
agrement of both parties, otherwise the U,N, was wasting i t s time, 
America, despite i t s earl i e r declaration i n favour of p a r t i t i o n , 
delayed, u n t i l meeting No,11, i t s statement of policy. This seems to 
have been due to extreme caution, great care being given to the 
e d i t i n g of the t e x t , and the President's approval being required.(4) 
This makes the statement worthy of. close study, both f o r what i t said, and 
for what i t did not. America d e f i n i t e l y supported the p a r t i t i o n plan, 
i n the U.N. However, i n U.S.A, opinion, the U,N., by discussing 
Palestine, had not taken r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for Palestine. Responsibility 
lay with the Mandatory Power, However, t h i s did not mean that the 
U.N, could i ^ o r e the problem of implementing p a r t i t i o n , America 
would co-operate with the U,N. during a tr a n s i t i o n a l period, tifould 
help the new states economically and f i n a n c i a l l y , and to maintain 
law and order. This l a s t might i n v o ^ i ^ a volunteer force, recruited 
by the U.N, Enforcement of law and order however, did not refer to 
meeting external inervention, which the U.S.A. declared would not 
happen. This r e a l l y was a declaration that, while the U,S,A, vjould 
f i g h t f o r p a r t i t i o n i n the U.M,, i t would not use i t s troops to 
enforce p a r t i t i o n . Instead, America seemed to hope that B r i t a i n 
could 
while 
be persuaded not to throw o f f responsibility for Palestine, 
re l u c t a n t l y admitting B r i t a i n could not be r e l i e d on to 
co-op«irate completely, 
1, China and Cuba 
2, A/AC,14/19 Yugoslavia wanted entry from refugees i n Cyprus only, 
3, Poland wanted 250,000 admitted immediately, Urugay 30,000 children 
added to Unscop's proposals, 
4, New York Times October 12, 19^7 (see Riggs pp,49-50) 
(80) 
At the next meeting, Russia stated her policy, i n s i s t i n g that 
i t was unchanged from the F i r s t Special Session. The U.S.S.R, 
would have l i k e d a unitary state i n Palestine, i f both Jews and 
Arabs would have agreed on one. However, since they would nd agree, 
the p a r t i t i o n scheme stood more chance of success. Russia did not 
approve of the Unscop plan as i t stood. Adjustments would have to be 
made over f r o n t i e r s , the arrangements for the t r a n s i t i o n from 
mandatory rule to independence, and the status of Jerusalem. 
Although the Soviet delegate refered to the need to make proper 
arrangements f o r implementing a solution, he did not stress t h i s . 
In f a c t , Russia was not committed to more than q u a l i f i e d support for 
p a r t i t i o n . 
The Arab states' major f a i l u r e at th i s stage was the i r 
i n a b i l i t y to arouse interest i n t h e i r scheme to have the Palestine 
•Question refered to the International Court. The scheme does not 
seem to have been well planned, Iraq, on October 14, presented 
a proposal to ask the International Court whether the Palestine 
Mandate was consistent with Britain's promises to the Arabs during 
the F i r s t World V7ar,(l) Apparently, the other Arab states found 
the idea a t t r a c t i v e , and two days l a t e r , Egypt and Syria presented 
proposals to ask the Court vjhether the U,N, or any state was 
Competent to impose p a r t i t i o n on Palestine, against the wishes of 
the majority of i t s inhabitants.(2) I f th i s scheme had succeeded, 
then, whatever the Court's r u l i n g , there would have been s u f f i c i e n t 
delay f o r any U.N. action to be l e f t behind by events. However, 
nearly a l l delegates ignored the proposals, and only Iran gave" 
support t o the Arab states. 
On the conclusion of the general debate, the Chairman 
(Evatt, Australia) proposed that two committees be established 
to deal with some of the proposals. The f i r s t was to be a 
1. A/AC.14/21 
2. A/AC.l4/2ft and A/AC.14/25 
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committee of c o n c i l i a t i o n , as suggested by EL Salvador, to see 
i f i t was possible to get agreement between Jew and Ar.ab^(l) 
The second was to consider the U,S,A./Canadian proposal for a 
subcommittee to prepare a plan based on the Unscop majority plan.(2) 
The Chairman refefed to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a t h i r d subcommittee to 
prepare a plan based on the lirab states' proposals. This was opposed 
by America, who had already proposed that the p a r t i t i o n plan be 
studied exclusively,(3) Russia supported t h i s , and asked the Committee 
to take a decision immediately, approving p a r t i t i o n i n principle 
as a solution. The U,3,S.R. proposal was, however, voted down, 
receiving on3>y 14 votes. Three subcommittees, therefore, were 
established.(4) 
At the Chairman's suggestion, i t was agreed that the committee 
on c o n c i l i a t i o n should!, consist of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman 
and Rapporteur of the Ad HQC Com.mittee, and that the subcommittees 
on the p a r t i t i o n plan and the unitary state plan should be known 
as Subcommittee 1 and Subcommittee 2, each consisting of 9 members. 
The Chairman also suggested that Subcommittee 1 be composed of 
Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Sweden, U.S.S.R,, U.S.A., 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Belgium promptly refused to serve, 
declaring that Belgium had not yet taken up a position on the issue. 
Russia t r i e d to get the whole of the permanent members of the 
Security Council on Subcommittee 1. Russia presum^ably hoped that 
i f Security Council members supported a solution i n the Subcommittee, 
then they might also support i t i n the Security Council, which 
Russia l a t e r made i t clear she saw as the supervising authority 
to implement a solution, Russia insisted on a vote, despite two 
Security Council members (B r i t a i n and Belgium) having already 
stated they would not serve. The proposal was defeated, 32 to 6. 
1. A/AC.14/21 
2. A/AC,14/17 and A/AC,14/23 
3, A/AC,14/16 j o i n t l y with Svjeden 
4, Voting vras f o r subcommittee on co n c i l i a t i o n , unanimous, 
on p a r t i t i o n 35 to n i l (8 abstentions) 
on unitary state 30 " 10 (6 " ) 
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i.v.)The Acceptance of P a r t i t i o n by the Ad Hoc Committee, 
The Committee then agreed to l e t the Chairman choose the subcommittees 
from those w i l l i n g to serve. 
For convenience, Subcommittee 1 divided i n t o 7 working 
groups, each considering one important aspect of the Uhscop Report.(l) 
These groups recommended no important changes to Uhsccp's 
provisions f o r the Holy Places, citizenship, international 
Conventions and f i n a n c i a l obligations, or economic union, Jerusalem 
was to be controlled by the Trusteeship Council. None of the above 
caused any controversy. Boundaries seem to have caused the Agency 
most v^orry, but delegates regarded implementation as the m.ost 
d i f f i c u l t problem. B r i t a i n , the Arab Higher Committee, and the 
Jewish Agency were i n v i t e d to send observers to the subcommittees. 
However? the Higher Committee, true to i t s s p o l i c y of complete 
non-co-operation with p a r t i t i o n , refused to send an observer to 
Subcommittee 1, 
On boundaries, the most c r i t i c a l area was the Negev. f f 
i t were transfered to the Arab state, then the strangle hold which 
the- p a r t i t i o n plan gave to the Jews over Palestine x^ould be removed. 
Yet i t was extremely d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y placing many thousands of 
Arabs under Jewish rule i n an area where Jewish population was 
ne g l i g i b l e . There was a p o s s i b i l i t y , how much appreciated by the 
Jews i t i s impossible to say, that, i f the Negev were excluded from 
the Jewish state, B r i t a i n might implement the U.N. p a r t i t i o n plan, 
at least to the extent of excluding Jews from i\rab areas. The Agency 
believed that Bevin held the Negev outside Jewish interests, (2 ) 
1. No.l on Holy Places directed by Czechoslovakia. 
No.2 on Bitizenship directed by Uruguay. 
No.3 on International conventions and f i n a n c i a l obligations 
directed by Guatemala, 
No.4 on economic union directed by Guatemala. 
No.5 on boundaries directed by Poland and Uruguay 
iJb'®6 on implementation consisting of Canada, Guatemala, Russia, America. 
No.7 on Jerusalem directed by Czechoslovakia. 
2. Horowitz p.268 says Bevin said so to Creech-Jones. 
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and B r i t a i n c e r t a i n l y raised objection to the Jews having the 
Negev i n the xwrking group on boundaries. They may have been 
r i g h t , since Eevin said p r i v a t e l y i n November, that he would 
only stay i n Palestine i f America gave up interference an gave 
him a free hand,(l) B r i t a i n apparently did convince the State 
Department, After consultation with American delegates at Lake 
Success, the Department ordered that the U.S.A, should support the 
transfer of the southern part of the Negev to ths Arab state. 
The Agency frustrated t h i s however, by an appeal, via Weizmann, 
to Truman. The President was convinced by Weizmann*s presentation 
of the case, and countermanded the State Department*s orders,(2) 
Apart from t h i s , no major change was attempted. No real Jewish 
objection was made to the transfer of Jaffa to the Arab state. 
This was not surprising, Jaffa, i n an isolated enclave, was no 
threat to the Jewish state, but i t s transfer to the Arabs reduced 
the Arab minority i n the Jewish state. 
In discussion of implementation, the wealaiess of the American 
policy became obvious. Debate dragged on for 13 meetings, and the 
report of Subcommittee 1 was.delayed u n t i l Novembbr 19. At f i r s t 
America persisted i n assuming B r i t a i n would, f i n a l l y , implement 
a U.N. solution. In the end, the section on implementation might 
well have been drafted by the B r i t i s h representative. On October 31) 
America proposed that B r i t a i n hand over control to the new states, 
graduallij, as she withdrew. Withdrawal was to be completed by July 1, 
1948, This, i n e f f e c t , was asking B r i t a i n to implement the p a r t i t i o n 
plan i n a mere 6 months transtional period. The reaction of the 
B r i t i s h delegate was to repeat the September 26 statement, that 
B r i t a i n would not implement a plan unless both sides agreed to i t , 
Russia then proposed that ths Ilandate should end on January 1, 1948, 
and B r i t a i n withdraw by A p r i l 30« Order was to be preserved by an armed 
m i l i t i a of Jews and Arabs, under Security Council supervision. 
1. Furlonge pp.148-9 
2, Weizmann pp.561-2 reports his meeting with Truman and influence 
of Weizraann over Truman i s obvious. 
(84) 
America and Russia then reconciled t h e i r proposals, after an 
i n t e r v a l which suggested very careful consultation with t h e i r 
governments, and possibly talks with Britain.(1) The result was 
a j o i n t proposal f o r the I-landate to end to end on May 1, 1948, 
vjith the new states to become independent by July 1. A commission 
of 5 small powers, under directives of the General Assembly, but 
supervised by the Security Council, would implement the solution. 
The implication was clear. The commission could not possibly 
implement any solution requiring use of force, but the necessity 
for force was becoming steadily more obvious, therefore i t was 
being assumed that B r i t a i n would co-operate with the commission and 
implement a solution, 
B r i t i s h reaction was tr- announce that troops would not be 
withdravm completel.y before August 1, and, while they remained i n 
occupation of any area, they would retain responsibility for law 
and order i n that area, but they would not enforce a U.N. solution. 
The c i v i l administration would be maintained u n t i l i t was obvious 
the U.N. decision was not accepted by both Jews and Arabs, and 
would not necessarily be maintained i n the areas s t i l l occupied by 
B r i t a i n during a withdrawal. In response to questioning, the 
B r i t i s h delegate did not appear well briefed. He declared i f the 
U.N. approved a solution, B r i t a i n would not obstruct i t . However, 
he had no instructions on the B r i t i s h attitude to the proposed U.N. 
commission^ a c t i v i t i e s , , i n areas x^here the c i v i l adm.inistration had 
been l a i d dov/n but were s t i l l occupied. He did not know the date when 
the vdthdrawal would begin, the stages i t would follow, or even the 
exact d e f i n i t i o n of an occupied area, therefore he could not say which 
areas the commisssion might be able to take over before the tflithdrawal 
xras completed. 
In response, therefore, the working group altered i t s plan 
so that the Mandate should terminate and B r i t i s h forces be withdrawn 
l.Granados p.253 
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on a date to be agreed, but not l a t e r than August 1, 1948. Pa r t i t i o n 
would become effective by October 1, 1948. B r i t a i n would maintain 
law and order and public services i n areas where they were not handed 
over to the commission. The f i v e members of the commission were to 
be Guatemala, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Uruguay, During the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the working group, many people were surprised at the 
c6-operation between America and Russia, apparently not realising that, 
although i n t h i s case t h e i r immediate objectives were similar, t h e i r 
motives were e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t . ( 1 ) 
Subcommittee 2, on the unitary state, completed i t s work much 
more quickly than Subcommittee 1, but refused to release i t s report 
other than simultaneously with that of Subcommittee 1, I t s report 
asserted that Unscop had f a i l e d to consider the l e g a l i t y of the 
Balfour Declaration and similar international agreements, and had 
ignore the question of the rights of the inhabitants of Palestine to 
self-determination. These points should be refered to the International 
Court, The Committee declared that Palestine had accepted a 
"disproportionately large" number of Jewish refugees, called upon 
countries of o r i g i n to take them back, and other countries to accept 
them where return to t h e i r native lands was impossible, A special 
committee was suggested to co-ordinate the re-settlement of Jews 
among U,N, members, Palestine should be established as a unitary 
state, on lines previously suggested by the Arab states and the Arab 
Higher Committee,(2) 
The Committee on Conciliation had no success. Actually, i t 
does not seem to have t r i e d very hard, although t h i s i s understandable, 
considering how vehemently both sides vjere expounding irreconcilable 
principles, ( 3 ) 
1, For the report of Subcommittee 1, see A/AC.14/34 and A/AC,14/34 
add. 1. 
2, For the report of Subcommittee 2, see A/AC,14/32, 
3, For the report of Subcommittee . , see A/AC,14/SR,23, For c r i t i c i s m 
of Subcommittee, see remarks of France and Syria, General Assembly 
meeting No,127, November 28, 
(86) 
Reports were presented at meeting No.23 of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Palestinian Question, Wednesday '^lovember 19, 
and discussed at the 11 subsequent meetings between then and 
Tuesday, November 25, 
Sir Alexander Cadogan (U.K.), now appearing better briefed 
than i n the working group, c l a r i f i e d the B r i t i s h position, to some 
extent, by raising further objections. These indicated that B r i t a i n 
was going to control Palestine xdth no interference from the U.N. 
u n t i l a certain date chosen by B r i t a i n . At that date, the Mandate 
would end and Palestine become a U.M. responsibility. B r i t a i n , 
therefore, would not accept Security Council control over the 
timing of the end of the Mandate or the B r i t i s h withdrawal, both 
of which being implied by Subcommittee I's report. B r i t a i n would 
not hand over authority to a provisional government, but only to 
the U.N. Sir Alexander warned, therefore, that proper provision 
fo r the U.N. to assume control of Palestine s t i l l had not been 
made. 
In the end, the question of transfer of authority from 
B r i t a i n to the provisional governments of whatever plan the U.N. 
should adopt was never cleared up. Subcommittee 1 held 3 meetings 
and struck out the references to Security Council interference, 
which B r i t a i n found so offensive, but did not c l a r i f y the status of 
t e r r i t o r y s t i l l occupied by B r i t i s h troops after B r i t a i n had declared 
the Mandate ended. Subcommittee 2 should have had an easier task. 
I t could simply have declared that B r i t a i n should transfer authority 
to the U.N. commission when the Mandate ended, and that the commission 
should then transfer i t to the provisional government. However, the 
subcommittee refused to accept B r i t i s h d i c t a t i o n and i t s 
recommendations remained unaltered. 
America s t i l l persisted i n t r y i n g to soften the blow which 
p a r t i t i o n would deal to the Arabs. The inclusion of the Negev i n 
(87) 
the Jewish state was s t i l l widely c r i t i c i s e d , but American delegates 
were under s t r i c t orders not to deviate from t h i s part of the 
p a r t i t i o n plan, ^owever, the Jewish Agency i t s e l f responded to t h i s 
c r i t i c i s m by offering to transfer Beersheba to the Arab state, and 
t h i s was incorporated i n an American proposal,(1) The Agency offer 
aroused much surprise, and vjas welcomed as a generous gesture, but 
i s understandable i f i t i s assumed that the Agency was concerned to 
preserve the essentials of the p a r t i t i o n plan, and were not worried 
about the transfer of the Arab population of Beersheba from the 
Jewish state. Another conciliatory gesture by America towards the 
Arabs was the removal of the commission*s two most ardent Zionists, 
Granados (Guatemala) and Fabregat (Uruguay), America supported a 
proposal by Pakistan and Norway that the membership of the coraiiiission 
should be l e f t to the General Assembly, Granados was very b i t t e r 
at being excluded, and afterwards wrote that those who had supported 
his_ membership of the commission changed their minds after American 
lia'son men had spoken to them i n the delegates* lounge, (2) 
America also remained determined that American troops should 
not become involved. When Denmark proposed that the Security Council 
should be instructed to regard any attempt to f r u s t r a t e a UN solution 
by force as a threat to peace, which would have obliged the Council 
to raise U.N, forces against the Arabs i f they carried out t h e i r 
threats against p a r t i t i o n , America objected. Obviously America 
considered U.N, forces would probably have to be American. The 
re s u l t was the Danish proposal was watered down to a simple exhortation 
to the Council to do i t s duty, (3) 
Surprisingly, B r i t a i n did not object to Subcommittee I's 
request f o r the I'landatory power to make available a port for 
1, A/AC, 14/38 
2, Granados pp,258-260 
3, A/AC,14/43 and A/AC,14/43 Rev,l, November 24 and 25, 1947 
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Jewish immigration, before the Mandate ended. Britain's attitude 
seems to have raised some Jewish hopes that B r i t a i n would, i n the 
end, grant t h i s request, but Britain's real intention seems to have 
been tha t , since i t was only a request i t could be ignored 
eventually and, meanwhile, i t was better not to make a fuss i n the 
U.N. 
Subcommittee 2's recommendations were voted f i r s t . The 
proposal f o r reference to the International court v/as defeated, but 
with enough votes i n favour to show that many delegations would 
have been happy to see the whole problem shelved.(1) The proposal 
to ask the Court whether the U.N. could enforce a decsion contrary 
to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine was 
only defeated by one vote.(2) Of three proposals on displaced 
persons, one was actually passed,(3) and the whole section was only 
rejected by the Chairman's casting vote.(4) The proposal for a 
unitary state, however, was decisively defeated.(5) A long l i s t 
of amendments, mostly t r i v i a l , had been prepared f o r the report 
of Subcommittee 1.(6) Pakistan attempted to get the Subcommittee's 
recommendations on boundaries refered to a new commission, but 
failed. ( 7 ) The plan f o r p a r t i t i o n with economic union was then 
accepted, but with nothing l i k e the 2/3 majority required f o r 
approval by the General Assembly.(8) 
l , l 8 : 2 5 i l l ( i . e . votes for:against:abstentions) 
2.20:21:13 
3,17:14:23, 18:16:21, 15:18:22 
4,17:16:26 
5.12:29:14 
6. A/AC.14/35-40 and 42-46 
7. A/AC. 14/40 
8.25:13:17 (as No.l) 
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V,)The Passage of the November 29. 1947. Resolution f o r P a r t i t i o n , 
Although, T^hen the delegates assembled, on November 26, 1947» 
to consider, i n the General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Palestinian Question*s report, the plan f o r p a r t i t i o n seemed only 
to lack one vote f o r a 2/3 majority, appearances were deceptive. 
There was the usual large proportion of abstentions to be found i n 
a U.N, committee, where many countries were eager not to get 
involved i n the issue being discussed. In the General Assembly, 
however, these countries often committed themselves after consulting 
t h e i r governments. However, i f the supporters of p a r t i t i o n divided 
the votes of former abstainers equally with the opponents of p a r t i t i o n , 
then a 2/3 majority would be further away. After November 25, 
when the l a s t vote was taken i n the Ad Hoc Committee, the supporters 
of p a r t i t i o n had to gain one extra vote plus two extra votes for 
every extra one gained by the opposition. The result was, when 3 
previous abstainers, Belgium, Netherlands, and New Zealand announced 
support f o r p a r t i t i o n , and 3 others, Philippines, Greece, and H a i t i 
announced opposition, the p a r t i t i o n i s t s were i n a worse position, 
needing 4 extra votes,(1) Zionists had hopes of Luxembourg and 
France voting f o r p a r t i t i o n , ( 2 ) but even th i s l e f t a d e f i c i t of 
2 votes, A South American f r i e n d t o l d the Jewish Agency leaders, 
who viere h o r r i f i e d at t h i s s i t u a t i o n , "Go home. The sight of your 
faces i s demoralising your friends."(3) The only solution seemed 
to the Agency to be to work for a postponement so that pressure 
could be used on uncommitted or weakly committed delegations 
to obtain a majority when the p a r t i t i o n plan was f i n a l l y voted. 
Zionist supporters, p a r t i c u l a r l y Fabregat (Uruguay) made long 
speeches, to which l i t t l e attention vjas paid. This prevented the 
speakers' l i s t being completed i n meetings 124 and 125. The p a r t i t i o n i s t s 
mustered enough votes to prevent a proposed night meeting to 
complete the Assembly's business, and therefore a vote was postponed 
l,See p,9'2, f o r a stage by stage examination of the voting and 
po t e n t i a l voting November 26-29 (Table e n t i t l e d "The Struggle 
for P a r t i t i o n " ) . 
2. Granados p.267 
3, Horowitz p,299 
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u n t i l , at least,'Friday, November 28.(1) What was significant 
about the p a r t i t i o n i s t s ' success i n t h i s case was i t s narrow 
raargin,"7on;iyf.24,v6tessagaihstntheJ;nigh±^^^^ to 21 i n favour. 
The vote showed that, not only were many abstainers prepared to 
see p a r t i t i o n rejected, but several who had voted for p a r t i t i o n 
i n Committee were prepared to see i t f a i l to gain a 2/3 majority. 
By Friday November 28, 1947, the situation had changed. 
Two abstainers, Paraguay and Liberia, had been won to p a r t i t i o n , 
plus two of the opposition, H a i t i and the Philippines. Also, 
one of the opposition, Thailand, was absent, the delegate being 
disowned by his government as a resul t of a revolution. This 
gave the p a r t i t i o n i s t s 8 votes beyond that required for a 2/3 
majority. Zionists and t h e i r supporters were eager for an 
immediate vote, but when France proposed a postponement to allow 
a f i n a l attempt to bring both sides together, the majority of the 
U.N. approved, shovdng again that p a r t i t i o n x*as not regarded as 
a v i t a l issue by the majoTity . (2) Not surprisingly, t h i s l a s t 
attempt at co n c i l i a t i o n f a i l e d , and the General Assembly met 
fo r a f i n a l debate and vote on Saturday, November 29, 1947. 
Lebanon, i n an obviously desperate attempt to avoid defeat, 
proposed a new federal plan. Iran, with similar motives, t r i e d to 
have the General Assembly adjourned. Both attempts f a i l e d when 
the Chairman (Brazil) gave the p a r t i t i o n vote p r i o r i t y . The f i n a l 
vote, therefore, v;as 33 favour, 13 against, 10 abstentions, and 
1 absent. P a r t i t i o n of Palestine was, therefore, approved by the 
U.N, (3) 
1. Thursday November 27 was a holiday for Thanksgiving. 
2. Voting was 25 to 15. 
3. The only surprise between Friday and Saturday was Chile's 
move from support to abstention. 
(91) 
The Struggle f o r P a r t i t i o n . 
Date Votes 
November For Against Abstention Absent Credit/deficit 
f o r p a r t i t i o n 
25 25 13 17 2 - 1 
26 (a) 28 16 12 1 
(b) 30 16 11 - -2 
28 3^ 13 9 1 + 8 
29 33 13 10 1 +7 
Key 
November 25 i s the f i n a l vote of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
November 26 (a) i s the Committee vote adjusted by declarations 
of intent of delegates at General Assembly meetings 
124 and 125. 
November 26 (b) i s the above adjusted by Granados' estimate of the 
situation on the evening of November 26, 
November 28 i s the above adjusted by Granados' estimate for 
that date plus declarations of delegates, 
November 29 i s the actual vote of the General Assembly on p a r t i t i o n , 
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vi)The Forces Which Produced a ^ia.^ority f o r P a r t i t i o n . 
Much has been wr i t t e n about the Zionists' s k i l l i n using 
pressure to gain a 2/3 majority i n the U.N, However, the effect 
of pressure used by the Zionists would have been minimal without 
the special advantages they enjoyed i n the situation which existed 
i n November 19^7. These advantages tend to be overlooked. 
Zionist ideas were always more acceptable i n countries with 
European and Christian t r a d i t i o n s than i n other parts of the World. 
In European and Christian countries, i n the 20th Century, a feeling 
of g u i l t at past persecution of Jews and anti-Jewish prejudice i n 
general, alvrays lay close to the surface of people's consciences. 
In 19^7, t h i s feeling was very strongly re-enforced by the 
recent revelations of Nazi massacres of the Jews i n Germany and 
eastern Europe. In these countries also, the Jews had t h e i r 
strongest organisations. This produced a special advantage, 
because, i n November 19^ 79 of the 57 states i n the U.N.,'37 could 
be described as predominantly Christian and European in.tradition, ( 1 ) 
The key factoc i n Zionist success, however, was t h e i r doznination of 
America, America's large Jewish population, led by Zionist organisations, 
was able to sway the American people to the Zionist cause, even 
to t o l ^ e r a t i n g barely disguised advertisements f o r funds f o r 
guns f o r t e r r o r i s t s , to be used against B r i t a i n , which was supposed 
to be America's most important a l l y . Through Weizmann, Zionists 
had access to the President. Through Jewish donations to party funds, 
and Jewish votes, Zionists had a p o l i t i c a l influence which the 
President could not ignore. While there i s l i t t l e doubt that President 
Truman always believed that what he was doing was morally j u s t i f i e d , 
and even praiseworthy, i t seems hardly l i k e l y that he would have been 
prepared to back his own judgement against that of the State Department, 
which opposed p a r t i t i o n , i f personal and p o l i t i c a l pressures had been 
pro-Arab and not pro-Zionist. 
l.This can been seen by examining the table e n t i t l e d "Policies and 
votes of U.N. members," given on p. 9^ and 95-
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1,Europe 
Policies and Votes of U.N. Members 
Policy stated i n Vote i n Ad 
Ad Hoc Committee 
a) Western 
Norway Y 
Sweden Y 
Iceland 
Denmark A 
Belgium A 
France 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
B r i t a i n A 
b) Eastern 
Czechoslovakia Y 
Yugoslavia N 
Greece 
2.The Americas 
Bolivia Y 
Donimican Republic Y 
Guatemala Y 
Panama Y 
Peru Y 
Uruguay Y 
U.S.A. Y 
Venezuela Y 
Hoc Committee 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
A 
A 
A 
Y 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
(continued p,95) 
General Assembly 
Vote November 29 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Key 
Y = vote or statement i n favour of p a r t i t i o n . 
N = " " " against " 
A = abstention on p a r t i t i o n . 
- = absence or no policy stated 
Within the geographical divisions, countries vjith a similar voting 
pattern have been grouped together. 
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The Americas (continued) 
Brazil 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Nicaragua 
Paraguay 
H a i t i 
Chile 
Argentina 
Colombia 
Honduras 
Mexico 
El Salvador 
Cuba 
3. The Soviet Bloc 
Poland 
U.S.S.R. 
^e l o r u s s i a 
Ukraine 3.S.R. 
4. The Commonwealth 
Canada 
South Africa 
Australia 
New Zealand 
5. The Arab League 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Lebanon 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
Yemen 
A 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
Y 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
(continued on p.96) 
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6.other Countries of Asia and Africa 
Philippines - - ^ 
Liberia - A I 
Ethiopia - A A 
Thailand - N -
Turkey - N N 
Afghanistan N N N 
India N N N 
Iran N N N 
Pakistan N N N 
(96) 
Success i n America brought American influence i n other 
countries to the aid of the Zionists, Western Europe was recovering 
from the Second World War and was largely dependent on American aid, 
Latin America was very much influenced by American economic policy. 
Also, Latin American countries had been encouraged to rel y for arms 
on the sale of U,S,A, surplus or obsolete m i l i t a r y supplies. Europe 
and Latin America together t o t a l l e d 29 U.N. members, ju s t over 50^. 
American p o l i t i c a l and economic influence was also important, over 
the whole World. 
F i n a l l y , f o r reasons e n t i r e l y unconnected with Zionist', Russia 
had decided to support p a r t i t i o n . This automatically provided 4 
votes dominated by Russia, and, of course, Russia was able to put 
pressure on other countries, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Eastern Europe, 
Altogether, therefore, the Zionists could r e l y on, or have reasonable 
hopes of at worst an abstention, about kl countries out of 57• 
Policy statements and votes cast support the thesis outlined 
above. Only 3 countries with a Christian/European background voiced 
opposition to p a r t i t i o n . Of these, two (Greece and Yugoslavia) were 
of Eastern rather than Western Christian t r a d i t i o n s , and one 
(Yugoslavia) had a Moslem minority. Only Cuba was a real exception. 
In Vfestern Europe there i s circumstantial evidence of American pressure, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y after the Ad Hoc Committee vote of November 25, 19^7, 
In the Committee, only 2 (Norway and Sweden) declared support for 
p a r t i t i o n , while 3 (Denmark, Belgium, and B r i t a i n ) declared they would 
abstain, and ^ (Iceland, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) 
did not declare an a t t i t u d e . However, i n the Committee vote, one 
previously uncommitted (Iceland) and one previous abstainer (Denmark) 
supported p a r t i t i o n . At the General Assembly vote, on November 29, 
19^7t a l l Western Europe, except B r i t a i n , voted f o i p a r t i t i o n . B r i t a i n , 
of course, was i n a desperate f i n a n c i a l situation and dependent on 
America. However, i t would probably be a mistake to assume American 
influence had no effect i n Britain's case. Rather than defying American 
pressure by abstaining, B r i t a i n , more l i k e l y was being forced, by 
American pressure, not to oppose a U.N. action, of which Br i t a i n very 
strongly disapproved, 
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American influence does not appear so obviously i n Latin 
/anerica, buththe pattern of voting suggestd that American pressure 
converted to support many countries which would have prefered to 
abstain, 9 refused to commit themselves i n the Committee, but, of 
these, at the Committee vote, 4 supported p a r t i t i o n , 4 abstained, and 
1 was absent, but l a t e r supported p a r t i t i o n . Of the rest, 7 
consistently supported p a r t i t i o n , and 1 (Cuba) consistently opposed 
i t . 5 appeared determined to avoid taking an a t t i t u d e . Only Rati 
and Chile's behaviour was e r r a t i c . 
Russian controlled votes were s o l i d l y behind p a r t i t i o n 
throughout. Czechoslovakia's support f o r p a r t i t i o n suggests Russia 
pressure (Czechoslovakia was s t i l l independent), and i n the case of 
Yugoslavia there i s evidence that Russian pressure changed the 
Yugoslavian vote from opposition to abstention. 
Since voting i n the U.N, i s supposed to be free, the use of 
pressure i s generally concealed and therefore not well documented. 
However, America was accused i n the U.N. of "tackling each delegation 
i n hotel room, i n bed, i n corridors and ante rooms, to threaten them 
with economic sanctions or bribe them with promises,"(1) Sir Mohamed 
Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan) declared that, although he succeeded i n 
persuading a " s u f f i c i e n t number" of delegates against p a r t i t i o n , 
"they were not permitted to stand by the r i g h t as they saw i t . " These 
accusations, which might well be taken f o r propaganda, are confirmed 
by Sumner Welles, who declared that "every form of pressure" was used 
where i t had a chance of succeeding.(2) David Horowitz wrote afterwards 
that p a r t i t i o n was only accepted because of American pressure.(3) 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t , however, to give examples. The votes for H a i t i 
and Philippines seem l i k e l y examples of pressure, with t h e i r delegates 
1. General Assembly meeting No.124, November 26, 1946 (speech 
by Lebanon) 
2. Welles p.63 
3. Horowitz p.301 
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making sudden changes of att i t u d e , Cuba, whose geographical 
position and trad i t i o n s suggested 
she was voting against p a r t i t i o n , 
brought to bear on us." American 
Zionist pressure, which, i n Ajneric 
i n high o f f i c i a l positions, acting; on the i r om i n i t i a t i v e . 26 
senators sent a telegram to the Philippine delegation asking for 
a vote f o r p a r t i t i o n , and at least 
Philippine delegation i n person. 
support f o r p a r t i t i o n , declared 
"despite the pressure which has been 
pressure i s also confused with 
a, often came from Zionist supporters 
two Supreme Court judges saw the 
Harvey Firestone, with considerable 
business interests i n Liberia, telephoned the Liberian C-overnment 
asking f o r a vote f o r p a r t i t i o n . ( 
f o r p a r t i t i o n , when Liberia might 
to vote against. 
A further d i f f i c u l t arises 
pressure vjas used, Zionists seem 
of some American o f f i c i a l s on t h 
included i n Weizmann's l i s t of 
obtaining the p a r t i t i o n vote ( 2 ) , 
of Forrestal, who cer t a i n l y was 
found, on consulting Baruch, that 
e i r 
thos 
not 
) This may explain Liberiaivote 
have been more naturally inclined 
i n t r y i n g to estimate what 
to have overestimated the eff o r t s 
behalf. Bernard Baruch i s 
e xvho did valuable work i n 
fcut Baruch was a close associate 
a supporter of Zionism, and he 
"not a l l Jews are Zionists, " ( 3 ) 
American pressure does not seem to have been used to any great 
extent u n t i l near November 25, whm the f i n a l vote was taken i n 
Committee, and only became very sirong after the Committee vote 
indicated the p a r t i t i o n plan t^ 'as 
of course, also used pressure, Ru 
Costa Rica and Guatemala(5), and 
i n great danger. Other countries, 
psia on Yugoslavia (ij-), the Arabs on 
the few examples available are. 
almost ce r t a i n l y , only a t i n y f r a i t i o n of the a c t i v i t i e s inside and 
outside of Lake Success, during t 
1. L i l i e n t h a l pp.60-67 gives these 
2. Weizmann p.560 
3. Rogow p.156 
4 . Granados p.265 
5. Granados p.26^ 
le l a s t days of November, 19^7. 
examples. 
(^9) 
CHAPTER FOUR 
UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES BETWEEN THE SECOND REGULAR SESSION AND 
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION 
i)Russian.American, and B r i t i s h Policies. 
I f the work of the Second Regular Session was proof that the 
U.N, could take decisions i f only Russia and America co-operated, 
then the work of the U.N, af t e r the.Second Regular Session i s proof 
that, without t h e i r co-operation, npthing effective could be done. 
The contrast was obvious. Up to November 29, 1947, Russia and 
America were w i l l i n g to compromise to reach agreement. After 
November 29, "every word vjas weighed cautiously l e s t i t should 
commit the speaker to some a c t i o n , " ( l ) This was understandable. 
From the F i r s t Special Session onwards, the lesser powers had wanted 
to thrust r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for Palestine onto the Great Powers. Nothing 
had happened to make them change t h e i r minds, not even the minds of 
the majority who had voted for p a r t i t i o n . Rather, the increasing 
violence i n Palestine, i n early 1948, was l i k e l y , more than ever, to 
make them determined not to become involved. In the Security Council, 
i n 19^, of the 6 non-permanent members, 2 (Argentina and Colombia) 
had consistently abstained on p a r t i t i o n , 1 (Belgium) had been a 
la s t minute conversion, despite i t s delegate's obvious dissatisfaction 
with the plan. Only 2 (Canada and the Ukraine) had consistently 
supported p a r t i t i o n , while 1 (Syria) was t o t a l l y opposed. L i t t l e , 
therefore, could be expected from the lesser powers i n the Security 
Council. L i t t l e more could be expected from the permanent members. 
2 ( B r i t a i n and China) had abstained. France had been a l a s t minute 
conversion. Only America and Russia had consistently supported 
p a r t i t i o n . Upon t h e i r co-operation, therefore, depended any hope of 
effective action i n Palestine, either to enforce the p a r t i t i o n 
resolution, or to seek and agree an alternative solution. This 
co-operation, however, was hot forthcoming. 
I.Horowitz p.315 
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Russia's a t t i t u d e x\'as the simplest of the three powers most 
involved, Russia's aim had been to get B r i t a i n to leave Palestine, 
I f B r i t a i n withdrew, and no great power dominated the Middle East, 
then, to Russia, i t would have been very satisfactory. Therefore, 
Russia had no real incentive to see p a r t i t i o n properly implemented. 
Indeed, any plan to enforce p a r t i t i o n after a B r i t i s h withdrawal 
raised the danger of American troops entering the area. The Russians, 
however, appeared to realise that America would be very reluctant to 
send i n her troops, and the nain fear of the Russians, at t h i s time, 
which can be deduced from U.N. records, seems to have been that 
the Security Council might f i n d some formula to sati s f y B r i t a i n 
and allow B r i t a i n to stay, Britain's determination to leave Palestine 
must have appeared to the Russians to be based on her objections to 
p a r t i t i o n , therefore, to ensure that B r i t a i n did not change her mind, 
the Russians strongly opposed any attempt to water dovm the p a r t i t i o n 
plan, s t i l l , of course, with seriously proposing any means on j ' ^ 
implementation. As months passed i n 19^8, i t became obvious that 
B r i t a i n was leaving, whatever happened, and, therefore, the Russians 
l o s t i n t e r e s t . Their suspicions were, however, aroused, when America 
proposed a second special session to consider a temporary trusteeship 
for Palestine, which seemed again to raise the p o s s i b i l i t y of a halt 
i n the B r i t i s h withdrawal, and which, therefore, was opposed by 
Russia, 
U.S.A. policy was produced by a complex situation inside America. 
The p a r t i t i o n plan had never been popular within the State Department. 
From his appointment on September 17, 19^7j the Secretary of Defence, 
Forrestal, had become convinced that support f o r Zionism would be a 
desaster f o r American interests i n the Middle East, ^y early 19^8, 
t h i s conviction had become an obsession. In his b e l i e f , he was 
largely supported by his colleagues, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, who believed that support f o r p a r t i t i o n might lead to American 
forced being committed which were needed elsewhere. The Joint Chiefs 
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were p a r t i c u l a r l y conscious of the need to economise on men and 
materials, because Truman had insisted on cuts i n the defense estimates, 
for the f i n a n c i a l year, July 1948-June 19^9, to a le v e l f a r below 
that considered safe by the Joint Chiefs, Since i t was generally 
considered that the reduction i n defence expenditure was to curry 
favour with voters i n the 1948 election. State Department Chiefs 
were sympathetic to charges that Truman was putting p o l i t i c a l 
considerations before national security, both on defence spending and 
Palestine, They became p a r t i c u l a r l y worried af t e r the Russia coup 
in Czechoslovakia, February 22, 1948. However, t h i s would have made 
l i t t l e difference i f , by about the end of March, 1948, Forrestal, and 
probably Marshall, the Secretary of State, and other State Department 
o f f i c i a l s , had not become convinced Truman was going to lose the 
Presidential election, (1) The State Department, therefore, concluded 
they could act without reference to Truman, and resulted i n the Ajnerican 
delegate i n the Security Council proposing a temporary trusteeship 
for Palestine to replace the p a r t i t i o n plan. This was announced on 
March 19, and Marshall took f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r advising Truman, 
although Truman had not been advised at a l l . That the State Department 
could take such an action shows that TruHBin, at thi s time, was very 
preoccupied with his election campaign, and had not been supervising 
the State Department as closely as he might have been expected 
normally. Also, Truman had not been informed of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
by Zionists. The Jewish Agency certainly appreciated such a change 
of p o licy was l i k e l y , but, over-persistent Zionist propagandists had 
caused Truman to exclude Zionists from his presence. However, on 
Inarch 18, Truman had given one interview to Weizmann, gained by the 
intercession of Truman's former business associate, Eddie Jacobson, 
and Truman had promised continued support f o r p a r t i t i o n . The following 
day, Truman was shocked to hear the State Department's proposals. 
He f e l t he had been made to appear a l i a r . He could hardly contradict 
l.Rogow pp.164-73 and 253-58 
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the American delegate's proposal without making America appear 
ridiculous, therefore he allowed the State Department to carry on 
with arrangements f o r the Second Special Session. However, he 
remained determined to support the Zionist cause, and did so by 
giving I s r a e l immediate recognition, as soon as the state was declared. 
This was done without p r i o r notice to the State Department, which 
was t i l l , i n the U,N., struggling with various proposals f o r a solution 
i n Palestine, other than p a r t i t i o n . The State Department o f f i c i a l s were 
very b i t t e r about the President's action, but his authority was not 
questioned again over Palestine, 
Much has been written about the incomprehensibility of B r i t i s h 
policy, or lack of B r i t i s h policy, between November 29, 19^ 7» and 
Nay 1^, 19^8, when B r i t a i n ended the Mandate, However, examination 
of the scanty evidence that i s available suggests a thesis that 
explains these inconsistencies. 
B r i t a i n had decided to leave Palestine, before the Second Regular 
Session began. This was not taken seriously at the time, but cannot 
now be doubted. However, Jews and Russians were afraid B r i t a i n v;as 
looking f o r an excuse to stay, and Americans assumed Bri t a i n would 
stay, at least long enough to enforce p a r t i t i o n . When i t became obvious 
B r i t a i n would not enforce p a r t i t i o n , the State Department believed 
that Britain might stay on some other terms, and t h i s was regarded 
as a serious p o s s i b i l i t y by Jews and Russians. Writers since then have 
persisted i n these views, despite i t being obvious that, i f B r i t a i n 
was anxious to leave i n September 19^7* B r i t a i n would be even more 
anxious to leave i n January 19^8. Britain's f i n a n c i a l state was even 
worse, and violence i n Palestine was increasing. Above a l l , the U.N. 
had produced a plan which B r i t a i n could only enforce by going back on 
a l l her solemn declarations of policy during the Second Regular Session, 
and by turning her troops on the Arabs, whose friendship B r i t a i n 
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considered v i t a l , and co-operating with the Jews, whose t e r r o r i s t 
a c t i v i t i e s had c e r t a i n l y not endeared them to the B r i t i s h Government. 
ESy the U.N. plan, B r i t i s h troops might be committed to hazardous 
service i n Palestine f o r a long time, and, at the end of i t , when 
Br i t a i n withdrew, there xirould probably be a war between Arabs and Jews. 
B r i t a i n might have considered staying i n Palestine i f the U.N. had 
produced a plan which the Arabs might possibly, udder duress, have 
accepted, but, since the U.N. did not, i t must have seemed to B r i t a i n 
that to stay i n Palestine was going to do nobody any good and Br i t a i n 
a l o t of harm. However, by leaving, i t i s most unlikely that Britain's 
motive was to sabotage p a r t i t i o n , as was rumoured at the time. This 
was e x p l i c i t l y denied by Creech-Jones to Weizmann. More l i k e l y , 
B r i t a i n would have prefered to see another country enforce p a r t i t i o n , 
or attempt t o . Creech-Jones, i n f a c t , t o l d Weizmann Brit a i n vrould 
have welcomed an international force.(1) 
B r i t i s h n e u t r a l i t y , therefore, was bound to be "benevolent" 
towards the Arabs, but i t i s hardly l i k e l y that the Foreign Office 
expected ot desired a complete Arab vi c t o r y . Apart from humanitarian 
considerations, f o r the Jews vjould have gone down f i g h t i n g , prospects 
of an Arab v i c t o r y would have brought pressure from Zionists i n 
America f o r U.S.A. intervention. The complications which might have 
resulted from t h i s could not be taken l i g h t l y . Most l i k e l y , therefore, 
B r i t a i n did not desire a complete Arab v i c t o r y , but rather that the 
Arabs would f i g h t the Jews, be forced to realise they could not be 
eliminated, but salve t h e i r pride to some extent by modifying the 
U.N. plan by force of arms, u n t i l i t was acceptable without too 
much loss of face. Creech-Jones t o l d Weizmann that he believed 
Jews and Arabs would have to f i g h t i t out, and the result would be 
favourable to the Arabs.(2) The exact extent of Arab gains, hoped for 
1. Vera V/eizmann p.224 
2. Weizmann p.580 
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may never have been defined precisely i n B r i t a i n , I t i s not l i k e l y 
that B r i t a i n hoped for the Jews to lose both Eastern Galilee and the 
Negev, f o r a too great Arab vi c t o r y would have produce other complications, 
although there i s evidence that some Foreign Office s t a f f f e l t t h i s 
would be desirable, (1) V/hat xiiould probably have suited Britain was f o r 
the "Jews to have the smallest possible viable state, which would 
have had to include Eastern Galilee, and, perhaps, some or a l l of 
Western Galilee, 
A complete, or nearly complete Arab victo r y was undesirable to 
B r i t a i n , because i t would have brought c o n f l i c t i n the Arab V/orld 
between the Mufti's supporters (Egypt and Syria) and Abdullah of 
Transjordan., who was apppotted by Iraq. Abdullah was ambitious to 
extend his f r o n t i e r s . Since A.bdullah had an e f f i c i e n t B r i t i s h trained 
and equipped army, better placed than any other Arab country^s to invade 
Palestine, there was a danger that Abdullah would enter Palestine as 
a l i b e r a t o r and remain as a conqueror, arousing the hatred of his 
opponents against B r i t a i n f o r helping him do i t . On the other hand, 
Abdullah's most a t t r a c t i v e q u a l i t y to B r i t a i n was his appreciation, 
unique among Arab leadsrs, that the only possible solution was a 
compromise with the •j'^ ews, therefore, of a l l Arab rulers, he was the 
only^suited to administer Arab Palestine with any hope of peace. The 
Mufti c e r t a i n l y was not. I f he had been established i n an Arab 
di v i s i o n of a partitioned Palestine, he would certainly have attacked 
the Jewish part. The obvious course, therefore, for B r i t a i n , was to 
allow Abdullah l i m i t t e d success. In the l i g h t of the above, the 
apparent inconsistencies i n B r i t i s h policy become comprehensible. 
The Jews were hampered by arms searches and a blockade u n t i l the 
end of the Mandate, but the Arabs received no extra deliveries of 
arms, Abdullah was encouraged by Bevin to invade the eastern Arab 
area, but t o l d not to invade terriitory allocated to the Jews, Arab 
1,Horowitz, who was i n London December 17-29» 19^7, writes that 
Harold Beeley t o l d him the U.N. f r o n t i e r s were impractical, but 
p a r t i t i o n was unavoidable. He thought the Jews would lose 
Eastern Galilee and the Negev. Horowitz says Beeley's views were 
similar to a certain " B r i t i s h V.I.P," he met at V/eizmann's i n 
New York, 
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irregulars were tol^erated before the end of the tSandate, but Arab 
regular armies were t o l d not to invade. The result was the "^ ews did 
establish themselves, but not i n the whole of Palestine. However, 
the extent of Jewish success seems to have been greater than was 
expected i n B r i t a i n , and c e r t a i n l y was too much ever for the Arabs 
to be expected to tolerate. However, before the end of the I-^ndate 
B r i t i s h hopes were reasonable, and, i n l a t e May seemed to be coming 
true. I f B r i t a i n did miscalculate the situation early i n 1948, and 
i t would be reasonable to say the situation was incalculable except 
within very wife l i m i t s , then i t i s understandable. Palestine had been 
an exasperating problem, but was not a major issue at that time. • 
B r i t i s h diplomats f e l t Palestine watted time better devoted to more 
important issues, and may not have been prepared to give i t t h e i r 
f u l l a ttention. In a very undiplomatic outburst to Mrs, Weizmann, 
Creech-Jones revealited, " I have po look after s i x t y m i l l i o n people, 
I have on my desk papers on the Argentine trouble, Ceylon, Malaya, 
China, and others-and here i s Palestine1"(1) 
\ 
1. 
(106) 
ii)The Work of the Palestine Commission 
In these circumstances, the a c t i v i t i e s of the U.N. became 
irylefective. The Palestine Commission's duties were to take over 
Palestine as B r i t a i n l e f t , establish f r o n t i e r s and provisional 
governments, supervise the election of constituent assemblies and then 
of regular governments. No provision had been made for a refusal 
by the B r i t i s h Government to co-operate. The Commission was to act 
"under the guidance of the Security Council," which was to "take the 
necessary measures as provided f o r i n the plan f o r i t s implementation." 
The Council was to "consider whether the situation i n Palestine 
constitutes a threat to peace," and take action, i f necessary, under 
Art i c l e s 39 and 41 of the U.N.Charter. I t was to "determine as a threat 
to peace...any attempt to a l t e r by force the settlement envisaged by 
th i s resolution," The Commission's members(1) were nominated by the 
President of the General Assembly (Brazil) a f t e r the acceptance of the 
p a r t i t i o n resolution, and accepted without objection. Lobbying 
had excluded at least one strong supporter of p a r t i t i o n (Guatemala) 
and, of the members, only Czechoslovakia had been a strong supporter 
of p a r t i t i o n and had been a member of Unscop, although the rest had 
voted i n favour. 
The Commission met, f o r the f i r s t tim.e, on January 9, 19^, and 
elected Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) Chairman, with Medina (Bolivia) 
Vice-Chairman, After the f i r s t meeting, the Commission met i n private, 
although press conferences were given afterwards, E|y the sixth meeting, 
January l4 , 1948, rules od procedure had been adopted. The Commission 
then produced a plan of work, based on Part IB of the p a r t i t i o n plan, 
and i n v i t e d B r i t a i n , the ewish Agency, and the Arab Higher Committee to 
send representatives to co-operate with the Commission. At th i s point. 
I.Raul Diez de Medina (Bolivia) 
Karel Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) 
Per Federspiel (Denmark) 
Bduardo Morgan (Panama) 
Vincente J. Francisco (Philippines) 
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the Commission's weakness became obvious. The Jewish Agency and 
B r i t a i n accepted the i n v i t a t i o n s , but the Arab Higher Committee 
refused to appear, pointing out that i t had rejected p a r t i t i o n 
completely. Then i n a meeting with Sir Alexander Cadogan (U.K.), 
the Commission learnt that B r i t a i n s t i l l insisted on retaining 
complete control u n t i l the JIandate ended, and would not co-operate 
i n implementing the p a r t i t i o n plan i n any way, B r i t a i n vjas not 
prepared to allow the Coramissinn into Palestine before Ifey 1, 19^8, 
although, a concession was made, i n that an advance party would be 
allowed. This arrived i n Palestine on March 2, and had to f i n d i t s 
own accommodation and servants. I t did however, send some reports 
to Lake Success, which was the only work done by the Commission 
i n Palestine. 
The Commission, therefore, concentrated on gathering such 
information as was available at Lake Success, and on presenting 
a report on the s i t u a t i o n i n Palestine to the Security Council. 
In t h i s report, the Commission concluded that, unless adequate 
m i l i t a r y force was available, after the termination of the Mandate, 
there would be "uncontrolled, widespread s t r i f e and bloodshed." 
The Commission informed the Council that even B r i t i s h troops were 
losing control, Arab forces were organising, both inside and outside 
of Palestine, to r e s i s t the p a r t i t i o n plan, and the Arab Higher 
Committee had declared that a Jewish state would be resisted by force, 
The Commission did not exclude Jews from blame, for "certain elements 
were committing irresponsible acts of violence." The Commission, 
therefore, asked the Council for help against the forces being used 
to f r u s t r a t e the p a r t i t i o n plan. 
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i i i ) T h e Work of the Trusteeship Council 
Meanwhile, the Trusteeship Council had been preparing a draft 
statute f o r the City of Jerusalem, i n accordance with i t s instructions 
i n part I I I C of the p a r t i t i o n plan. A working Committee on 
Jerusalem was established on December 1, 19^7, to prepare a f i r s t 
d r a f t . The Committee produced a comprehensive p l a n , ( l ) which, af t e r 
a preliminary debate on February 18, 19^8, the Council considered 
i n d e t a i l from February 19 to March 10. At the suggestion of Belgium(2), 
during meeting 35> Ilarch 10, formal approval and the appointment 
of a governor, which were specified i n the p a r t i t i o n plan, were 
postponed u n t i l not l a t e r than A p r i l 29. However, on A p r i l 21, the 
Council accepted an American suggestion(3) to hand the whole question 
over to the General Assembly. 
1. T/122 (the plan, as ammended i n the Trusteeship Council, appears 
as T/118 and T/ll8/Rev.l) 
2. T/SR.62 
3. T/SR.63 
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iv)The Work of the Security Council 
At the very f i r s t meeting i n which the Palestine Question 
appeared on the Security Council's agenda, there was a fore-taste 
of the c o n f l i c t which was to s t i f l e a l l i n i t i a t i v e during much 
of 19^ . On the simple question of taking note of the Secretary 
-General's l e t t e r , communicating the resolution of November 29 to 
the Council, America made i t clear that i t did not welcome the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y placed on the Council by the resolution. VMle Russia 
wanted the Council to "accept" the resolution, America wanted to 
"take note" of the resolution. The importance America placed upon 
what might be considered a t r i v i a l matter of wording showed quite 
c l e a r l y that America wanted a xvay l e f t open for the Council to 
reject p a r t i t i o n . 
Serious discussion on Palestine i n the Security Council did 
not begin u n t i l February 24, 19^8, when Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) 
presented the Palestine Commission's f i r s t special report. At the 
next meeting Colombia presented a proposal which assumed that the 
Council had to reject the Commission's plea f o r help because the 
General Assembly's request to the Council to give such help i f 
required was not covered by A r t i c l e s 39 and 41 of the Charter. 
Colombia, therefore, wanted the permanent members to consult among 
themselves about what should be done, and a committee of 2 permanent 
members and 3 non^r-permanent members to consider whether conciliation 
was possible. As a l a s t resort, a second special session was 
suggested to reconsider the whole Palestine Question. A comparison 
of the Colombian proposal and America's i n the next meeting suggests 
that Colombia's was U.S.A. inspired. In fact Colombia withdrew her 
proposal i n favour of America's. America, however, v?anted no more 
than consultation among the permanent members. The American proposal 
contained a paragraph stating that the Security Council should accept 
the p a r t i t i o n plan, subject to the U.N. Charter. The debate on t h i s 
paragraph i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of how determined was the Security 
Council not to get involved i n Palestine. I t became clear that the 
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majority of members would regard t h i s paragraph, i f accepted, as 
a rejection of res p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Palestine, because, by the 
American and Colombian inte r p r e t a t i o n , the Council could not 
take action to enforce the plan, and keep within the Charter. 
I f the paragraph were not accepted, then again responsibility 
would be rejected. Belgium proposed that the paragraph be 
ommitted, but the majority was determined on a vote. Finally, 
t h i s paragraph was rejected, although the provision f o r consultation 
among the permanent members was retained. The permanent members, 
therefore, held private t a l k s , between March 5 19, 19^. 
On l-Iarch 19, 1948, Austin (U.S.A.) reported to the 
Council on the talks.(1) He declared f i r s t that B r i t a i n had not 
participated i n the talks but had given information. The 
permanent members had concluded that the Jew^ish Agency had 
accepted the p a r t i t i o n plan, but the Arab Higher Committee had 
rejected i t , neither would accept a modified p a r t i t i o n plan, 
both believed p a r t i t i o n could not be implemented peacefully, i l l e g a l 
arms and armed groups were entering Palestine, and the B r i t i s h 
withdrawal would be followed by violence. However, as Gromyko 
(U.S.S.R.) remarked, everybody knew t h i s already. V/hat a l l wanted 
was the permanent members' recommendations on what should be done. 
This was not impressive. The Council was to make i t clear that 
i t would not permit a threat to international peace and would take 
action to restore order. However, the action was not specified. 
Russia made a reservation that p a r t i t i o n could s t i l l be implemented 
peacefully, and ought to be implemented. 
Most of two meetings had been spent i n discussing this report, 
when the situation was completely changed by a new merican proposal. 
Austin made a long speech, i n which he amplified his previous 
arguments that the Security Council was not competent to enforce 
i.S/P.V.270 
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p a r t i t i o n . In the l i g h t of America'sjprevious support f o r p a r t i t i o n , 
the U.S.A. seems to have f e l t obliged to make a very f u l l case. 
Austin (U.S.A.) declared that the U.U. was not automatically the 
heir to the League of Nations, and, since A r t i c l e 21 of the Charter 
had not been invoked, the U.N. had not taken responsibility for 
Palestine. This meant that the U.N., i n the November 29 resolution, 
had only taken r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Jerusalem, under a trusteeship. 
The Council had rejected r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Palestine by rejectirig 
the paragfaaph accepting the resolution i n the American resolution 
of March 5» The Council's only r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Palestine, therefore, 
was the maintainance of international peace, Austin, therefore, 
declared that a second special session should be called to arrange a 
temporary U.N. trusteeship f o r Palestine.(1) 
This proposal was debated i n two more meetings before being 
voted, on A p r i l 1, 19^8. Gromyko (U.S.S.R.) accused America and 
B r i t a i n of p l o t t i n g to retain Palestine as a strategic base. 
Shertok (Jewish Agency) condemned the proposal i n the strongest 
terms as unjust and u n r e a l i s t i c . CanadJ" France, and Belgium 
gave the proposal guarded support. The Arab states declared they 
regarded a temporary trusteeship as acceptable, provided that i t 
led to a unitary state i n Palestine. Finally, the proposal was 
accepted with 9 i n favour, and only Russia and the Ukraine 
abstaining. At the same meeting, the Council also approved 
unanimously an American proposal to c a l l on the Jevjish Agency and 
Arab Higher Committee to arrange a truce. Austin (U.S.A.) declared 
t h i s was purely to "save human l i f e . " ( 2 ) Immediately o f f i c i a l 
business was over, Austin i n v i t e d a l l members of the Council to 
his o f f i c e at 2 Park Avenue, on A p r i l 5, for informal conversations 
on the trusteeship proposal. 
1.American suggestions were circulated as a working paper (S/P.V.271) 
at f i r s t , and not as a formal proposal u n t i l i^Jarch 20 (S/705) 
2.3/704 
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To enforce the truce, the Council established a Truce Commission, 
consisting of those Council members, except Syria, which had career 
consuls i n Jerusalem (America, France, and Belgium). The Commission 
was not supported by any m i l i t a r y force, and was, therefore, branded 
by Russia as "toothless." However, there was a reasonable prospect 
of a cease f i r e , as both the Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee 
had been consulted before Colombia presented formal truce proposals.(1) 
These proposals asked f o r both sides to cease both m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s 
and preparations, and also p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , which might prejudice 
the rights or claims of either side.(2) Only Russia and the Ukraine 
abstained i n the vote, after Russian attempts to have the Arab forces 
coming i n t o Palestine named as invaders had been defeated. Jews and 
Arabs accepted t h i s truce, though with reservations which appear 
intended to provide a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for truce breaking i f i t should 
prove convenient. In f a c t , the acceptance seems to have been on paper 
only, f o r widespread f i g h t i n g continued. The Truce Commission, at 
f i r s t , continued negotiations which had been begun i n Jerusalem on 
A p r i l 18, f o r a truce i n Jerusalem only, by the High Commissioner. 
However, .Arab forces, which then appeared to be winning, would not 
agree, to a truce, although the Jews would have accepted one. Later, 
the s i t u a t i o n was reversed. On A p r i l 28, agreement was reached on a cease 
f i r e i n the Old City, but, on the night of A p r i l 29-30, the Jews 
launched attacks on Arabs outside the Old City, The Arab position 
deteriorated, and by May 9, they were w i l l i n g to accept a truce. 
However, t h i s time the Jews, now on the offensive, prevaricated. 
A cease-fire was f i n a l l y forced on both sides by the B r i t i s h Army's 
use of a r t i l l e r y , which lasted from about Yiay 8 u n t i l the Army's 
withdrawal on May 14, During a l l t h i s time the Commission played 
a subordinate role to the High Commissioner. They reported great 
d i f f i c u l t y i n contacting leaders on both sides, and, when the B r i t i s h 
Army withdrew, were helpless to prevent f i g h t i n g being resumed. 
l.S/P.V.287 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION 
i)American. B r i t i s h . Jewish, and Arab polic i e s . 
The Second Special Session presents an extremely confusing 
picture. There v/ere far more subcommittees, proposals and amendments 
than i n the F i r s t Special Session, yet the result was far less, the 
s t e r i l i t y of the Session can be blamed on four serious mistakes of the 
State Department, F i r s t , they thought the Jews could be persuaded to 
accept trusteeship i f the alternative was war with the Arabs. 
Secondly, they thought that, even i f the Jews did not at f i r s t accept 
trusteeship, the Arabs would be certain to win, and the Jews would 
f i n a l l y accept trusteeship as the price of American protection. 
Thirdly, they believed B r i t a i n could be persuaded to stay, to help 
to enforce trusteeship. Last, they believed President Truman would 
allow them to defy his wished on Palestine policy. 
The Department probably thought the Jews might accept trusteeship 
because some Jewish Leaders i n America, possibly even Shertok, may 
have given t h i s impression, perhaps because they thought trusteeship 
might have been accepted as a temporary expedient.(1) However, they 
were overuled by Ben Gurion. The Department, also, seems to have had 
hopes of winning Weizmann to t h e i r side. Shortly after announcing 
th e i r trusteeship proposal, three members of the U.S.A. delegation 
(Austin, Jessup, and Ross) v i s i t e d Weizmanns They appear to have 
suggested to Weizmann that the declaration of a state by the Jevjs, 
when the Mandate ended, would result i n a war i n which the Jews would 
be beaten, and that the Jews should accept trusteeship for t h e i r own 
good. The Department, therefore, wanted Weizmann to help them convince 
the Agency of t h i s . Weiamann completely rejected t h e i r proposals,(2) 
The Department's b e l i e f that the Arabs would win was a common 
misconception, except among those closely acquainted with Palestine, 
1. Bilby p.260 
2. Weizmann p.579, Weisgal and Carmichaei p.309 
(11^) 
However, the State Department was not i n close touch with a f f a i r s 
i n Palestine. 
The Department's b e l i e f that B r i t a i n might be persuadedtto stay 
was an astonishing blunder, shared by many others, including the 
Jewish Agency. I t - seemed inconceivable that such an old established 
and recently victorious imperial power should withdraw volunt a r i l y 
from an area i t dominated. The example of the B r i t i s h vjithdrawal 
from Bidia, the previous year, appears to have been generally 
ignored. However, the State Department's persistence i n t h i s 
b e l i e f , at least i n public, r i g h t i n t o the Second Special Session, 
i n face of point blank B r i t i s h refusal to have anything to do with 
trusteeship, or to entertain the idea of staying i n Palestine on 
any terms, needs another explanation. The most l i k e l y i s that the 
State Department had run out of ideas xjhen they found that the Jews 
would not co-operate with trusteeship and were not going to be beaten 
by the Arabs easily. 
. F i n a l l y , as already eaplained, the Department thought they 
could defy Truman's wishes, because he was unlikely to remain i n 
power much longer. Truman, however, did not face an election u n t i l 
November, and was quite prepared to assert his authority before then. 
He replaced Henderson, who had been i n charge of Palestine a f f a i r s 
i n the State Department, with H i l l d r i n g , formerly alternate delegate 
to the U.N. and a supporter of Zionism. The appointment may have 
been Zionist inspired, and H i l l d r i n g may have been reluctant to accept 
i t but was persuaded by Weizmann.(l) In the end, Truman recognised 
I s r a e l without f i r s t informing the State Department, so that when 
news reached the U.N., Jessup had to telephone the White House for 
confirmation. At least one member of the U,S,A. delegation f e l t 
deeply humiliated. (2) 
1. Vera Weizmann p.230 
2. Granados p.290 writes that a member of the delegation, a few minutes 
aft e r Jessup read a statement confirming that America recognised 
I s r a e l , declared, "That i s VJhite House language, not State Department." 
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The B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e was unchanged from the Second Regular 
Session. B r i t a i n concentrated on getting out her troops. Areas 
where either Arabs or Jews were i n a considerable majority were 
simply abandoned to them, beginning with Tel Aviv to the Jews and 
Jaffa to the Arabs, on December 15, 19^7. Violence between Jews 
and Arabs steadily increased as re p r i s a l was followed by counter-
r e p r i s a l , B r i t i s h policy, was j u s t i f i e d by the Minister of State 
for Colonial A f f a i r s , who stated, on January 20, 1948, that troops 
were better employed i n mixed areas and Jerusalem, to preserve order 
there, B r i t a i n persisted i n refusing to implement the p a r t i t i o n 
resolution i n any way. She refused to permit unlimil^ted Jewish 
immigration, and refused entry to the Palestine Commission u n t i l 
a f o r t n i g h t before the ^^andate ended. The result was the Commission 
never evan arrived i n Palestine. The B r i t i s h j u s t i f i c a t i o n was that 
the Commission would be l i a b l e to attack by the Arabs, and would 
receive no co-operation from Arab c i v i l servants, whose co-operation 
was necessary f o r the success of the U.N. plan. B r i t a i n began to 
disengage completely from Palestine. On February 22, 1948, Palestine's 
s t e r l i n g balance (about £100 m i l l i o n ) was blocked and Palestine was 
excluded from the s t e r l i n g area. The only B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e i n the 
U.N. was her proposal of May 3, 1 9 ^ i f o r a neutral authority to 
take over Palestine when B r i t a i n l e f t . Although often accused of 
some plan of Machiavellian cunning associated with this proposal 
designed to f r u s t r a t e the Jewish state and ensure the continuation 
of B r i t i s h presence i n Palestine, i t seems more l i k e l y the proposal 
was only intended to f a c i l i t a t e a more peaceful B r i t i s h withdrawal. 
The Jews were constantly a f r a i d , before and during the Second 
Special Session, that the partion plan might be revoked. In Sban's 
opinion, "No American President would recognise a Jewish State after 
the United Nations had voted to place i t s t e r r i t o r y under trusteeship." 
He considered the adoption of trusteeship a real p o s s i b i l i t y , " i n the 
absence of an alternative solution." A s t i l l greater danger, he 
considered, was the p o s s i b i l i t y that some of the Jewish leaders would 
be frightened by the Second Special Session i n t o postponing the 
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declaration of a state. V/eizmann, holding similar opinions, 
thought the declaration of the state, on May Ik, to be "now or 
never." (1) 
The only real support for trusteeship, therefore, came from 
the Arab states, but only because i t was a step away from p a r t i t i o n 
towards t h e i r ideal of a unitary state, and the Arab states were 
cer t a i n l y not prepared to give up pressure outside the U.N. against 
p a r t i t i o n , during the Second Special Session. Following t h e i r declared 
intention of re s i s t i n g the p a r t i t i o n of Palestine by forde, the 
Arab League, on January 15, 1948, announced that i t was going to give 
a l l possible help to the Arabs i n Palestine, and Arab armies were 
preparing to occupy Palestine as soon as B r i t a i n l e f t . By January 23, 
Fawzi el-Ka^^rukji, who had previously led Arab irregular forces i n the 
Arab Revolt of 1936-9» had entered Palestine from Syria, to organise 
the Arabs against the Jews, Following further discussions i n February, 
i t was decided, i f the U.N. set up an international police force to 
implement p a r t i t i o n , then the League would unite i t s armies into 
an Arab People's Array," to l i b e r a t e Palestine. By A p r i l 1948, only 
the f a c t that B r i t a i n had, on January 23, warned Transjordan that an 
invasion of Palestine before the end of the Mandate would result i n 
a refusal of Britain's annual subsidy to Jordan's Arab Legion, had 
prevented an invasion by Abdullah. This held back the Arab's best 
prepared force u n t i l May 14. B r i t a i n also warned the other Arabs' 
armies to stay out of Palestine, therefore, no invasion took place 
by regular forces before I4ay l 4 . I t was, therefore, very much i n 
the Arabs' interest to support the trusteeship proposal. The American 
working paper would, i f implemented, have prevented p a r t i t i o n , and 
have removed the necessity for war. I f accepted, but, l i k e the 
November 29, 194?, resolution, without effective implementation, then, 
at least, i t would destroy the t i t l e deeds of a Jewish state. The 
Arabs could then reprent t h e i r invasion as a police action to restore 
order, instead of i t being represented as aggression against a 
l.Vera Weizmann p.231 
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sovereign state. At the very least, consideration of the trusteeship 
proposal would c a l l i n t o question the p a r t i t i o n proposal, and, i n 
these circumstances, chance events were more l i k e l y to favour the 
Arabs than the Jews. The Arabs, Therefore, welcomed the trusteeship 
proposal from the moment i t was announced i n the Security Council, 
(118) 
ii)The Work of the Second Special Session, 
The Second Special Session opened on Friday, A p r i l 16, 19'^9 
at 11 aoiDo, with meeting No,129 of the General Assembly, Unlike the 
F i r s t Special Session, no country t r i e d to prolong the i n i t i a l 
procedingSo Argentina was elected Chairman, i n the morning session. 
In the afternoon the General Ck>mmittee was chosen, which met that 
evening, to decide, with no real opposition, to recommend to the 
General Assembly, that the Security Council's request "to consider 
further the question of the future government of Palestine," be placed 
on the agenda of the F i r s t Committeeo The General Assembly, at i t s 
next meeting, on Monday, A p r i l I99 19'^ > approved the General 
Committee*s recommendation by 44 votes to 0 with 10 abstentions. 
Debate i n the F i r s t Committee began on A p r i l 20, Most delegates 
simply restated the positions they had adopted during the Second 
Regular Sessions Merica, therefore, preceded cautiously. Instead 
of presenting trusteeship as a formal proposal, the U,S,A. asked for 
the discussion of a working paper. This avoided the necessity of 
asking immediatley f o r the p a r t i t i o n resolution to be revoked, and 
allowed time, before a vote was l i k e l y to put pressure on other 
countries. The working paper indicates th a t , even at this time, the 
State Department was s t i l l r e l y i n g on being able to persuade B r i t a i n 
to stay i n Palestine f o r a considerable period to administer trusteeship. 
Although emphasising that trusteeship was to be temporary, the plan 
provided that trusteeship would end when Arabs and Jews had agreed on 
Palestine's future governmento Any p o s s i b i l i t y of agreement between 
Arabs and Jews,had, by A p r i l 20, 19^, receded in t o the very distant 
f u t u r e . Trusteeship was to be "without prejudice to the r i g h t s , 
claims, or positions of the parties concerned, or to the character 
of the eventual p o l i t i c a l settlemento" However, the i n t e g r i t y of 
Palestine was to be maintained, which cer t a i n l y prejudiced «^ ewish 
claims to pcartition. Further r e s t r i c t i o n of Jeidsh ambitions was 
implied by immigration being regulated by the Governor-General, " i n 
accordance with the absorptive capacity of Palestine." Provided 
America persuaded the Trusteeship Council to appoint a Governor-
General who was not cofamitted to Zionism, immigration would probably 
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have been j u s t enough to remove the displaced persons problem, and 
therefore destroy the Agency's greatest propaganda asset, but would 
have been nothing l i k e enough to give the Jews a majority i n Palestine. 
The working paper also specified that the Governor^General was to 
be supported by a j u d i c i a r y chosen by the Trusteeship Council. The 
people were to be represented by two houses, one chosen on a 
geographical basis, and one by the two communities separately. No 
country, however, was named as the trustee, who was to provide the 
force need to make the scheme work,(l) 
In Committee, America was immediately opposed by Australia and 
New Zealand, who declared that the U.N, should stick to i t s decisions. 
Russia t r i e d , unsuccessfully, to ruin America's plans at an early stage, 
by asking that a decision be taken at once on trusteeship for Palestine, 
i n p r i n c i p l e . This move was defeated, but most U.M. members seem to 
have been at a loss about what to do, having been f i r s t subjected 
to American pressure to vote for p a r t i t i o n , and now faced the propospect 
of equal American pressure to vote against. Their reaction was to 
avoid committing themselves to anything. Granados wrote, " i n the 
l a s t days of A p r i l and the f i r s t days of May, 1948, a strange lethargy 
overtook the United Nations,.,.repetitious speeches....an interminable 
orator would unfold a voluminous stack of notes.....the same arguments 
we had heard over and over for an entire year."(2) 
On A p r i l 26, three days after the Truce Commission had been 
established, the Committee interrupted debate on the working paper, 
to approve a French proposal to ask the Trusteeship Council to do 
something about the f i g h t i n g i n Jerusalem, which the Truce Commission 
seemed unable to prevent. (3) when debate reopened, C-ranados (Guatemala), 
who was working closely with Fabgegat (Uruguay) and the Jewish Agency, 
1. A/C.1/277 
2. Granados pp.278 and 280 
3. A/P.V.132 
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introduced a delaying t a c t i c . He proposed a subcommittee to examine 
whether trusteeship was actually desired or p r a c t i c a l i n Palestine. 
Granados considered such a subcommittee would spend several days 
hearing witnesses, several more i n discussion and preparation of a 
report, and, i ^ i t h luck, business would drag on u n t i l after the Jews 
had declared t h e i r state. This delay was considered v i t a l by the 
Jewish Agency, because public opinion, throughout the World, would 
approve a Jewish state set up i n accordance with a U.N. resolution, 
but would d e f i n i t e l y oppose i t , i f established contrary to the U.N.(l) 
Granados was immediately successful i n delajdng procedings, for two 
days, A p r i l 27-8, 1948, were spent discussing his proposal. 
On A p r i l 29, the Committee again began to consider the working 
paper, item by item. On May 3, Creech-Jones (U.K.) reminded the 
Committee that time was running short, and urged that a neutral 
authority be appointed quickly to take over from B r i t a i n , to hold assets, 
further mediation, and work towards a solution. On tlay 4, the Committee 
returned to Granados' proposal f o r a subcommittee. However, Granados' 
o r i g i n a l proposal had been much modified by amendments urged on 
Granados p r i v a t e l y by America, The subcommittee's task had become 
to work out a plan f o r a provisional government of Palestine, 
Granados had only accepted these amendments because he realised that, 
without U.S.A. support, his subcommittee would not be set up, but 
with American support i t certainly would be, and he considered any 
subcommittee would be useful i n prolonging the work of the Session. 
The American motive i n supporting t h i s amended subcommittee i s obscure. 
State Department o f f i c i a l s may have f e l t that there was a real 
p o s s i b i l i t y of Granados' o r i g i n a l proposal being accepted against 
American pressure, and t h i s might have produced a recommendation 
against trusteeship. Perhaps, i n working with Granados, they hoped 
to convince t h e i r new chief, H i i l d r i n g , that they xvere now t r y i n g to 
follow the President's wishes. lAatever the Department's motives. 
1,Weizmann pp.581-2, Granados pp.280-1 
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Granados had judged the sit u a t i o n better. The subcommittee contained 
so many shades of opinion that i t proved impossible f o r i t to carry 
out i t s a l l o t t e d t a s k , ( l ) I t began work on May 5, and decided to ask 
the Rapporteur (Norway) to d r a f t a working paper. This was considered 
by the subcommittee on Monday, MaylO, but Moe (Norway) declared that 
the paper did not necessarily represent the o f f i c i a l view of the 
Norwegian Government, Russia, therefore, objected to the working 
paper because i t did not represent an o f f i c i a l Norwegian proposal, 
and also because Russia considered Moe had gone beyond his instructions. 
F i n a l l y , the subcommittee could only agree to discuss the paper 
informally. The only r e s u l t of the informal discussions was to take 
a formal decision to ask the Arab Higher Committee and the '^ewish 
Agency t h e i r opinions of the working paper. They rejected i t 
completely. By then, i t was May 12, 
Meanwhile, the Trusteeship Council had been debating the 
F i r s t Committee's request of A p r i l 26 regarding Jerusalem. The 
Council, on May 5» recommended to the General Assembly, that the 
r(feindatory Government appoint a special municipal commissioner, 
who should be neutral, acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. The 
Council emphasised that t h i s alobe would not bring violence to an end,(2) 
therefore, on May 11, the General Assembly set up a subcommittee(3) 
to consider further the protection of Jerusalem, B r i t a i n appointed 
Evans (U.S.A.) as Municipal Commissioner, following agreement between 
Arabs and Jews. The Trusteeship Council's work was, however, 
completely overtaken by events. 
The consistent lack of success with i t s trusteeship proposal 
seems, by May 12, 1948, to have forced the State Department to realise 
that trusteeship was, almost c e r t a i n l y , going to f a i l . Therefore, 
1. This was Subcommittee 9 (China, Poland, Nonfay, Argentina, Belgium, 
Canada, Cuba, Guatemala, France, India, Russia, America) I t s 
report i s A/C.1/299 
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America persuaded Subcommittee 9 to recommend that a U.N. 
commissioner be appointed f o r a l l Palestine, to act as mediator, 
A French proposal fear a commission rather than a mediator was 
rejected. The Subcommittee's recomrf.endation was discussed by the 
F i r s t Committee on May 13 and 14, The t i t l e "commissioner" 
was amended to "Mediator" because some delegates objected to the 
s i m i l a r i t y between "Commissioner" and the Mandatory Government's 
"High Commissioner," The General Assembly met at 5 P'ln. to consider 
the" F i r s t Committee's report, on I'lay 14. The proposal for a 
Mediator was approved, but the whole resolution on the Mediator^ 
terms of reference was s t i l l being voted, paragraph by paragraph, 
when news arrived of the declaration of the State of Israel and 
i t s recognition by America. The American deleggtion were i n confusion, 
and had to confess ignorance of the recognition f o r some minutes. 
The net res u l t of the Second Special Session, therefore was 
the appointment of a Mediator. (1) As &anados points out, the 
Mediator's duties duplicated those of the Truce Commission, 
and, i n f a c t , the Mediator could j u s t as well have been appointed 
by the Security Council, l i k e the Truce Commission, without a l l 
the trouble and expense of a Second Special Session,(2) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE UNITED NATIONS MP PALESTINE FROM THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE 
OF ISRAEL TO THE ADMISSION OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
i ) B r l t i s h and American Policiesn and the Russian Attitude. 
Once the State of Isra e l had been declared and recognised by 
both America and Russia, the Jews ceased to have a special need f o r 
the U.N., therefore the existence of the U.N. did not have a special 
effect upon the s i t u a t i o n . However, U.N. influence did not disappear 
completely, f o r the Great Powers found the Security Council a convenient 
means of expressing t h e i r wishes, and the existence of the U.N. 
f a c i l i t a t e d the setting up of neutral bodies to supervise truces and 
arrange armistices. 
The effectiveness of the Security Council was small because 
of the d i f f i c u l t y of agreeing on solutions, or, i f solutions were 
agreed, on the meand of enforcement. The three powers most concerned 
were a l l prepared to accept a Jewish state, but had dif f e r e n t 
approaches to Palestine. Russia'a main aim was, as usual, the 
elimination of Western influence i n the Middle East. The withdrawal 
of B r i t a i n was a great success. To establish a strong I s r a e l , detested 
by the Arabs would be to introduce a discordant element into the area, 
which might be exploited to Russian advantage i n the future. I t i s 
possible the Russians even hoped the new state would become t h e i r c l i e n t . 
However, i n any case, Russia had nothing to lose and the chance of 
gaining a great deal by supporting I s r a e l . They, therefore called 
f o r support f o r I s r a e l , i n the Security Council, and ignored Arab 
protests. ^ the end of May, 19^, B r i t a i n and America seem to have 
developed similar views. Both saw the best way of dealing with the 
sit u a t i o n i n handing over Arab Palestine to Abdullah. In t h i s case, 
B r i t a i n seems to have persuaded America to accept B r i t i s h ideas. The 
main difference between B r i t a i n and America was the amount of support 
each was prepared to give to I s r a e l . America seems to have considered 
Isr a e l much weaker i n re l a t i o n to the Arabs than she r e a l l y was and 
wanted an Isr a e l much larger than B r i t a i n would have l i k e d . Also, 
U.S.A. Palestine policy was dominated by the forthcoming Presidential 
(12^) 
election, i n November, l^' ^ * i n which the Jewish vote was of far 
more immediate concern than the niceties of p o l i t i c s , far away 
i n the Kiddle East. B r i t a i n , however, took the Middle East situation 
very seriously, probably made a much more accurate assessment of the 
forces involved than America, and made more constructive proposals 
during t h i s period. I n the Security Council, therefore, Ameria and 
B r i t a i n both supported truces, although America supported truce 
terms more favourable to I s r a e l than did B r i t a i n . Both seem to have 
hoped that the truces could be prolonged into armistices, and the 
armistice l i n e s become the basis of a new p a r t i t i o n . This, f i n a l l y , 
did happen, although i t was never formally accepted by the Arabs. 
However, a truce could not be imposed without American pressure, 
and, while America, was w i l l i n g to put pressure on the Arabs for 
a cease-fire, during early Arab successes, America was not w i l l i n g 
to put pressure on I s r a e l , during the rest of 19^, while the I s r a e l i s 
were winning, u n t i l a f t e r the November election had seen the Jewish 
vote safely gathered i n . In December, therefore, American pressure 
was applied f i r m l y , f o r the f i r s t time, to I s r a e l , and major f i g h t i n g 
quickly came to an end by January, 19^ 9o 
Following the cease-fires, the way was open for armistices. 
Since the Arab states refused to recognise I s r a e l , the U.N. was a 
convenient mediator. The l a s t armistice was signed with Syria, on 
July 20, 19'+9» a f t e r I s r a e l had becom a U.N. member on May 11. 
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ii)The Iftiited Nations and Palestine from the Declaration of the 
State of I s r a e l . May 14. 19^. to the F i r s t Truce. Ju&g 11. 1948. 
In the war which, u n t i l May 14, had been restrained by B r i t i s h 
forces, the Arabs, at f i r s t , had some successes, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
Jerusalem and the Arab area according to the U.N. p a r t i t i o n plan. 
This was not due to any respect f o r the U.N., but simply because of 
the t r i v i a l Jewish population i n the areas allocated to the Arabs. 
Isolated settlements l i k e Kfar Etsion, 12 miles south west of Jerusalem? 
were easily overwhelmed. Arab attacks on the Jewish areas were less 
successful. The Egyptians launchbddtwo attacks, one advanced through 
the S.W. Arab area and attacked the central Jewish area, only being 
halted by the Jews 20 mile south of Tel Aviv. The other crossed the 
Negev, which was by the U.N. Jewish, but was not defended by the Jews 
because of the almost t o t a l absence of Jewish population, re-entered 
the Arab area at Beersheba, and advanced to the outskirts of Jerusalem. 
The Arab Legion of Jordan went to the help of the Arabs i n Jerusalem, 
who were i n danger of being driven completely out of the c i t y , isolated 
the Jews i n Jerusalem by occupying the police post at Latrun, which 
dominated the road from Jerusalem to the coast, and took control of 
the Old City. Palestinian forces siezed control of Palestine's most 
important a i r p o r t at lydda, 12 mile from Tel Aviv, but j u s t within 
the U.N. Arab area. Iraq forces occupied Tul Karm on the edge of 
the central Arab area, but only 10 mile, through the Jewish area, 
to the sea. Lebanese forces, however, although obviously best placed 
to defend western Galilee, were i n ^ f e ^ c t i v e , and remained so for the 
entire war. Saudi Arabia and the Yemen supplied negligible forces. 
By the F i r s t Truce, June 11-Iuly 7» 19^» the Arab attacks had l o s t 
momentum, due to bad s t a f f work and t h e i r refusal to co-operate with 
each other, and the Jews were preparing a counter-attack. 
Oa May 1?, Austin (U.S.A.) introduced i n the Security Council, 
a resolution ( l ) and a questionnaire, which suggested he was now 
f i r m l y under Truman's control and working to support I s r a e l . The 
questionnaire demanded detailed information from the Arab states, the 
Arab Higher Committee, and the Provisional Government of Is r a e l , of 
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t h e i r forces operating i n Palestine. The object of the questionaire 
appears to have been to provide evidence of Arab aggression to. j u s t i f y 
further American proposals for action to expel the Arab armies from 
Palestine, f o r l a t e r the American view was expressed that the Arab 
states were acting contrary to international law, and that action 
should be taken, p a r t i c u l a r l y against Jordan, who had the most 
successful Arab army. The resolution was to declare the situation i n Palestine 
a threat to peace wi t h i n the meaning of A r t i c l e 39 of the U.N. 
Charter, to order a l l parties to issue cease-fire instructions, and 
to iquest the Truce Commission to report vi o l a t i o n s . Probably the 
mention of A r t i c l e 39 was intended as an extreme measure, to 
fr i g h t e n the Arabs, because America thought a quick cease-fire was 
necessary to save the Jews. I f the Americans wanted a speedy 
solution, then they had miscalculated. Discussion of A r t i c l e 39 
delayed procedings. America was only supported by France, Russia, 
and Colombia. Belgium and Canada pointed out that no U.N. forces 
were available, and that to invoke A r t i c l e 39 without proper provision 
for enforcement would bring the U.N. into contempt. B r i t a i n , 
probably embarrassed at the thought of having U.N. forces mixed 
with her own, suggested that A r t i c l e 39 was inappropriate as no threat 
to peace existed. The B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e was also acceptable to the 
Arabs, who regarded the whole a f f a i r as a police action i n aid of 
the Palestinians, and not a war. 
On May 18, 1943, a much amended questionnaire was approved by 
the Council. The Arab states were s t i l l asked for detailed information 
of the a c t i v i t i e s of t h e i r forces operating i n Palestine, but a 
d i s t i n c t i o n was drawn between areas of Jewish and Arab majority. 
They were asked to j u s t i f y t h e i r presence i n both these areas, and 
to give any evidence they had of Jewish incursions into areas allocated 
by the U.W. to the Arabs. The Arab Higher Committee was invited to 
declare i t s exact status, and to say whether i t , or the Arabs of 
Palestine, had requested foreign assistance, and again to report 
on Jewish invasions of U.N. allocated Arab t e r r i t o r y . The Jews were 
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asked what areas they actually controlled, whether they had forces 
outside that t e r r i t o r y , and whether the Arabs had forces within the 
t e r r i t o r y they claimed to control. F i n a l l y , would they accept a truce 
i n Jerusalem?(1) The Arabs replied that the Arab states had been 
i n v i t e d i n t o Palestine to subdue a rebellious minority, and the Jews 
replied that they were i n possession of a substantial part of the 
proposed Jewish state, and would accept a truce i n Jerusalem. 
Under these circumstances, therefore, the Council voted on the 
American proposal on May 22, 1948. A B r i t i s h attempt, probably 
aimed at gaining Arab favour, to declare the status of Palestine s t i l l 
i n need of c l a r i f i c a t i o n , was defefited (France, Russia, and America 
abstained) The American proposal to declare the situation a threat 
to peace within the meaning of A r t i c l e 39 was also defeated (France 
and Russia voted i n favour). The result was another c a l l f o r a 
truce, again without proper proMsion f o r enforcement. (2) The 
Arab states accepted the truce on condition that the Jews ceased 
immigration, and, since t h i s was t o t a l l y unacceptable to the Jews, 
f i g h t i n g continued. On I'fey 24, therefore, the Russians raised the 
question of applying A r t i c l e 39| but when i t was voted, on Ifey 29, 
i t was rejected again.(3) On the same day, however, an amended 
B r i t i s h proposal was accepted.(4) The o r i g i n a l proposal had been 
fo r a truce of 4 weeks, during which no f i g h t i n g men, men of m i l i t a r y 
age, or war materials should be brought into Palestine. The 
amendments, proposed by America, extended the ban to a l l the Arab 
states, but allowed the entry of c i v i l i a n s , provided they were not 
trained a f t e r entry. Although B r i t a i n had not proposed an arms embargo, 
Cadogan (U.K.) had declared i n the Security Council, that B r i t a i n 
would respect a U.W. arms embargo, i f i t were imposed on the Arab 
states. Under pressure from B r i t a i n , and af r a i d of losing t h e i r arms 
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supplies from B r i t a i n permanently, the Arab states agreed to the truce, 
while the Jews, facing a c r i t i c a l situation i n Jerusalem, also agreed.(1) 
Probably a truce would have been welcome, i n any case to the Jews, 
Their forces could be trained, organisation developed, and truce 
regulations evaded, so that they would be stronger i n relation to 
the Arabs when the truce ended. 
1,Levin pp,243-4 
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i i i ) T h e F i r s t Truce. June 11 to July 7. 1948 
During the truce, the Arab states' main suppliers of arms, i n 
the West, ceased to send them weapons, but Russia did not respect the 
Security Council resolution, and allowed supplies to Israel from 
her clierit*state, Czechoslovakia. Arms from t h i s source arrived i n 
increasing quantities i n Israel throughout the war. The Jews also 
succeeded i n smuggling a i r c r a f t out of Europe and America, obtained 
appreciable quantities, including two tanks, by corrupting B r i t i s h 
o f f i c e r s , then i n the l a s t stages of withdrawal, and intercepted at 
least one consignment due to be delivered to the Arabs. Also, 
Jewish production of small arms continued i n Palestine. The result 
was, by the end of the f i r s t truce, Is r a e l was much better equipped than on May 
14, 1948. The Arabs f a i l e d to use the truce to re-equip, as f a r 
as possible, reorganise, and plan future strategy. Instead, the 
truce revealled the Arab governments either could not or would 
not co-operate. They could not, very largely, because public 
opinion, inflamed by Government propaganda predicting an early 
v i c t o r y over I s r a e l , demanded a renewal of the war. This was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y so i n Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, This reduced th e i r room 
fo r manoeuvre. They would not co-operate because Abdullah had made 
i t clear he intended to annex eastern Palestine and recognise the 
existence of I s r a e l , while other Arab states opposed t h i s . The 
c o n f l i c t between Abdullah and the the other Arab states had a p a r t i c u l a r l y 
bad effect i n that Egyptian forces i n the south, which were not 
allowed t o co-operate with the Arab Legion, i n the centre, were 
separated by the Legion from the other Arab forces i n the north 
east and north. 
In Palestine, Count Folke Bemadotte of Sweden, former head 
of the Red Cross, who had been appointed Mediator by the Security 
Council, b u i l t up a team of observers from Swedish officers he had 
brought with him and a contingent from the Truce Commission 
countries. Of these, America was very slow at providing i t s quota. 
I t has been suggested that t h i s was due to fear of casualties which 
would have led to a demand, i n America, for direct intervention. 
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I t would have been p a r t i c u l a r l y embarrassing i f the casualties had 
been caused by Jews, as an anti-Zionist feeling might have arisen 
i n America which would make i t d i f f i c u l t to please Jewish voters 
without losing votes elsewhere. I t was also going to be d i f f i c u l t 
f o r the American Goveimaent to ignore reports of I s r a e l i violations 
of the truce, i f the reports were written by Americans. The observers 
were, of course, helpless to stop Czechoslovakian arms being unloaded 
i n the docks, before t h e i r eyes. Similarly, Irgun arms, siezed by 
the Haganah, were not handed over to the U.N. 
Since the U.N. Mediator had not been e x p l i c i t l y bound to 
follow the November 29 p a r t i t i o n plan, Bemadotte considered himself 
free to make other suggestions. Following consultations with both 
Arabs and Jews, he announced a series of proposals on June 27, 1948.(1) 
He presented these, i n person, to the Security Council, on July 3• 
He emphasised that he did not consider himself appointed to decide 
Palestine's future, but was only t r y i n g to make practical suggestions 
to solve a d i f f i c u l t problem. The Jewish state, he considered, was 
an established fact,' and capable of looking af t e r i t s e l f , but the 
rest of Palestine would be better united with Transjordan. Since the 
Jews were f i r m l y established i n two of the areas allocated to them 
(the central coastal and eastern Galilee) and were i n a strong position 
to attack western Galilee, he suggested regularising the situation 
by an exchange of Arab t e r r i t o r y . Jews should have western Galilee, 
and Arabs the Negev. This would give Israel a compact, defensible, 
area, which they already occupied, and would do a minimum of i n j u s t i c e , 
since the vast majority of Jews i n Palestine l i v e d i n those areas. 
Jerusalem, he considered^! could only be given to the Arabs, because of 
i t s i s o l a t i o n i n Arab t e r r i t o r y . He also suggested that the new Arab 
and Jewish states should form a union for economic purposes. Although 
Bernadotte does not admit to B r i t i s h and American influence i n his 
recommendations, his ideas were certainly welcome to them. Probably i t 
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was because Bernadotte's solution actually seemed viable, and Br i t a i n 
and America, by t h i s time, would have been happy to see any solution 
which brought peace i n Palestine. Bernadotte's solution, i n f a c t , 
must have been p a r t i c u l a r l y welcome to B r i t a i n , as i t was similar 
to B r i t i s h thinking on the subject since the Peel Commission. 
The F i r s t Truce f a i l e d because Arab states, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Egypt and Syria, and Iraq, were forced by the public opinion they 
had themselves created, to continue the war, and also because a truce 
at t h i s time l e f t Abdullah i n too dominant a position f o r the other 
Arab states. Bernadotte's proposal f o r an enlarged Transjordan were 
p a r t i c u l a r l y unwelcome. During the l a s t week of June, Abdullah 
explained, i n person, his plans to King Farouk of Egypt, King Saud 
of Saddi Arabia, and the Mufti, but f a i l e d to win them over. 
In f a c t , the Arab League, on July 9» 1948, announce the formation 
of an administrative council f o r Palestine, which was dominated by the 
Mufti's supporters. Since a solution had not beed reached as the end 
of the truce approached, Bemadotte appealed to Arabs and Jews to 
continue the truce, on July 3 and 5» and, on July 6, requested the 
Security Council to take further actiono The Council approved a B r i t i s h 
resolution, on t h i s subject, on July 7» and Br i t a i n put pressure on the 
Arab states to continue the truce. Abdullah was, of course, happy 
to agree, since, i f the Jewish state was r e s t r i c t e d to the t e r r i t o r y 
i t held on June 11, and the rest of Palestine had gone to Abdullah, 
he would have made a very considerable gain. B r i t a i n probably got 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Lebanon to agree also, but war was forced 
on the others by Syria and Egypt, f o r i t was impossible f o r one 
Arab country to stand aside while another engaged the enemy. I s r a e l , 
at t h i s point, was also ready to continue the truce. Considering 
I s r a e l i gains af t e r t h i s truce, Egypt and Sjrria's attack was a very 
great mistake. The end of the truce must also have been a disappointment 
to Bevin, f o r , at that point, he believed, "the Palestine question 
i s s e t t l i n g i t s e l f . " ( 1 ) 
I.Nicholson p.145 (conversition with Bevin, June 17, 1948) 
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iv)The Ten Days Campaign. July 8 to 18. 1948 
Although Is r a e l had been prepared to continue the F i r s t Truce, 
when Egypt and Syria reopened h o s t i l i t i e s , the Is r a e l i s were prepared 
to counter-attack. Egypt had no success i n the south. On the 
norther f r o n t , I s r a e l occupied almost a l l the remainder of western 
Galilee. In the east, Transjordan, now very short of ammunition, 
because of the arms embargo and the siezure of some of her supplies 
by Egyptians, withdrew from exposed positions at lydda and Rarala, and 
concentrated t h e i r forces i n Jerusalem. 
Bernadotte, on July 9, appealed to both sides for a cease-fire, 
and presented a report to the Security Council. America introduced 
a resolution on July 13, again to declare the situation a threat to 
peace under firticle 39 of the U.N. Charter. This time, only Argentina 
and China abstained, and only Syria vote against. The resolution,(1) 
therefore, was accepted. I t called f o r a permanent truce, was approved 
by the Council on July 15, accepted by Jews and Arabs, and came int o 
operation on July 18, The acceptance of the truce i l l u s t r a t e d that, 
when the Security Council worked together, as i t did on thi s 
occasion, states were reluctant to go against i t . Of course, with 
Russia voting f o r the truce, the I s r a e l i s could not be sure of Russian 
intentions, and Russian approval was needed f o r the arms from 
Czechoslovakia. Also, the I s r a e l i s were not quite ready to take over 
further large areas of Palestine, apart from western Galilee. The 
Arabsst^tes were ready to accept a truce when Jewish resistance 
to t h e i r attacks and Jewish gains forced them to realise they had 
not at that time, the strength necessary to eliminate I s r a e l . 
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v)The Second Truce and the 3?birdjRegularrS§ssion^ 
The Second Truce lasted o f f i c i a l l y from July 18, 1948, to 
the signing of armistices by each Arab state i n 1949. However, 
the truce was broken by a series of I s r a e l i attacks, which by the 
end of 1948, had vastly increased t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . During the 
Second Truce, U.N. a c t i v i t y continued i n the Security Council, 
but Palestine also appeared on the agenda of the Third Regular Session, 
but with even less effect than during the Second Special Session. 
Following the establishment of the Second Truce, Syria t r i e d to 
get Security Council approval f o r a request to the International 
Court f o r an opinion on the status of Palestine arising out of the 
end of the Mandate.(1) I t f a i l e d , due to the opposition of Russia 
and America, although supported by 6 votes, including B r i t a i n . 
On August 2, 13, 18,,and 19, the Council discussed the Palestine 
s i t u a t i o n , i n l i g h t of a series of reports from Bernadotte that the 
truce was increasingly being violated. B r i t a i n introduced a resolution 
I 
supporting Bernadotte's demand that f i v e B r i t i s h subjects, kdnapped 
from a U.N. building i n Jerusalem by the Irgun, should be returned. (2) 
B r i t a i n also raised the question of the future of Arab refugees from 
I s r a e l , whose numbers were estimated at 250,000 to 500,000. Israel 
protested at the destruction of a pumping station at Latrun, by Arab 
ir r e g u l a r s , which cut of Jewish water supplies i n Jerusalem. The 
Arabs had already refused to operate the station during the truce, 
despite Bernadotte's pleas. Russia and Israel complairjed that B r i t a i n 
had not released Jewish refugees from Cyprus. B r i t a i n replied that 
they would contribute to.«Jewish f i g h t i n g strength, thus making i t 
clear B r i t a i n did not consider that the provision i n the truce that 
immigrants were not to be trained was enforceable. On August 18, 
the Council received a report from Bernadotte, declaring that both sides 
were beginning "deliberately to ignore"the truce , and he requested 
the Council to issue a warning.(3) 
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fhe Council granted Bernadotte's request with a j o i n t 
resolution of America, B r i t a i n , France, and Canada. The f i r s t 
two paragraphs declared that each side was responsible f o r i t s 
irregular forces and had a duty to ptevent truce viol a t i o n s , and were 
supported by Russia,(1) However, on September 17, 1948, Bernadotte 
was assassinated by members of the Stern Gang, probably because both 
Stern Gang and Irgun p a r t i c u l a r l y resented his suggestion that 
Jerusalem be handed over to the Arabs, The Secretary-General ( l i e ) 
appointed Ralph Bunche as Acting ^%diator i n his place, and the 
appointment was confirmed by the Security Council, Bunche continued 
Bernadotte's work without a break. He reported that the Jewish 
authorities were negligent, and had to assume f u l l responsibility for 
the murder. On truce observance, he confirmed Bemadotte's earli e r 
reports. Observers were being refused access to some ports and 
strategic areas, movement of U.N, personnel was being deliberately 
hindered, there was a reluctance to allow observers to investigate 
violations of the truce u n t i l too long af t e r the event to obtain 
accurate information, and agreements readied between the Commission 
and the authorities were not being observed by commanders i n the 
f i e l d . F i n a l l y , neither side was w i l l i n g to give any special 
protection to U,N, s t a f f . The Truce Commission supported Bunche i n 
a separate report, declaring that there had been a propaganda campaign 
against Bunche and the Commission i n Jerusalem, directed by the Jewish 
m i l i t a r y governor, Bunche, therefore, asked f o r a Council resolution 
defining the r i g h t s and duties of a l l parties, to enable the U,N, 
authorities i n Palestine to work e f f e c t i v e l y , B r i t a i n and China 
proposed a resolution embodying Bunche's requests, Britain urged that 
there was "a threat to the foundation of the truce and to the 
authority of the Security Council." Howevery debate was interrupted 
by news of an I s r a e l i offensive i n southern Palestine. 
At the beginning of the Second Truce, on July 18, Egypt s t i l l 
held the main road between El Majdal and El Faluja, cutting o f f the 
l,S/983 
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I s r a e l i settlements i n the Negev, which Israel began to supply by 
a i r . On September 14, Bernadotte approved a scheme by which Israel could have 
used the road at certain times, under U.N, supervision, while 
a i r supplies were to be re s t r i c t e d to more remote settlements, 
again under U,N, supervision. Lack of co-operation by both sides 
prevented the plan from coming i n t o e f f e c t . Then, on October 15, 
t h e l s r a e l i s launched an attack on the road, occupied a large area 
of the Negev, including Beersheba, and isolated a large Egyptian 
force at El Faluja. The I s r a e l i success was p a r t l y due to the lack 
of co-operation between Egypt and Transjordan. Abdullah would not 
r i s k his forces to help Farouk. Despite t h i s flagrant v i o l a t i o n of 
the truce, i t appeared, fo r a time, that the Security Council would 
not so much as pass a resolution. Then Syria proposed that that 
the Council adopt a series of recommendations that had been made by 
Bunche i n an oral report, Bunche had declared that both parties 
should withdraw to positions held before the outbreak, they should 
accept U.N, proposal f o r administering the truce, and should negotiate 
with each other, either d i r e c t l y or via the U,N,, over Truce 
arrangements i n the Negev, This resolution was accepted by I s r a e l , 
subject t o each part being open to separate negotiation, which gave 
Isra e l the the opportunity to stand f i r m on any gains, and was 
approved by the Council, I s r a e l i attacks, however, continued u n t i l 
October 25, and Is r a e l then refused to give up any conquered t e r r i t o r y , 
I s r a e l also violated the truce by attacking Fawz al-Kawukji on 
October 22, who, probably because he had got himself into a dangerous 
position, obeyed the U,N, c a l l to give up gains he had made during 
the I s r a e l i offensive i n the south, but, after his withdrawal, was 
attacked by I s r a e l , and driven in t o the Lebanon, where, by October 31» 
I s r a e l had occupied 15 villages i n the south-east. 
While trouble continued i n Palestine, despite the Security 
Council, the Third Regular Session met i n Paris, Unlike the previous 
three sessions, Palestine was not the most important item on the agenda. 
Instead, i t had to compete with 72 other items, p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
control of atomic energy, the reports of the U,N, Special Commission 
on the Balkans, and the report of the Temporary Commission on Koreao 
(136) 
So great was the work load that, on November 15, 19^, an ad hoc 
committee was established to share work with the F i r s t Committee. 
Even t h i s did not enable the U.N, to complete i t s business, therefore 
i t was decided to hold a second part of the Third Regular Session 
i n A p r i l , 1949, which lasted A p i i l 5 to May 18. 
On Palestine, the main item on the agenda was the Mediator, 
Bernadotte^s, progress report, (1 ) and the Acting Mediator, Bunche's, 
special report, which was presented l a t e r i n the session.(2) In his 
report, Bernadotte further developed his ideas. He considered i t 
essential to restore peace i n Palestine, that there could be no 
question of a l t e r i n g the status of Is r a d l as an independent country, 
but i t s boundaries needed careful consideration. Boundaries had to 
be f i x e d , either by agreement between Jews and Arabs, or i f t h i s 
were not possible, by the U.N. In any case, boundaries should not 
r e s u l t i n the fragmentation of Palestine. This meant that the 
boundaries prescribed by the November 29, 1947, p a r t i t i o n resolution 
were unsuitable. Refugees ahould be allowed to return home or 
receive compensation, and Jerusalem needed special treatment. 
International guarantees were required on boundaries and human 
r i g h t s , Bernadotte suggested that the 1947 p a r t i t i o n plan be altered 
hy the exchange of western Galilee f o r the Negev, Arab Palestine 
should then be merged with Transjordan, Haifa should be a free port 
and Lydda a free a i r p o r t , Jerusalem should be international, as i n 
the p a r t i t i o n plan, U.N. help should be given to the refugees, either 
to return home or s e t t l e elswhere, and a conciliation committee should 
be set up to supervise boundaries and report threats to peace. 
B r i t a i n introduced a resolution supporting the transfer of 
the Negev to the Arabs, western Galilee to I s r a e l , and Arab Palestin 
to Transjordan.(3) MacNeil (U.K.) asserted that the f a i l u r e of Jews 
1. A/648 
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and Arabs to agree made the 1947 plan f o r p a r t i t i o n with economic 
union impractical, and therefore i t was essential to produce two 
states which could exist independently. This required boundary 
adjustment, B r i t a i n rejected completely the I s r a e l i claim that 
she should retain western Galilee by ri g h t of conquest but have 
the Negev given to her i n accordance with the 1947 U.N, rssolution, 
ibierica, however, did not endorse the Mediator's report, but 
emphasised that t e r r i t o r y awarded to Israel i n 1947 should not be 
jjaken away without her consent(1)This made i t obvious America supported 
Israel's position that what she had conquered, but which had not 
been awarded to her by the U,N, she could keep, but that which the 
the Arabs had conquered, which had been awarded to Is r a e l , should be 
handed over to I s r a e l . Soviet proposal were unconstructive, but 
indicated support f o r I s r a e l , e.g. Poland emphasised Israel's r i g h t 
to existence, but wanted the I^Iediator's conciliation committee to 
attempt to enforce the o r i g i n a l p a r t i t i o n resolution.(2) Russia 
called f o r the withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine. (3) 
Australia supported the Polish proposal.(4) Russia considered 
the Mediator's plan calculated to increase B r i t i s h and American 
power i n the Mddle East. Probably, Russia considered that the plan 
might r e s u l t i n a settlement, and any settlement was bound to reduce 
B r i t i s h and American unpopularity i n the area. In opposition to 
a l l t h i s , Syria proposed a plan for a federal state i n Palestine.(5) 
The f i n a l product of the debate was based on a B r i t i s h proposal, 
none of the other having survived. However, the B r i t i s h proposal was 
diluted by the deletion of references to Bernadotte's suggestions on 
boundaries, leaving l i t t l e more than a proposal for a conciliation 
committee and aid for refugees,(6) This was approved on December 4, 
1948, Following detailed amendments in the General Assembly, designed 
to remove phrases offensive to various delegations, a resolution 
was approved on December 11, 1948.(7) 
1, A/C.1/397 Rev.l 
2, A/C.l/400 
3, A/C,l/396 and A/c.1/396 Add,l 
4, A/C.1/SR.206 
5, A/C,l/402 
6, A/776 
7, A/P.V,186 
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The main provisions of the resolution were the establishment 
of a Palestine Conciliation Committee, which was to take over the 
duties of the Acting Mediator, and was to s t a r t work immediately, 
re|u|ees wishing to return home were to be allowed to do so, those 
who did not were to reeeive compensation, and the Commission was 
to aid them i n both cased. The Commission was to consistsof America, 
France, and Turkey. Russia attempted to weaken the Commission and 
exclude America, by proposing a commission of small powers, 
including Poland, but t h i s was rejected. (1) 
On October 20, 1948, the Social Committee heard Ralph Bunche 
explain- the Palestine refugee s i t u a t i o n . In debate, many members 
expressed the opinion that the refugees were the result of the U.N. 
p a r t i t i o n resolution, and therefore U.N. members had a responsibility 
to provide aid. The result was a recommendation, approved by the 
General Assembly, to provide 29,500,000 dollars aid to refugees, 
i n the next 9 months. 
During the Third Regular Session, the r i f t between Transjordan 
and the other Arab states, p a r t i c u l a r l y Egypt, continued to widen. • 
On September 20, 19^» the Arab League announced an Arab government 
for a l l Palestine, based on the administrative council established 
on July 9o Abdullah immediately rejected i t , and i t never exerted 
any authority outside Egyptian controlled southern Palestine. 
Abdullah followed his rejection of the Arab League's government by 
encouraging a national Palestine congress. A meeting of 5»000 
"notables" at Amman, on October 1, called on Abdullah to take Palestine 
under his protection, and, on November 28, a meeting at Jericho 
proclaimed him King of a l l Palestine. This was accepted o f f i c i a l l y 
by Abdullah, on December 7f 1948. The I s r a e l i s , therefore, could 
r e l y on Jordan not going to the aid of either the Arab armies 
i n the north or the south, unless i t was p a r t i c u l a r l y to Abdullah's 
advantage. On December 22, I s r a e l again attacked Egypt, piftning dovjn 
1.A/P.V.186 
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the main body of Egyptian troops i n the Gaza area, while further 
inland an I s r a e l i attack from the Beersheba area drove the Egj^tians 
out of Palestine, and I s r a e l i troops invaded Egypt. 
In the Security Council, a B r i t i s h resolution c a l l i n g f o r an 
immediate cease-fire, was approved on December 29, but was ignored. 
B r i t a i n , therefore, on December 31, declared that she would intervene 
against the I s r a e l i forces i n Egypt i f they were not withdrawn, 
America, now that the Presidential election was over, was prepared 
to act nore f i r m l y towards I s r a e l , threatened that i f Israel troops 
were not with drawn, American policy towards Isr a e l might have to 
be reviewed, I s r a e l , therefore, withdrew, claiming to have no forces 
withi n Egypt after January 2, although, probably, some small I s r a e l i 
forces remained u n t i l about January 7, ^9^9* The tension between 
Br i t a i n and Is r a e l was made worse by the shooting down of several 
B r i t i s h a i r c r a f t on reconnaisance, by I s r a e l , B r i t i s h support, and 
the reduction i n the American commitment to I s r a e l should have been 
to Egypt s advantage, but was not exploited because, on December 28, 
19^8, the Egyptian Prime Minister was murdered during disorders 
r e s u l t i n g from discontent at Egypt's f a i l u r e i n the war. The 
new Prime Minister informed the Acting Mediator that he was w i l l i n g 
to negotiate an armistice a f t e r a cease-fire. Fighting ended, 
therefore, i n the south, on January ?, 
On January 12, 19^9, delegations from Israel and Egypt arrived 
at the Acting Mediator's headquarters at Rhodes, Buncbe having been 
in v i t e d by the Conciliation Committee to stay at his post. I t was 
agreed to prolong the cease-fire. On January 2k, Israel agreed to 
r e l i e f medical and food supplies being sent to the garrison at Faluja, 
Ch January 30, Bunche in v i t e d the other Arab states to participate 
i n the negotiations, and, on January 30, an armistice agreement was 
signed between I s r a e l and Egypt. This agreement allowed Egypt to 
evacuate the Faluja garrison and retain a coastai, s t r i p of Palestine, 
25 miles long and 3j to 5r miles wide, including Gaza. Lebanon had 
never taken much part i n the f i g h t i n g , and quickly followed Egypt's 
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example, I s r a e l withdrew from 4 of the villages occupied i n 
Lebanon, i n October, 19^, and negotiations began on January 16, 
1949. The signing of an armistice was, howeber, delayed u n t i l 
Syria indicated willingness to negotiate, because the remaining 
villages i n Lebanon were regarded as essential defence against 
Syria, The armistice with Lebanon was, therefore, delayed u n t i l 
iferch 23, 19^9* the demarcation l i n e being agreed as the old border 
between Lebanon and Maridatory Palestine, Negotiations between Israel 
and Jordan began on I'larch 2, I949. Iraq refused to negotiate, 
but agreed to accept terms agreed between Jordan and I s r a e l , However, 
negotiations were delayed because of a disput over the Negev, Israel 
s t i l l claimed the area, and, on March 7i 19^9* sent an invasion force towards 
Aqaba, Since Iraq had already begun to withdraw her forces from 
central Palestine, Jordan forces were inadequate to oppose I s r a e l , 
therefore the Arab Legion withdrew from Palestinian t e r r i t o r y into 
Aqaba, I s r a e l i troops reached the Gulf of Aqaba on March 10, Bunche 
arranged an end to the f i g h t i n g on '^•^ rch 11, and, on March 13» 
B r i t i s h forces i n Aqaba, under treaty with Transjordan, were increased 
to brigade strength. This prevented any p o s s i b i l i t y of Israel 
invading Jordan. In Central Palestine, however, I s r a e l , at a secret 
meeting with Abdullah, gave an ultimatum that Jordan should withdraw 
several mile along the f r o n t previously held by Iraq, or war would 
begin again. This was to relieve the constriction i n Israel's centre, 
Abdullah agreed, and an armistice was signed on A p r i l 3» Negotiations 
with Syria were delayed by a coup d'etat i n Syria, on March 30, 19^9. 
Negotiations began on A p r i l 12, and, after an agreement to demilitarise 
I^ike Hula, an armistice was signed on July 20, 19^9» 
(1^*1) 
vi)The Admission of I s r a e l to the IMited Nations, 
Israel's application f o r admission to the U,N, f i r s t came before 
the Secuiity Council on December 2 , 19^, B r i t a i n proposed that 
consideration of the application be postponed, because Israel had not 
yet implemented Security Council resolutions on Palestine, However, 
B r i t a i n was defeated, only being supported by Belgium, China, and 
Syria. Then France proposed a postponement of one month. This was 
rejected, only being supported by B r i t a i n , Belgium, China, Syria, 
and Canada, Next, Syria proposed that the application should not 
be considered u n t i l the whole Palestine Question had been examined by 
the International Court, However, Syria was only supported by Belgium, 
Israel's application was, therefore, considered by the Council, and 
received strong support i n debate from America and Russia, However, 
when i t was voted i t received only the votes of Argentina, Colombia, 
Ukraine, Russia, and Merica; Syria voted against; Belgium, China, 
France, and B r i t a i n abstained,(1) On March 3 , 19^9, the Council 
again considered the application, B r i t a i n declared that she would 
abstain, unless I s r a e l promised not to oppose the return of refugees 
and the internationalisation of Jerusalem, Since Is r a e l refused, 
B r i t a i n d4>d abstain. However, at the vote on March there was 
no other abstention, and only only Egypt voted against. The Council, 
therefore, recommended Israel's admission to the U.N, 
In the second part of the Third Regular Session, i n A p r i l 
and May, 1 9 ^ 9 * Israel's application was refered to the Ad Hoc 
P o l i t i c a l Committee, i n which i t was debated from May 3 to May 9. 
After a b i t t e r debate, i n which accusationssand counter accusations 
were hurled, conseming refugees, the internationalisation of 
Jerusalem, Bernadotte's murder, and the a t r o c i t i e s of both sides i n 
the Arab-Israeli war, a j o i n t resolution of Australia, Canada, 
Guatemala, H a i t i , Panama, America, and Uruguay was passed, by 
3 3 votes to 1 1 , with 13 abstentions, recommending to the General 
Assembly that I s r a e l be admitted. Following a similar debate 
i n the General Assembly, I s r a e l was, f i n a l l y , admitted to the U,N, 
by 3 7 votes to 1 2 , with 9 abstentions,(2) 
l.S/P.V.386 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
The object of t h i s thesis has been to estimate the effect 
the existence of the U.N. had upon the events i n Palestine, 
1 9 4 ? - 9 . To make conclusions on t h i s , i t i s necessary, by examining 
the d i r e c t i o n of events early i n 1 9 ^ 7 , to make some estimate of 
how the sit u a t i o n was evolving, how i t might have developed without 
the U.N., and to compare i t with what i n fact happened after the 
U.N. became involved. 
In early 1 9 ^ 7 , i t was becoming obvious to a l l statesmen 
interested i n the Palestine problem, that the only peaceful solution 
would be by p a r t i t i o n . Peel had suggested t h i s i n 1 9 3 7 * Gradually, 
the Jewish Agency leaders, led by Weizmann, had come to accept i t . 
In Transjordan, Abdullah was w i l l i n g to accept that some special 
provision would have to be made f o r the Jews, Although i n t h e i r 
public declarations, other Arab statesmen had been adamant i n 
reje c t i n g p a r t i t i o n , i t i s not unreasonable to assume that they 
might have accepted p a r t i t i o n eventually, provided that the p a r t i t i o n 
plan was not too obviously unjust and was backed by a force 
s u f f i c i e n t l y overwhelming f o r them to be able to explain to t h e i r 
people t h a t , although they were j u s t as fi r m as ever against p a r t i t i o n , 
i t Mas impossible to do anything about i t . Overwhelming force 
was an essential proviso. After so many affirmations of opposition 
to p a r t i t i o n , no Arab ru l e r or government, except Abdullah, could 
compromise with p a r t i t i o n and survive. The rea l question, therefore, 
was what should be the boundaries of the Arab and Jewish states, 
and who should provide the necessary force. 
In 1 9 ^ 7 and 1 9 ^ , events demonstrate that the implementing 
authority would have had to be B r i t a i n , f o r America was steadfast 
against involving American troops, neither America nor Brit a i n would 
have allowed Russia to i n t e r f e r e , and other countries repeatedly 
demonstrated they were determined not to get involved i n Palestine. 
(143) 
B r i t a i n , however, had a par t i c u l a r interest i n maintaining good 
relations with the Arab states, therefore any plan which Britain 
would be w i l l i n g to enforce would have to be as acceptable as 
possible to the Arab states. Any plan, therefore, would have been 
lar g e l y a product of B r i t a i n with t h i s i n mind. Certainly, other 
countries would have attempted to apply pressure on B r i t a i n , and 
ce r t a i n l y the effective diplomacy of the Zionists during the 
Second Regular Session would also have been applied here. However, 
i n t h i s case, i t would have been very d i f f i c u l t f o r Truman to 
apply pressure to B r i t a i n to produce a settlement very favourable 
to the Jews, B r i t a i n would simply have had to ask America for 
help and Truman would have found i t necessary to explain either 
why the problem was too d i f f i c u l t f o r America, which would have 
completely j u s t i f i e d the B r i t i s h position, or why America did not 
sort out the whole thing f o r the B r i t i s h , which was what Truman's 
m i l i t a r y advisers would have been completely against. Truman, 
with the presidential election i n mind, would certainly not have 
put himself i n a position of having to refuse a Jewish backed 
demand f o r intervention i n Palestine. 
Assuming, therefore, that, i n the absence of the U.N., Bri t a i n 
would have been l e f t almost alone to produce a solution, i t i s also 
reasonable to assume that B r i t a i n would have made an attempt to 
produce a viable solution. The alternative of withdrav/al without 
a solution would have never been contemplated by B r i t i s h statesmen, 
as the example of India, i n 19^7, demonstrates. This i s not to 
say B r i t i s h statesmen would have been happy with the solution, but 
they would have had to produce the best possible i n the circumstances 
and make i t work. However, i t seems quite l i k e l y that B r i t i s h 
statemen had i n mind a not too unsatisfactory solution, although, 
as Cunningham pointed out to Uhscop, they could not sati s f y everybody. 
A Jewish state would have been established most easily i n those 
areas where the Jews were a majority. This, of course, would not 
have produced a viable state, but i t i s inconceivable that B r i t a i n 
would have made Uhscop's mistake of assuming an economic union of 
Arab and Jewish states would work. Therefore, B r i t a i n would have 
had to add to the Jewish state s u f f i c i e n t t e r r i t o r y to make i t 
viable and defen|ible. 
In these circumstances the choice of boundaries i s l i m i t t e d . 
Taking the Ihscop di v i s i o n of Palestine as a st a r t i n g point, only 
the central Jewish area had a Jewish majority, and Jews only 
i n eastern Galilee were -bhey even a large minority. Eastern Galilee 
would have had to be included i n the Jevrish state, however, to make i t 
economically viable. This Jewish state would have been too 
fragmented to be defenSible, therefore the obvious course would have 
been to include western Galilee, which had only a very small 
Jewish minority, thus producing a solution which was proposed by 
Bemadotte i n 19^ •> I t cannot be denied that t h i s plan would have 
produced a Jewish state with i n i t i a l l y an Arab majority ( 5 l 6 , 7 6 0 to 
501,040) but i n the Unscop plan the Jews only had a majority i f 
1 0 5 , 0 0 0 Bedouin were neglected. Also, i n a Bemaddttestype solution, 
a greater number of Jews would be i n the Jewish state than i n 
Uhscop's plan ( 5 0 1 j 9 4 0 instead of 499,020). Jewish immigration 
would quickly have provided a Jewish majority, and t h i s could have been 
permitted before the state was establishedo(l) 
A p a r t i t i o n plan l i k e t h i s would have had certain special 
advantages f o r B r i t a i n , I t was not necessary to provide a viable 
Arab state from the rest of Palestine, because Transjordan had once 
been part of Palestine and could be reunited with the Arab area. 
This would probably have suited B r i t a i n very w e l l , for Abdullah was 
the only Arab leader both to place a real value on association with 
B r i t a i n and to take a r e a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e towards the "^ ews, Abdullah 
might well have accepted a Jewish state i n part of Palestine and 
a continued B r i t i s h presence i n the rest i f the rest were given to him~ 
as a great extension to his Kingdom, Jerusalem alone might have been 
enough to decide him, B r i t a i n would, therefore, no longer have had 
to r e l y on bases i n Egypt which were considered, r i g h t l y , insecure 
i n the long terra, and the Mu f t i , who was no f r i e n d of B r i t a i n , would 
have had no influence i n Palestine, 
l , A p p , I I I contains Unscop's figures f o r the populations of the 
areas i n the Unscop plan. 
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This should have produced a peaceful solution. Arab states 
would have denounced the new state of I s r a e l , but would have done 
nothing because i t would be obvious to t h e i r people that they could 
do nothing. There would c e r t a i n l y not have been the sense of shame 
f e l t by the Arabs a f t e r t h e i r defeat i n the Arab-Israeli War i n 
1 9 ^ 8 , which has made settlement of the problem very d i f f i c u l t . 
I s r a e l would, i n fa c t have been quite safe. Egypt could not have 
harmed I s r a e l without passing through the enlarged Transjordan, 
which Abdullah c e r t a i n l y would not have allowed. With Egypt therefore, 
there could not even have been f r o n t i e r incidents. Egypt would 
not even have been able to put pressure on Abdullah as long as 
B r i t a i n was his a l l y and B r i t i s h bases were maintained i n Arab 
Palestine, Lebanon never was enthusiastic about the use of armed 
force against I s r a e l , even i n 1 9 ^ 8 , therefore l i t t l e trouble would 
have been expected there. Syria, with the only other f r o n t i e r to 
Is r a e l would not have acted alone. Also, i n these circumstances, 
there would have been less pressure within the Arab states for an 
attack on I s r a e l , f o r there would have been no refugee problem. 
In 1 9 ^ » Jewish a t r o c i t i e s against Arabs, which resulted i n the 
Arab exodus, were excused by ASab a t r o c i t i e s against Jevjs. However, 
a settlement imposed peacefully by B r i t a i n would have given the Jews 
no excuse f o r putting d i r e c t pressure on the Arabs to leave. Any 
t e r r o r i s t action, or r a c i a l i s t laws even, would have l o s t I s r a e l 
World sympathy and could have given B r i t a i n an excuse for punitive 
measures, l i k e reducing Israel's t e r r i t o r y , which might have redeemed 
B r i t a i n a l i t t l e i n Arab eyes. 
Such a solution would s t i l l have undermined Britain's 
position i n the I-Uddle East, although secure bases i n Palestine 
would have been some compensation. However, i t i s reasonable to 
suppose tha t , to B r i t i s h statesmen, a solution l i k e t h i s was the 
best t o be hoped f o r . I t i s unlikely that they expected the U.N, 
to f i n d a d i f f e r e n t solution, but the existence of the U.N. gave 
B r i t a i n the opportunity to t r y to spread responsibility for 
the settlement i n Palestine, and to di v e r t some Arab wrath and 
also most l i k e l y some Jewish wrath onto others. B r i t a i n probably 
hoped f o r the U.N, to endorse a B r i t i s h solution. Doubtless, events 
i n 19^7-^8 did not follow the course predicted i n London. 
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Once the Palestine Question was i n the hands of the U.N., 
i t wa& removed from B r i t i s h control, and given over to countries 
which had l i t t l e knowledge or interest i n Palestine. " The Apab 
^ - s t a * e ^ The Arab states gained nothing, because they could not avoid 
i n the public debates i n the U.N. pressing f o r the complete 
rejec t i o n of p a r t i t i o n and refusal to make any concession whatever, 
i n conformity with the policy they had declared to t h e i r peoples. 
The only Arab state which might have taken a more reasonable 
a t t i t u d e was Jordan, but she was not a U.N, member. This made i t 
obvious to U,N. members that i t was no use t r y i n g to produce a 
solution to s a t i s f y the Arabs, therefore, i n the U,N,, less e f f o r t 
was put in t o t r y i n g to modify U.N. plans i n Arab favour than would 
have been the case i f the Arabs had given even a hint of willingness 
to compromise. Also, i t made the Arab states appear unreasonable 
to the V/orld at large, and therefore made Zionist pressure more 
e f f e c t i v e . Once the Arabs were forced to realise that the U.N. 
was going to recommend a solution completely contrary to Arab 
wishes, the Arabs were so f a r committed to oppose p a r t i t i o n , even 
by force, that they could not avoid going to war as soon as Br i t a i n 
declared the Mandate ended, and forced them to continue the war 
to t h e i r own disadvantage when the F i r s t Truce and Bernadotte's plans 
were about to give them the best possible terms they could have 
hoped f o r . The Arab states only stopped f i g h t i n g when th e i r 
f a i l u r e against I s r a e l could no longer be concealed from t h e i r public. 
Governments f e l l and armistices were signed, but only after the 
Arabs had l o s t f a r more than they could have gained months before 
by negotiation. 
For the Jews, reference to the U.N, was a gpeat opportunity. 
Jewish representatives at the U,N. could pose as national representatives. 
Jewish pressure could sway the votes of those disinterested i n 
Palestine. P a r t i c u l a r l y important was the Jewish pressure on the 
American President as the presidential election began to dominate 
American p o l i t i c s . In t h i s case, the Jews had a special advantage 
i n the great personal influence Weizmann was able to exert over 
Truman. Jews did not suffer i n the U.N. from the Arab weakness of 
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having committed themselves so f a r they could not compromise. 
Also, the average Zionist was w i l l i n g to t r u s t his leadership to 
a f a r greater extent than the Arab public. This made i t possible 
for the Jews to accept the Unscop plan although the i n s t i n c t i v e 
reaction of Jews i n general was, at f i r s t , complete rejection. 
Further, since most western statesmen, who formed a majority i n the 
U,N,, believed p a r t i t i o n was the only possible solution, once the 
Jewish Agency had accepted p a r t i t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e , while the Arabs 
rejected i t completely, the Jews became the only party i n the 
dispute with whom agreement was possible. This gave JJW, members 
the choice of recommending a solution acceptable to the Jews or 
acceptable to nobody. Naturally, the Jewish Agency exploited t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n by going to the l i m i t of what the U.N, would give to the 
Jews. In f a c t , a solution which gave the Jews a state i n the 
richest part of Palestine, with a population 50/* Arab, and which 
dominated s t r a t e g i c a l l y and economically an Arab state almost lOOjJ 
Arab, could hardly have been more to the Jewish advantage i f 
dictated by the Agency i t s e l f , for i t gave a minority an effective 
control over a majority, while preserving a superficial impression 
of democracy. I t can be argued, i n f a c t , that the Jews went too 
far i n exploiting t h e i r advantages i n the U.N., for the adoption of 
the Uhscop plan, on November 2 9 1 9 ^ 7 , led to a war which the Jewish 
Agency did not want, and, i f the Arab-Israeli War of 1 9 ^ i s regarded 
as a tragedy f o r the Jews, then the Agency went too far i n 
exploiting t h e i r advantage» 
The Unscop plan put B r i t a i n i n a very d i f f i c u l t position. 
I t could not be enforced, except at very great cost i n both the 
material sense and i n Britain's standing with the Arab states. Under 
these circumstances i t was perfect l y reasonable f o r B r i t a i n to warn 
the U.N. she might not enforce a U.N. plan. Of course, Britain's 
declaration that she was leaving Palestine and that she would not 
enforce any plan to which bothsArabs and Jews did not agree was not 
to be taken 100^ seriously, but the common mistake i n the U.N. was 
to ignore the B r i t i s h declaration altogether. What should have been 
realised was that no co-operation whatsoever could be expected i n a 
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plan which ignored Arab interests, but there might have been some 
co-operation viith a plan to which both sides did not agree, i.e. 
a modification of Unscop i n the Arab interest. As already described, 
such a modification might have preserved peace, and t h i s was apparent 
to disinterested observers l i k e Bernadotte i n 1 9 4 8 . However, i n the 
U.N., great issues i n Palestine were far less important to most U.N. 
delegates than the least issues concerning t h e i r ox-m countries, therefore 
Jewish votes and influence throughout the World counted f o r more 
than the merits of Unscop's plan, and once Jewish influence i n 
America had put the U.S.A. f i r m l y behiijd p a r t i t i o n and Russia had 
followed s u i t , to go against the p a r t i t i o n plan was to r i s k the 
disfavour of the VJbrld's two greatest powers. In these circumstances 
i t i s surprising so many delegations abstained. Once the U.N. had 
adopted the Uhscop plan, almost unmodified, B r i t a i n had no choice but 
to refuse complete co-operation and to withdraw as threatened. By 
November 2 9 , 1 9 4 7 , the decision to leave Palestine could not have 
been reversed, f o r f i n a n c i a l and p o l i t i c a l reasons, unless the U.N. 
had produced a pr a c t i c a l solution, enforcible at l i t t l e cost, which 
the p a r t i t i o n plan was neither. I f B r i t a i n had co-operated i n any 
way then there would have been a considerable r i s k that B r i t a i n would 
become so involved that the withdrawal would have to be halted, e.g. 
to protect U.N. s t a f f . The attitu d e of many delegations i n the U.N. 
during the Second Regular Session suggests that some at least assumed 
t h i s would happen. Another important consideration was, i f Br i t a i n 
expected to be taken seriously i n the World councils i n the future, 
she had to carry out her threat. 
While i t i s possible to suggest that the Agency might have been 
too successful, i t i s impossible to f i n d any success at the U,N, 
fo r the Arabs. An examination of t h e i r record there i l l u s t r a t e s 
how disastrous the reference t o the U.N. was f o r them. Being 
completely unable to move from t o t a l opposition to p a r t i t i o n made 
them throw away very many opportunites to destroy the Agency's 
hopes. I n f a c t , i t reasonably can be concluded that kr^b disadvantages 
were at least as important as Jewish diplomatic s k i l l i n ensuring 
Jewish success at the U.N. and eventually i n securing a much larger 
state of I s r a e l than they would otherwise. I t was certainly a 
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t a c t i c a l mistake to oppose the establishment of Uhscop. Once a 
majority had agreed to a special session i t should have been obvious 
that a majority agreed with the purpose of the session, i . e . to 
establish a special committee on Palestine, The Arab states should, 
therefore, have concentrated on improving Unscop's terms of reference. 
In t h i s they might have had some success, f o r America was several 
times put i n embarrassing positions, but only by- Asaf A l i (India) 
who proved the Arabs' best f r i e n d , and not by the Arabs themselves. 
At the very best, the Arab f a i l u r e at the F i r s t Special Session 
made the 'irabs appear to be people who pursued l o s t causes and whose, 
words, therefore, could be disregarded. The Arab Higher Committee 
boycott was a mistake. With the best w i l l i n the World, i t would 
be very d i f f i c u l t f o r any committee, opposed with open h o s t i l i t y 
on one hand and welcomed with open arms on the other, to remain 
completely imp a r t i a l . Even i f the Higher Committee persisted i n 
reje c t i n g p a r t i t i o n , i t should have welcomed Uhscop as warmly as 
the Jews, and prevented the Jews presenting a misleading picture of 
Arab backwardness and the Jews' supreme contribution ^a''economically 
and c u l t u r a l l y i n Palestine. The Arab states appreciated the Higher 
Committee's mistake, but t h e i r meeting with Uhscop i n Beirut, e n t i r e l y 
unconstructive, and i n some xrays i n s u l t i n g , was not calculated to 
change Uhscop's minds. In the Second Regular Session, the Arabs 
wasted time producing a plan f o r a unitary state, based neither on 
Uhscop's majority or minority plans, and therefore doomed to f a i l u r e . 
I f the Arabs had been able to concentrate on suggesting reasonable 
modifications to the Onscop plan, which would have been quite easy, 
they could have rendered i t unacceptable to the Jewish Agency, and 
therefore made the Agency appear unreasonable, while the Arabs 
were making enormous concessions. A r i v a l Arab plan, based on the 
majority plan, but modified i n Arab favour, could easily have drawn 
enough votes from the p a r t i t i o n plan to ensure i t s f a i l u r e . An 
amendment even, proposed about November 2 7 , that the Negev should 
be subtracted from the Jewish state, with a hi n t , hox^ever, insincere 
at possible Arab co-operation i n return, would certainly have succeeded. 
I f the Arabs had f r e e l y offered co-operation on these terms the Jewish 
Agency would hardly have been able to object, and Br i t a i n could not 
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have avoided keeping her word to implement a plan to which both 
sides agreed. Certainly Jewish objections to losing the Negev would 
have been d i f f i c u l t to sustain, since the Negev contained a 
populationlless than l$o Jewish. On a purely p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , 
the Agency would probablj'- have calculated that, while t h e i r supporters 
might have mustered enough voted to defeat the Arab amendment, 
the plan might then have become unacceptable to the very few members 
whose votes were needed f o r a 2 / 3 majority. However, the Arabs 
were too f i r m l y committed against p a r t i t i o n to contemplate, i n the 
public arena of the U.N, any such action. They therefore continued 
t h e i r course to war, defeat, and the loss of most of Palestine. 
The American and Russian part deserved special mention. Since 
the Russians considered t h e i r interest would be served by a B r i t i s h 
withdrawal from Palestine, the Russians were ready to support any plan 
which seemed l i k e l y to ensure t h i s . They therefore were careful not 
to commit themselves u n t i l they were absolutely sure of t h e i r ground. 
The Americans, however, were too much influenced by internal p o l i t i c s . 
Since the State Department was continually against the Unscop p a r t i t i o n 
plan, i t i s only f a i r to conclude that America supported the p a r t i t i o n 
plan to s u i t i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s and either were ignorant or chose 
to ignore the probable consequences i n Palestine and throughout the 
Middle East, This makes due allowance f o r Truman's personal 
concern f o r his election prospects and f o r Weizmann's inflaence. 
Once America was committed to the p a r t i t i o n plan, the Russian 
course was obvious. The B r i t i s h declaration that she would withdraw 
i f the plan were adopted must have at f i r s t indicated to the Russians 
that Britain's a l l y , America, would not support the p a r t i t i o n plan. 
Once America supported i t , there was a real p o s s i b i l i t y of success 
given Russian help, therefore Russia supported p a r t i t i o n a f t e r •"merica 
had declared her support. The Russians must have been most pleased 
at America playing i n t o t h e i r hands. The existence of the U.N., 
therefore, made i t possible f o r American in t e r n a l p o l i t i c s to play 
a much larger part i n Palestine than otherwise, and allowed Russia 
to exploit the s i t u a t i o n . 
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In conclusion, therefore, the existence of the U,N, resulted 
i n the introduction into the Palestine Problem of a large number 
of irresponsible parties, or parties with other interests'Jin Palestine 
than a solution of the Problem i n the best interests of Palestine's 
inhabitants. To produce a viable solution would have been possible 
though not easy i n early 1 9 4 7 , and i t would have been implemented 
by B r i t a i n , The U.N., however, produced a solution which ^ i t a i n 
could not implement except at i n t o l f e r a b l e cost, and which no other 
state, not even those who had voted for the U.N. solution, were 
w i l l i n g to implement themselves. In the end, therefore, the solution, 
such as i t was, was supplied by war, and even that l e f t a host of 
problems f o r the future. 
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APPENPn I 
The Terms of Reference of the United Nations Special Committee 
on P a l e s t i n e . ( 1 ) 
WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United ifations has been 
called i n t o special session f o r the purpose of constituting and 
in s t r u c t i n g a Special Committee to prepare f o r the consideration 
at the next regular session of the Assembly a report on the 
question of Palestine, 
The General Assembly 
RESOLVES th a t : 
1 . A Special Committee be created f o r the above mentioned 
purpose consisting of the representatives of Australia, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, 
Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia; 
2 . The Special Committee s h a l l have the widest powers to 
ascertain and record facts, and to investigate a l l questions 
and issues relevant t o the problem of Palestine; 
3 o The Special Committee sh a l l determine i t s own procedure; 
4 . The Special Committee s h a l l conduct investigations i n 
Palestine and wherever i t may deem useful, receive and 
examine wr i t t e n or oral testimony, whichever i t may consider 
appropriate i n each case, from the mandatory Power, from 
representatives of the population of Palestine, from 
Governments and from such organisations and individuals 
as i t may deem necessary; 
5 . The Special Committee sh a l l give most careful consideration 
to the religious interests i n Palestine of Islam, 
Judaism and Ch r i s t i a n i t y ; 
6 . The Special Committee sh a l l prepare a report to the General 
Assembly and s h a l l submit such proposals as i t may consider 
appropriate f o r the solution of the problem of Palestine; 
7 . The Special Committee's report s h a l l be communicated to the 
Secretary-General not l a t e r than 1 September 1 9 4 7 , i n order 
that i t may be circulated to the Members of the United Nations 
i n time f o r consideration by the Second Regular Session of 
the General Assembly; 
1.A/309 (Resolution of the General Assembly, May 2 3 , 1 9 4 7 . Paragraphs 
8 and 9 authorised the Secretary-General to make appropriate 
arrangements) 
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APPENDIX I I 
The Unscop Plan f o r P a r t i t i o n with Economic Union, as Amended 
i n the Second Regular Session, 
1 , W,Galilee 
2, E.Galilee 
3, Plains of Sharon and Esdraelon 
4 , Jaffa 
5 , Jerusalem 
6,Samaria and Judea 
7 . Gaza 
8, Negev 
Mediterranean and Red Sea Coast 
Land f r o n t i e r s of Mandatory Palestine and the coasts of 
Lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea 
'*==^ =^  U.N. p a r t i t i o n boundaries 
I i Arab state 
\' y Jewish state 
Jerusalem 
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APPEI^DK m 
Populations of the Individual Sectors of the Unscop P a r t i t i o n Plan 
as Amended i n Subcommittee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Palestinian Question, but vathout Later Amendments Transfering^ 
Jaffa and Beersheba to the Arab State, 
v;. Galilee 
Samaria and Judea 
Gaza 
Total 
Arab State 
Arabs(1) 
123,800 
^ 5 , 3 5 0 
1 1 7 , 8 6 0 
+ 2 2 . 0 0 0 Bedouin (approx,, 
7 4 9 , 0 1 0 9 , 5 2 0 
E, Galilee 
Plains of Sharon 
and Esdraelon 
Negev 
Total 
Jewish State 
8 6 , 2 0 0 28,750 
3 0 6 , 7 6 0 4 6 9 , 2 5 0 
103,820 1,020 
+105.000 Bedouin (approx,j 
6 0 1 , 7 8 0 4 9 9 , 0 2 0 
Jerusalem 
1 0 5 , 5 4 0 9 9 , 6 9 0 
loIncluded under Arab are a l l those inhabitants of Palestine 
who were not Jews, There were about 1 , 0 7 6 , 7 8 0 Moslem Arabs, 
1 4 5 , 0 6 0 Christian Arabs, and about 1 5 , 4 9 0 of other sects. 
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NOTE ON SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
The main source f o r t h i s thesis i s the o f f i c i a l records of 
the U.No However, by themselves, they often present a very misleading 
picture, declarations often being made purely f o r propaganda value. 
David Horowitz and Jorge Garcia Granados were active participants i n 
the U.N. from F i r s t to Second Special Sessions, Horowitz's account, 
although i t contributes much d e t a i l , i s often reticent on the aims 
of Jewish policy. Granados writes very f r e e l y , but was distrusted 
f o r his fanaticism, and even the Jews v/hom he supported thought he 
indulged i n wi l d ideas. The most detailed accounts are of Weizmann's 
a c t i v i t i e s , by himself, his wife Vera, and by his colleagues Weisgal 
and Eban (Eban's diary i s quoted i n Meisgal and Carmichael). These 
can be supplemented by Truman. American policy appears clearly 
i n Forrestal's Diaries (his biographer, Rogow, i s most useful) and 
Welles. There are no r e a l l y useful books from B r i t a i n , and nothing 
useful i n Biglish from the Arabs (Henry Cattan, who represented the 
Arab Higher Committee during the F i r s t Special Session, confines 
himself to legal points), and nothing from Russia. The general works 
I have found most useful have been by Hurewitz, Kirk, • Monroe, and 
Sykes. 
Documents 
U.N. documents can be found i n the United Nations Guide to O f f i c i a l 
Records, 19^-1962 (U.N. I963) This includes documents before 19^. 
Bound volumes have been published of verbatim or summary records of 
a l l the General Assembly and Main Committee meetings, plus important 
documents (reports of committees, proposals, resolutions etc.) i n 
annexes or supplementso 
Other useful documents can be found i n "The Arab States and the Arab 
League, a Documentary Record," by Muhammad K h a l i l 
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